Power-Sharing in Bosnia-Herzegovina*
Strengthening Implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord and Lessons for Conflict Management
Aims
This project aims to consolidate implementation practice in Bosnia and Herzegovina in view of the dispersed nature of its governance. Consequently, it undertakes to comprehensively examine key areas of public administration across different layers of public authority. This survey will likewise include an overview of existing national and international initiatives aimed at strengthening the implementation of the particular areas of governance.
The aim of this comprehensive review will be to evaluate the effectiveness of existing power-sharing structures and implementation mechanisms in Bosnia. It will furthermore identify best practices. The project will draft policy recommendations to amend weaknesses of current practice and create tools for the reproduction of best practices. It endeavours to establish a greater sense of ownership of the Dayton political and administrative structures in the territory.
Relevance
Bosnia is the first case of long-term international institution-building in a post-conflict setting in Europe. More than five years after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA), some aspects of power-sharing and institution-building have been successfully implemented, while other elements remain weak. On the one hand, the mechanisms established, in combination with the substantial presence of international security forces and international implementing agencies, have succeeded in maintaining peace in Bosnia. The established institutions do permit the functioning of Bosnia as a state. Nevertheless, the implementation of the power-sharing structures remains mixed.
For one, the complexity of the institutional set-up has delayed progress in numerous areas of the peace accords. Both the structure of the permanent institutional mechanisms-more complex than other systems governing post-conflict countries and multi-ethnic settings-and the sheer number of the agencies implementing the accords, contribute to the intricacy of the arrangements. This complexity, in turn, diminishes public understanding of the issues and hampers participation in issue-based politics, contributing to the continued success of "ethnic politics."
In addition, the functioning of the power-sharing arrangement in Bosnia has been prone to obstruction by individuals and parties on the level of the joint state, the entities, and on the level of cantonal and municipal government. In some cases, parties unwilling to compromise stall and block the decision-making in relevant power-sharing institutions. In other cases, instead of seeking to resolve their demands within the existing structures, parties have unilaterally withdrawn or threatened to opt out of power-sharing mechanisms. In sum, the joint institutions of the Bosnian State have not been rendered fully functional.
There has been occasional criticism of the power-sharing structures from local political parties. Furthermore, there have been efforts by the international community to assess the overall progress in the implementation of the DPA, for example in the form of regular reviews of the Peace Implementation Council, and analyses of select specific aspects of implementation mechanisms (e.g. refugee returns studies compiled by the International Crisis Group). Nevertheless, no comprehensive evaluation-in both detail and scope-of the implementation of the Accords has taken place to date.
In addition to the apparent need to evaluate the effectiveness of one of Europe's greatest investments in state-building, the new political realities in Southeastern Europe, and the international community's changing policy toward the region, demand that the functioning of the power-sharing system in place in Bosnia be comprehensively examined. The current level of international involvement in the implementation of the DPA cannot be sustained indefinitely. The development of fully democratic and functional institutions and the economic reconstruction of Bosnia, therefore, cannot rely solely on the continued engagement of the international community, but rather requires a working power-sharing arrangement at the level of domestic institutions that is sustained through domestic support.
The challenge in Bosnia is to identify successful existing mechanisms of power-sharing within the current institutional set-up and to explore tools to improve the dysfunctional power-sharing mechanisms within the existing framework. This requires identifying the needs for legal protection and political guarantees for all national communities in Bosnia, and juxtaposing this with the power-sharing framework. In doing so, there is also a need to differentiate legitimate political demands within the power-sharing system from obstruction of the system itself.
In addition to this analytical task, it is important to promote public involvement in the political process that will extend beyond a fairly narrowly circumscribed political class. A more active civil society involvement in state-building needs to be encouraged.
Project Activities
The project commenced with a two-and-a-half day Workshop held on 13-15 July 2001, and will continue over a period of 24 months (see ECMI Report # 12).
The project activities revolve around a series of interlinked events and outputs, consisting of regular Working Groups and Workshops as well as the production of Research Reports. The Working Groups constitute the backbone of the project's activities, their primary purpose being to guide the substantive development of the project. Each Working Group will address one of the areas under investigation and will consist of approximately ten representatives of the main target groups. There will be three meetings of the Working Groups as well as informal meetings and communications between its members and the researchers. At times, membership of the Working Groups will be expanded to about 25, in order to achieve a wider input into their work.
The participants of the Working Groups and Workshops will then come together in a final conference in order to present the findings of their efforts. In addition to presenting the project's findings, the conference will also include representatives involved in training programmes pertaining to the different areas of governance addressed in the project. In this way, the conference will also initiate a discussion on implementing the project recommendations through the establishment of targeted training programmes.
Links with other Institutions
The first workshop was carried out with the participation of the High Representative's Office and with representation from the OSCE. In addition, the project will build synergy with other initiatives, by identifying best practices and strategies for enhancing the existing power-sharing mechanisms.
Funding Details
An application for funding is under review. ECMI is launching this project from its own resources pending confirmation of external funding.
Project Personnel
The following members of ECMI staff are involved in the project:
Marc Weller, ECMI Director, Project Leader
Graham Holliday, ECMI Research Associate, Project Coordinator
Valery Perry, ECMI Regional Representative, Sarajevo, Project
Implementation
ECMI Report #12
ECMI Report #24 + 25
ECMI Report #29
ECMI Report #32
ECMI Report #36
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