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Calling the Big Brother: Turkish Cypriot Vulnerability and the Geopolitics of Kin-State Intervention

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Abstract

This article explores the development of minority and kin-state relations during times of conflict and transition, focusing on the interaction between the Turkish Cypriot ethnic minority and its kin-state Turkey from 1950 to 1974. The study challenges common perceptions that small and vulnerable minorities lack autonomous and effective agency and illustrates the significance of geopolitical drives for kin-state support. The Turkish Cypriot mobilization in the period under investigation provides proof of the effectiveness of minorities mobilizing kin-state support as a means of empowering their domestic security status. The study shows that an accurate grasp of geopolitical correlations, combined with goal-persistence and the willingness to co-opt, have assisted the Turkish Cypriot minority's bid to entangle Turkey's geostrategic interests in Cyprus. Essentially, the coupling of Turkish Cypriot calls for protection with Turkey's broader geostrategic objectives, motivated a relationship of mutual strategic empowerment for the weak ethnic minority and its powerful kin-state. Yet the long-term incongruity of security objectives has significantly reduced the minority's autonomous agency, inaugurating a new chapter of vulnerability.

Keywords: *Cyprus; Turkey; state intervention; security; conflict; minority politics; vulnerability*

Introduction

The present study examines the strategic interaction between the Turkish Cypriot minority and its kin-state Turkey in their effort to devise a political and military response against the island's Greek Cypriot majority demands from 1950 to 1974. The primary objective of this study is to reveal and better understand the capacity and limitations of minorities to affect and mobilize kin-state policies by focusing exactly on the less-studied yet more intriguing aspect of minority agency during times of conflict (Jenne, Saideman, & Lowe, 2007; Birnir & Jenne, 2008; Fedotov, 2017). The original idea stems from the standardized notion that minority groups possess fewer means and resources due to their inherent inferiority and are often faced with structural limitations that altogether prevent them from decisively pursuing their distinct security interests. In much of contemporary literature, ethnic minorities appear to be seen as inherently weak, powerless, and unavoidably subordinate to majorities (Agamben, 1995; Boulden & Kymlicka, 2015; Benhabib, 2004; Pentassuglia, 2009; Skrentny, 2009; Uzonyi & Demir, 2020). However, being an ethnic minority is not always synonymous with being weak, agency-less and ineffective. In principle, group vulnerability refers to the condition of a community being exposed to the possibility or risk of being attacked, deprived of the means for survival or harmed physically (Brown, Ecclestone, & Emmel, 2017). Minority group vulnerability is often attributed to chronic social, economic, and institutional constraints, sluggish socio-economic development, or active interethnic antagonisms (Gurr, 1993). Such forced or inherent constraints can prevent ethnic groups from attaining a sufficient degree of communal security and prosperity and may even threaten them with annihilation. On that account, politicized ethnic minorities with ties to actors in positions of power elsewhere are more likely to receive external support to counter existing or potential pressures that may be threatening their survival (Saideman, 2002). This study argues that a possible way of claiming a desired share of power domestically is by incentivizing neighbouring kinstates with the power and willingness to act in favour of the group that claims to be threatened (Waterbury, 2020; Davis & Moore 1997). On the one hand, historical evidence of ethnic, racial, and religious minorities with privileged or dominant status challenges the whole idea of associating ethnic minorities with an inherent status of powerlessness and vulnerability (Kaufmann, 2004; Hassan, 2020). On the other hand, weaker minorities with observably lower status and fewer capacities can also have the chance and the method to devise a rational strategy of empowerment. The question is whether the small and politically weak Turkish Cypriot community has ever possessed a sufficient will and capacity to induce its kin-state Turkey to

intervene. The argument focuses on minority inducement for kin-state intervention as a strategy of empowerment employed by weak and vulnerable minorities. Our case study explores the interactive relationship between the small and relatively weak Turkish Cypriot minority (18.2% - Census 1960) and its kin-state Turkey in their attempt to empower their domestic [Turkish Cypriot] and regional position [Turkey].ⁱ Within its limited scope, the case study aims to reveal how and under what conditions a weak ethnic group can appeal to its neighbouring kin-state for assistance, and how both minority and kin-state actors instrumentalize their relationship.

1. Ethnic minorities and kin-state intervention

The intervention of a powerful kin-state can provide ethnic minorities with an indispensable politico-military asset, a game changer in competitive relations with a comparably stronger ethnic majority. A growing body of literature examines the conditions that prompt third-party military intervention in ethnic conflicts with particular emphasis on the active role and involvement of ethnic kinstates in neighbouring conflicts (Carment & James, 2004; 2009; Regan, 1996; 2002; Regan & Aydin, 2012; Saideman, 1997; 2002; 2011; Jenne, Saideman, & Lowe, 2012; Walter & Snyder, 1999). We could safely argue that ethnic ties constitute a central – but certainly not the only – motivating force for third-party intervention in ethnic conflicts (Carment and James, 1996; Saideman, 1997; 2001; Jenne et al., 2007; Davis and Moore, 1997; Forsberg, 2014; Cederman, Gleditsch, & Girardin, 2009). Saideman argues that when an ethnic or secessionist conflict emerges abroad, third-party states will support actors with whom they share ethnic kinship (Saideman, 2001). Major qualitative and quantitative analyses provide sufficient support for this argument (Saideman, 1997; 2001; 2007; Carment et al., 2006; Forsberg, 2008). Moreover, the likelihood of military intervention increases when marginal actors in civil conflict (e.g. weak minorities) have ties with states whose ethnic kin dominates, while in most cases kinstates come to the support of marginal ethnic groups fighting against the dominant government forces (Nome, 2013).

From a wider perspective, other analysts have focused less on the motivation and likelihood of military intervention *per se* and more on the extent to which ethnic ties are generally related to conflict, suggesting that the existence of transnational ethnic ties can be a powerful factor shaping the likelihood of conflict (Davis & Moore, 1997; Caprioli & Trumbore, 2003; Petersen, 2002; Woodwell, 2004). In short, it seems that the existence of neighbouring ethnic kin and the possibility of external military intervention can influence the policy calculations of ethnic kin groups (Cederman, et al. 2013; Salehyan, 2011; Koktsidis, 2019). Yet the fact that not all kinstates are willing to intervene, just as not all ethnic minorities mobilize

for kin-state intervention, betrays the need for locating more accurately the conditions that facilitate kin-state involvement.

Although analysts have accurately suggested that “identity politics is often more about politics than about identity” (King and Melvin, 2000, p. 109), contemporary scholarship has a long way to go to fully understand the conjunction of ethnicity with power, and the conditions, which may increase the risk of conflict and the possibility of kin-state intervention. Findley and Teo have used realist ideas inspired by the study of international relations (macro-level) to study foreign interventions in ethnic conflicts (Findley & Teo, 2006). They focus their attention on the actor-centric factors that could explain third-party intervention and show that states tend to primarily base their decisions to intervene on the realist strategy of *balancing or bandwagoning* (Paquin & Saideman, 2017). Thus, when ethnic kin ties link to broader geostrategic objectives, then intervention may become a realistic possibility for the kin-state. According to this line of reasoning, it is usually state governments who are the central strategic actors in making simultaneous calculations of opportunities and constraints. Scholars have nevertheless found working at one level of analysis (state or ethnic group) to be too limiting. Carment et al. (2006) explain that it is the interdependence between domestic and international environments that creates opportunities and constraints on decision makers as far as third-party intervention is concerned. First, they conclude that variations in the decision of third parties (states) to intervene can be explained by opportunities at both the internal and external levels, and further observe that the possibility of intervention may play a critical role in the early stages of an ethnic conflict (Carment et al., 2006). Furthermore, Cetinyan argues that the expectation of outside involvement can shape the stance taken by ethnic groups and their host states (Jenne, Saideman, & Lowe, 2007; Cetinyan, 2003). If the kin-state is responsive to calls for assistance, and if it shows significant interest and the power to pursue a military intervention in support of its ethnic kin, then the group is likely to become more radicalized as it becomes confident of this outside assistance (Cetinyan, 2003). The possibility or threat of kin-state intervention can drastically magnify an ethnic minority’s assertiveness to counterbalance a more powerful ethnic majority. Jenne et al. argue that in typical majority-minority relations, the opposition majority group should then become more accommodating to the ethnic minority, given the threat posed by the minority group’s more powerful external ally (Jenne, Saideman, & Lowe, 2007). This, however, does not necessarily exclude the possibility of resistance and escalation by an equally assertive majority. Yet few scholars have so far studied how different forms of intervention may produce different kinds of outcomes (Regan and Aydin, 2006; Koktsidis, 2013). In addition to the above observations, neighbouring kinstates always hold a broader

geopolitical agenda driven by state-centric security objectives, which may in the long run overshadow the pleading minority's original objectives and reduce its autonomous capacity and political freedom in profoundly undesirable ways. The idea of taking the method and longitudinal effects of third-party involvement more seriously may again provide us with more variation and, therefore, more leverage to understand the substantial rather than declarative sources and effects of intervention.

Whereas intervening states can be clearly identified as unitary actors in terms of government action, discussions regarding the appropriateness of considering ethnic groups as unitary and autonomous actors, with distinct security objectives and capacities, have preoccupied the agenda of scholars and policymakers alike. Can ethnic groups be regarded as unitary actors? Do they really constitute a meaningful unit of analysis? On top of this, scholars have largely neglected the important collision of minority agency with regional geopolitics in the study of ethnic conflict and kin-state intervention. The very essence of the unitary agency of ethnic groups as collective actors has been questioned in the literature on minority politics, with experts on conflict and ethnicity criticizing the reliance on ethnic groups as a credible unit of analysis (Kalyvas, 2008). Although ethnic groups cannot be supposed to always act in unified and harmonious ways, dismissing them as a legitimate unit of analysis would simply relegate them to an abstract unit with no identifiable political trends or volition. Undoubtedly, many ostensible groups do not live up to the full "groupness" of such units because their outer boundaries are highly fluid or because their political decision-making is highly fragmented, yet politicized ethnic groups can possess a varying degree of "agency" in the form of a collective and autonomous decision-making capacity with political leverage (Barth, 1969; Cederman, Wimmer, & Min, 2010). Tang has accurately pinpointed that "elite manipulation of ontological (in)security is equivalent to elite manipulation of fear of ethnic extinction or domination. Essentially, elite manipulation of ethnic identity, hatred, and fear can be understood as a process of mobilization through the construction of a hardened ethnic identity and engineering a sense of ontological insecurity" (Tang, 2015, p. 266). Yet, although leadership is undeniably critical, and Tang might have been correct in pointing out the manipulative influence of ethnic entrepreneurs, it all really comes down to popular compliance and the capacity for group action. Group cohesion metrics in conflict analysis can determine the degree of group confluence and offer an assessment of its capacity to act. To make a long story short, cohesion metrics can provide an assessment of group expectations in relation to the validity and approval of methods and decision-making processes. Hence, depending on their ability to develop effective leadership and sufficient consensus, even weaker ethnic minorities can indeed catalyse external

intervention. Although it is highly desirable to be able to study the trends and fragmentations of ethnic minority politics, it is equally important to be able to identify hegemonic or predominant patterns of participation and mobilization to sufficiently measure the degree and impact of an acting group's agency. Hence, we need to take seriously the agency and role of ethnic groups as expressed through their leadership, cohesion, and collective mobilization as to the possibility of external involvement (Paquin & Saideman, 2017). For this reason, the cohesive agency of ethnic groups should be seen as an empirical variable. In most cases, there are still good reasons to expect ethnic groups to be relatively cohesive and sufficiently stable to warrant conflict analysis (Gurr, 2000). Conflict analysis has been making use of indices that allow for group cohesion to be measured. Cohesion indices may include electoral results, leadership consensus, referenda, militant recruitment flows, and the size and intensity of mobilization. Alongside an ethnic group's cohesion, their capacity to act is determined by the interplay of structural conditions, including access to resources, ethno-demographic concentration, geographic proximity, effectiveness of repression, recruitment capacities, diaspora mobilization, and relevant geopolitical opportunities, key among which is the willingness of a capable kin-state to support and energize ethnic demands (Koktsidis, 2013; 2017).

In our case study, a deep sense of Turkish Cypriot inferiority-cum-vulnerability was manifested by expressed fears of subordination to the Greek Cypriot majority. This lies at the heart of the Turkish Cypriot argument. Fearing communal subjugation, Turkish Cypriots needed to be able to maintain a convincing case of vulnerability, one that could mobilize kin-state support to counter Greek Cypriot demands and claim a desirable share of political power. To put it simply, the threat of exclusion and subordination motivated Turkish Cypriots to successfully mobilize and engage with the Turkish public (Bryant and Hatay, 2015). A chain of events that followed activated Turkey's geostrategic reflexes for jointly supporting the Turkish Cypriot separatist cause as a remedy to the threat of Greek and Greek Cypriot domination in Turkey's vicinity. Turkish Cypriot hardship following the collapse of the 1960 power-sharing accords provided Turkey's geostrategic incentives with a moralizing facade. Turkey grasped the opportunity to navigate the Turkish Cypriot resistance efforts on the island and fortified the minority's bargaining position throughout all phases of the conflict in nearby Cyprus. The conditions of Turkish Cypriot vulnerability, created by the raging hostilities between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot militias in the 1960s, provided a common operational and moral platform. Hostilities laid the ground for Turkey's geostrategic aspiration to prepare the Turkish Cypriots for secession (domestic) and prevent Greek Cypriot domination in Cyprus (international). For

the Turkish Cypriots, Turkey functioned as a catalyst for breaking away with the Greek Cypriot majoritarian pressures through kin-state intervention. The analysis clarifies the relationship between minority agency and kin-state responsiveness, but also illustrates the risky trade-offs in forging a condition of dependency with the kin-state. Adopting a bidirectional perspective that considers both minority and kin-state inducements, this study argues of the synergetic strategy of empowerment that was built between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot minority.

The argument contends that the proposition that vulnerable minorities have limited capacity to act and co-formulate their security environment due to their inherent weakness and assumed lack of effectiveness to influence the configuration of their security environment can often be misleading since it fails to account for the counterbalancing effects of powerful third parties. As Cederman points out, “we avoid the confusing and potentially misleading terminology labelling actors as majority and minority groups. Rather, we highlight the importance of the ethno-political power to trigger favourable change” (Cederman et al, 2012, p. 7). Our case study relates to similar other cases of kin-state interventions, ostensibly in support of separatist ethnic groups facing domestic pressures. Cases with varying degrees of similarities include Russia’s military invasion and occupation of Ukraine (2014-present), Serbia’s military support for Bosnian Serbs (1992-1995), Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh (1988-2021), Pakistan’s military support for Kashmiri separatists (1947-present), India’s involvement in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka (1987-1990), and Iran’s support for the Baluch secessionist movements. Syria’s military presence in Lebanon and Iran’s control of the Shi’ite Houthi minority in Yemen follow a related, but not identical, pattern of state intervention for kin group empowerment. It should be noted that kin group support for intervention and kin-state motivation can vary significantly. In some cases, minority groups in civil conflicts have explicitly called on the support of kin-states (indicatively: Bosnian Serbs, Donbas Russians, Kashmiri Muslims in India, Sri Lankan Tamils, Shi’ites in Yemen, Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh). Interventions, however, can be motivated by various reasons, including concerns over national security or the protection of ethnic group rights, and they also vary significantly in type and intensity. Having said that, the analysis challenges the notion that ethnic minorities should be treated as *ipso facto* helpless and agency-less entities, and at the same time, illustrates the geopolitical reasoning underpinning kin-state intervention.

2. A vulnerable minority: 1950-1959

The interethnic conflict in Cyprus escalated dramatically during the late period of British colonial rule on the island [1950-1960]. Greek Cypriot disappointment with the proposed 1948 self-government proposals [Winster Proposals]ⁱⁱ was followed by a plebiscite organized by the Greek Orthodox Church under its *Ethnarchic* capacity on 15 January 1950 (Richter, 2011). The result was a staggering 96% of Greek Cypriot registered voters, - representing approximately 82% of the population -, signing in favour of self-determination and union with Greece (Richter, 2011). Despite the distant possibility of Britain succumbing to Greek Cypriot unionist demands, Turkish Cypriots, led by their nascent community leadership headed by Fazıl Küçük and Faiz Kaymak, had unequivocally opposed Greek Cypriot demands and mobilized large anti-union rallies in Nicosia (Richter, 2011).

Unable to recover from the loss of their previous dominant status during Ottoman rule and conscious of their socially weak agrarian standing in relation to their more affluent Greek Cypriot counterparts, Turkish Cypriots regarded themselves as potentially vulnerable at the hands of an organized and politically dominant Greek Cypriot majority (Kizilyurek, 2019, pp. 80-89). Turkish Cypriot fears of potential subjugation ultimately exceeded into a de-nervative “fear of extinction” (Kizilyurek, 2019, pp. 63-74). On the one hand, under British administration, Turkish Cypriots found themselves “relegated” to the status of a parochial and economically weak religious group with unsubstantial minority representation (*Millet-i Hakime*) (Ktoris, 2013, p. 17). However, in the absence of any better alternative, they preferred living under the British colonial rule since they regarded it as a much more tolerable option in contrast to any other form of government that could give Greek Cypriots total control. Given that both union with Greece and the prospect of majoritarian self-governance lacked any appeal among Turkish Cypriots, the only thing conceivable to their ethnic leadership was either the perpetuation of colonial rule or, should a regime change occur, the return of Cyprus to its “original owner” i.e. Turkey (Ktoris, 2013). Political declarations against union with Greece and lobbying pressures initiated by home-grown Turkish Cypriot organizations preceded Turkey’s formal involvement in Cyprus, without the Turkish government formally taking an active diplomatic stance on the matter until 1954. Recent literature indicates that early Turkish Cypriot mobilization was indeed a key factor in accelerating Turkey’s involvement (Ktoris, 2013; Kizilyurek, 2019). The first signs of Turkish Cypriot mobilization appeared in the early 1940s with the ascendancy of Fazıl Küçük as founder of the “Turkish National Party” and Faiz Kaymak as head of the “Turkish Cypriot Minority Association” in 1943. The “Federation of Turkish Cypriot Organizations” united and coordinated Turkish Cypriot political action against Greek Cypriot unionist demands. Contrary to the more robust and cohesive Greek Cypriot

nationalist organization under the *Ethnarchic Council*, the striking lack of a clear political vision among Turkish Cypriots and the rift between Turkish Cypriot Kemalists and Traditionalists resulted in the ephemerality of such ventures. The lack of political coherence had become a source of political anxiety and weakness for the Turkish Cypriots. However, Turkish Cypriot concerns against Greek unionist demands were also trumpeted by a few pan-Turkish activists in Turkey, and by some young nationalist students (the Turkish National Federation of Students in Istanbul - *Milli Türk Talebe Birliği*) who undertook the task of raising public awareness about the alarming Turkish Cypriot fears (Aggeletopoulos, 2023, pp. 59-60). Interestingly, Suleyman Sedat Simavi and his successor Hikmet Bil, owners of Turkey's nationwide newspaper *Hürriyet*, spearheaded efforts to raise public awareness by projecting the potential tragedy that was to befall their co-ethnics in Cyprus in case Greek demands were to be realized. Nonetheless, under the presidency of prominent Kemalist İsmet İnönü, the Turkish government was convinced that there could be no drastic shift in the island's ownership status since Britain was clearly unwilling to concede to Greek Cypriot demands for self-determination.ⁱⁱⁱ Indicatively, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Necmettin Sadak stated in 24 January 1950 that: "There is no Cyprus issue...Britain does not have the slightest intention and desire to transfer the island to another state. No action in Cyprus can change this" (Aggeletopoulos, 2023, p. 67).

Until then, Greek Cypriots mobilized through pro-union demonstrations and extensive lobbying in Greece and abroad, which in turn triggered local anti-union demonstrations by the Turkish Cypriots. On 14 May 1950, Adnan Menderes and his Democratic Party were elected to power. In reaction to the pro-union rallies organized in Greece, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Mehmet Fuat Köprülü pointed out on 14 April 1951 that:

It is perfectly natural to closely follow the developments in Cyprus due to the geographic significance and proximity of the island to Turkey, and because a critical mass of our ethnic kin lives there. We do not see any reason for a change in the island's present legal status. If, however, we are faced with such an issue [change of status] in any serious way, then we shall not allow anything to happen without our say, or in anything that goes against our rights... (Aggeletopoulos, 2023, p. 80).

Having joined NATO in 1952, amidst the rising tensions of the Cold War, Turkey had been reassured by the impossibility of allowing Cyprus to be annexed by Greece, counting on Britain's tight grip on the island and Greece's unresponsive stance to Greek Cypriot demands.

Ankara downplayed the possibility of Britain undermining Greek-Turkish relations by conceding to Greek Cypriot demands for self-determination, given the importance of preserving NATO's cohesion and maintaining its sovereign control over the island. Nonetheless, Britain's unresponsive and dismissive stance against calls for Greek Cypriot self-determination intensified popular pressure in Greece (1950-1952), yet still without any success. However, in September 1954, under the fear of the Cyprus self-determination issue playing into the hands of the communists, Greece's right-wing government decided to eventually take on the Cyprus self-determination demand at the UN on the premises of the UN Charter's article regarding the recognition of the right to the self-determination of peoples. Greece did not eventually succeed in registering the issue at the UNGA, mainly because of Britain's powerful diplomatic networking and Turkey's outspoken objections. Nonetheless, this event marked the beginning of a long struggle to internationalize and legitimize the Greek Cypriot demand for self-determination.

By April 1955, disappointed by British intransigence and following the failed attempt by Greece to raise the question of Cyprus' at the UN, Greek Cypriots launched a guerrilla campaign (1955-1959) that was basically intended to increase pressure on the British administration and allow for the unconditional exercise of the right to self-determination. Alarmed by Greece's second attempt to submit the demand for self-determination to the UN (July 1955) and following the UNGA political committee's initial approval to examine the case at the General Assembly, the "Cyprus is Turkish" committee addressed the Turkish government via a communiqué, warning that "100.000 Turkish Cypriots are faced with the threat of a catastrophe" and calling on the Turkish government to act against the possibility of Turks becoming an oppressed minority in a majority Greek island (Aggeletopoulos, 2023, p. 214).

In June 1955, in coordination with Hikmet Bil, the Turkish Cypriot leader Fazıl Küçük changed the name of the "National Turkish Union of Cyprus" to the much more radical sounding "Cyprus is Turkish Party".^{iv} The party was coupled with an embryonic militant wing, *Volkan*, which first publicly appeared in September 1955 and filled its ranks with members serving in the British auxiliary police forces (Kizilyurek, 2019, p. 163). Although its size and capacity were too small for militant action, the organization created the first Turkish Cypriot radical nucleus which later, counting on Turkey's catalytic assistance, spearheaded the militarization of the Turkish Cypriot *Taksim* [partition] movement. By August 1955, the Turkish government was able to present a clear position in favour of the current status quo in Cyprus, pointing out that Greek Cypriot demands were incited by Moscow to cause a rift within NATO's southeastern flank. The idea was that the Greek Cypriot claim for self-determination

was raised against a fellow NATO member, Britain, and it did not only threaten the island's Turkish Cypriot minority, but it was equally hazardous to NATO's cohesion. On top of this, Turkey insisted that claims of ownership and self-determination cannot be asserted purely on the basis of a community's numerical superiority without taking into consideration the island's geographic proximity, its mixed demographic composition and historical ties with Turkey, adding that security considerations play an important role when deciding the validity of such claims.^v At the same time, Turkey raised a cold warning against the possibility of attacking the Turkish Cypriots following the spread of newspaper rumours from Cyprus of an alleged Greek Cypriot plan to "massacre" Turkish Cypriots, which never materialized. Nonetheless, Turkish Cypriot politician Faiz Kaymak warned Turkey that "the innocent and unarmed Turks fear that at any moment they will be massacred by the terrorists" and expressed the desire that Turkey provide every aid that ensures the lives and property of the Turks of Cyprus" prompting prime minister Adnan Menderes to declare that "Turkey will fulfil its duty in Cyprus...these people, I mean the Turks, will not remain even for a moment undefended" (Vryonis, 2005, pp. 83-88). Even despite any tangible evidence of EOKA planning to do so [*Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston* - National Organization of Cypriot Fighters], the news spread a shockwave of fear and mistrust enough to reinforce a sense of emergency among Turkish Cypriots. Besides, the British colonial administration had long sought to internally counter Greek Cypriot demands by employing and equipping dozens of Turkish Cypriot auxiliaries to help quell Greek Cypriot protests. This deeply divisive measure not only deepened the frustration and suspicion between the communities, but it also rendered the Turkish Cypriot auxiliaries' legitimate targets in EOKA's anti-colonial struggle. Britain responded by inviting both Greece and Turkey to the Tripartite London Conference on Cyprus (29 August to 7 September 1955) in an attempt to curb Greece's international pro-self-determination policy and initiate a strategy to intimidate Greece and the Greek Cypriots by ensuring that Turkey's interests will not be left out of any future developments regarding the island's political status (Yalçın & Yurdakul, 1999, pp. 48-52). Nevertheless, this gesture contradicted Turkey's recognition of Cyprus' legal annexation by Britain, and the legal relinquishment of all rights and title whatsoever over the territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in the Lausanne Treaty in 1923, including Cyprus (Art. 16 and Art. 20, Treaty of Lausanne).

According to Sotos Ktoris, in contrast to Turkey's (geopolitical) interests, Turkish Cypriots were mobilized by a much more acute and immediate existential fear. Ktoris argues that contrary to being guided by Turkey, Turkish Cypriot leadership had rather operated as the determinative factor for the mobilization of Turkey by encouraging its gradual involvement in

Cyprus (Ktoris, 2013, p. 342). Certainly, the flash reaction and counter-mobilization of the Turkish Cypriots against *Enosis* demonstrated the adamant and undisputed opposition to the prospect of union with Greece. Yet contacts between Turkish Cypriot leaders and Turkish state officials prior to 1954 indicate that Turkey's diplomatic services were sufficiently aware of developments in Cyprus and of the intention of Turkish Cypriots to counter Greek Cypriot demands (Yüksel, 2012). As Cevat Gürsoy characteristically mentioned "due to its historical rights and security considerations, it is completely impossible to imagine Turkey relinquishing Cyprus" (Özkan, 2015, p.11). Despite the Greco-Turkish Cold War alliance, the fact that Greece indulged in the Cyprus problem flared mutual suspicions and threatened to disrupt relations with Turkey and its major ally Britain. By insisting on its policy of internationalization, and despite the failure of five successive attempts (1954-1958) to obtain a favourable resolution, Greece ultimately reaffirmed Turkey's speculations of "Hellenic expansionism", transforming the right of self-determination into a Greek-Turkish foreign and security policy issue.

By the end of 1956, the British government had put forward the idea that the concept of self-determination could be equally applied to both communities in Cyprus regardless of their relative size. According to the Secretary of State for the British Colonies, Lennox Boyd, "the exercise of self-determination in such a mixed island must include partition among the eventual options (Kizilyurek, 2019, p. 200 and p. 207). Lennox-Boyd added that "if the Greek Cypriot majority asked for union with Greece, there would be a second ballot for the Turks alone. If the Turks voted to join Turkey, the island would be divided between two countries" (Kizilyurek, 2019, p. 207). Consequently, with the support of the Turkish Cypriot nationalist lawyer Rauf Denktaş who headed the "Federation of Turkish Cypriot Organizations" in 1955, the acknowledged leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, Fazıl Küçük advocated for the partition of Cyprus, urging Turkey to take a more active stance.^{vi} On 24 July 1956, Fazıl Küçük confidently stated that after his return from Ankara "Turkey would claim the section of Cyprus north of the thirty-fifth parallel, about half the island, as the Turkish share under partition" ("Cyprus Partition Demand", *The Times*, 25 July 1957, p. 10). While London was still considering the idea of partition and with the escalating Greek Cypriot insurgency in Cyprus threatening to neutralize Turkish Cypriot opposition, Turkey abandoned its previous restraint and hesitation and demanded partition as the only feasible compromise. For doing so, Turkey appointed special advisor Nihat Erim to draft a strategic plan on Cyprus, arguing in his declassified reports in 1956 that Turkey's minimum policy goal should be the partition of the island (*Taksim*) (Fouskas, 2001).^{vii}

With rising tensions between the two communities on the island, the Turkish Cypriot doctor and political activist Burhan Nalbantoğlu and Rauf Denktash, in cooperation with the Turkish embassy intelligence attaché Mustafa Kemal Tanrısevdi, founded the clandestine militant organization TMT [*Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı* / Turkish Resistance Organization] on 14 (or 27) November 1957, excluding the major Turkish Cypriot political figurehead Fazıl Küçük who was seen as being particularly soft.^{viii} In early 1958, the new governor of Cyprus, Sir Hugh Foot, was preparing to put forward a plan to overcome the deadlock by granting Cypriots self-government and while the plan recognized the distinct self-determination of the two communities on the island, it gave them the opportunity to vote for it after seven years of self-government, (Kizilyurek, 2019, p. 227; Foley, 1964, pp. 111-112). Turkey rejected the proposal, sticking to the dogma of “Partition and Only Partition” and accusing Britain of backing down from its stated consideration of partition as a solution. Clearly, due to Cyprus’ mixed ethnic-geographic composition, any possibility of exercising a distinct right to self-determination by the two communities would necessitate the sufficient territorial and demographic partition on the ground, which at the time seemed impossible. Ankara was outraged with the new governor’s manoeuvring and abhorred the possibility that the small, economically weak, and geographically dispersed Turkish Cypriot minority would eventually succumb to Greek domination by surrendering to the prospect of uniting with Greece. For Turkey, granting the right of self-determination to the Turkish Cypriot community without partitioning the island seemed as hollow and deceptive as any proposition of self-government with minority rights.

For this reason, in April 1958, Turkey undertook the task to mobilize, lead, train and equip TMT under the orders of Turkey’s MFA Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, who appointed Major General Daniş Karabelen, director of the newly founded Special Warfare Department, to cater for TMT’s recruitment and activation. In accordance with the “Reclaiming Cyprus Project” [*Kıbrıs İstirdat Projesi*] drafted by the Special Warfare Department Major Ismail Tansu, Ankara recruited, equipped, trained, and directed hundreds of operational officers and volunteers, forming TMT’s military cadre in Cyprus (Emircan, 2010, pp. 80-95). The Special Warfare Department secretly appointed Turkish officer Rıza Vuruskan to lead TMT operations on the ground and from August 1958 onwards, TMT had become more efficient in retaliatory strikes against Greek Cypriots, bomb attacks, arson, and in the targeting of the few Turkish Cypriot dissidents (mainly communists). TMT had ultimately set the stage for a drastic escalation of partitionist action through violence, provocations, forced displacement, and intimidation.

In a final attempt to put the Cyprus problem back on track, from June to August 1958

Britain prepared and submitted the “MacMillan Plan” to the communities, Greece, and Turkey. The plan provided for the creation of a condominium statelet with Greece, Turkey, and Britain acting as co-sovereigns and with extended self-administration rights granted to the two autonomous communities on the island. In fact, the “MacMillan Plan” provided a transition regime towards the substantial and permanent partition of the island.^{ix} The plan institutionalized Greece and Turkey’s partnership and co-sovereign role in Cyprus and introduced a functional communal separation. In line with Turkey’s condescending response to the plan, and despite their initial dissent, Turkish Cypriots accepted the plan since it created a plausible path towards dividing the island. Unsurprisingly, the plan was immediately rejected by Greece and the Greek Cypriots, prompting London to state it would move on with its implementation even without Greek consent. In short, dreading the possibility of the island uniting with Greece, Turkish Cypriots synchronized with the British administration’s policy against the Greek Cypriot demand for uniting with Greece, which practically translated into the definite strategic loss of Cyprus (for Turkey) and the redistribution of geopolitical power in the Eastern Mediterranean in favour of Greece. Although they remained equally suspicious of British proposals regarding self-government, grasping the geopolitical correlations of the time and the Greek Cypriot intransigence against self-governance, the Turkish Cypriot leadership raised a convenient and plausible case for resisting the Greek demands by mobilizing Ankara’s own geopolitical interests in the island.

3. A vulnerable national partner: 1960-1974

Britain’s initiative to invite Turkey to partake in the Cyprus talks and Harold MacMillan’s (British PM) proposal of turning Cyprus into a tripartite condominium forced Greece and Archbishop Makarios to retract from their insistence on union. Yet, London realized that any plan that would have not enjoyed some degree of legitimacy by the majority Greek Cypriots would have little chance of survival. Britain and the two interested states, Greece and Turkey, seemed prepared to discuss more seriously the idea of granting Cyprus independent state status. Neither union nor partition would be allowed, whereas the two communities would enjoy political equality and ethnic autonomy on vital communal and security issues (Emilianides, 2022). Ultimately, both communities would be forced to compromise on accepting the creation of an independent *bi-ethnic partnership state* under a set of extraordinary terms that included consociational arrangements and guarantees, which were laid down in three formal documents, known as the London-Zürich Agreements (the Treaty of Establishment, the Treaty of Guarantee, and the Treaty of Alliance).^x The signing of the 1959-1960 London-Zürich

agreements elevated the Turkish Cypriot minority to the status of “national partner” with provisions and representation that allowed Turkish Cypriots to play a significant role in the co-formulation of Cyprus’ political future.^{xi} Although the agreements prevented the island’s partition [and union], they were largely seen as unfair, undemocratic, and generally unwelcome to Makarios and to the many ordinary EOKA fighters who fought for union with Greece, as well as to some of the most prominent Greek Cypriot political figures of the time (Polykarpos Yorkadjis, Tasos Papdopoulos, Vassos Lyssarides).

The complicated nature of the power-sharing agreement in Cyprus and the difficulty of the Greek Cypriots to digest its provisions created an explosive security dilemma (Kaufman, 2007). The maintenance of ethnic dualism without geographical division constituted the building block of Cyprus’ constitution. The supreme principle that permeates the 1960 Cypriot constitution is the binary principle, which provided for the participation of the Greek and Turkish communities in a ratio of 70-30 in state institutions and a system of interdependent controls with veto rights on budget, security, and defence issues so that no decision could be enforced autonomously or unilaterally.^{xii} Given the profound lack of a common Cypriot identity, in the attempt to safeguard the Turkish Cypriot community against assimilation or subordination, the constitution essentially promoted the institutional entrenchment of ethnic divisions within their separate spheres of existence (Schneckener, 2002). Such provisions included the constitutional provision for the separation of municipalities according to ethnicity (an indirect form of territorial segregation), the introduction of separate electoral constituencies, complete institutional segregation at the community level and the need to obtain separate majorities by both communities in passing legislation. On top of this, disagreements emerged regarding the organization and command of a bicomunal security force. An external system of guarantees akin to a security mechanism was made up by the three major stakeholders, and it was put in place for the maintenance of constitutional order, granting the possibility of external intervention following proper consultations.

Despite having voted in favour of Makarios to implement the agreement, many Greek Cypriots, including Makarios himself, felt they were forced to sign and accept it. For the Greek Cypriots, the agreements established a partnership that was disproportionate to their population ratio, divisive and undemocratic. On the other hand, having become a national partner and co-founder of the state, the Turkish Cypriot community, although not entirely convinced of the possibility to coexist with the Greek Cypriots, was so deeply attached to the letter of the agreement that it failed to acknowledge its impracticalities and dysfunctions. Fearing that Greek Cypriot resentment would eventually turn into strife, Turkish Cypriots continued to press

hard for the immediate implementation of the agreement, while making parallel preparations for resisting an expected Greek Cypriot backlash. By autumn 1963, the delicate and complex partnership state had been worn out by numerous painstaking disagreements over administrative issues and jurisdiction, and the state was ultimately paralysed. Despite having been strongly discouraged by Greece, President Makarios drafted constitutional revisions that proposed to lift off and revise some of the “divisive rights and unworkable provisions” agreed in the London-Zürich agreements, which were thought to have prevented the well-functioning of the newly established republic. His reckless move triggered the immediate withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriot MP’s and officials from government institutions on the grounds that Greek Cypriots attempted to reduce the status of the Turkish Cypriots and take over the state’s apparatus with the aim to revamp the possibility of *Enosis*. Expecting harsh Turkish Cypriot resistance to Makario’s proposals, Greek Cypriot paramilitary formations organized by Makario’s henchmen had already been equipped and prepared to counter a potential Turkish Cypriot reaction and attempted secession (Ker-Lindsay, 2004). Armed clashes erupted in Nicosia in December 1963, and hostilities spread across the island until August 1964. Clearly, both parties were armed and prepared for a backlash, with Turkish Cypriot militants barricading within enclaves and Greek Cypriots attempting to break them. Many Turkish Cypriots began concentrating, often forced to by Turkish Cypriot militants, in barricaded and self-administered territorial enclaves, forming a parallel state with the financial and military-operational backing of Turkey (Jackson, 2021).

Unwisely, the L-Z signatories had failed to consider the establishment of a credible and capable international security mechanism to oversee the implementation of the power-sharing agreements in Cyprus, preferring to assign the sensitive task of security to the antagonistic motherlands. Power-sharing mechanisms in post-conflict and deeply divided societies are usually complex and fragile constructs, and for this reason, require a strong security dimension to survive. Security mechanisms can include monitoring duties, implementation oversight, sanctioning of unsolicited constitutional diversions, and in some cases may even include law enforcement and arbitration capacities (Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Bosnia-Herzegovina). In hindsight, domestic intercommunal strife had quickly dragged guarantor powers into the midst of a ferocious geostrategic power struggle over the island. Despite the US proposition to install a reliable NATO-led peacekeeping and monitoring force in Cyprus, at the UN Security Council the final decision was ultimately taken to deploy a UN peacekeeping mission (UNFICYP) following Makarios’ request (Brenner, 2019). Makarios estimated that if Turkey decided to intervene in support of the struggling Turkish Cypriots, NATO would probably not

hesitate to allow Turkey to partition Cyprus, if necessary, to preserve the alliance's cohesion and mitigate Turkish objections.^{xiii} Instead, US diplomats accurately suspected that Makarios preferred to take the matter to the UN in order to induce Afro-Asian and Soviet backing as a counterweight to NATO.^{xiv} Realizing the tension caused within NATO due to Makarios' acrobatics, the Soviets and Arab nationalists would be keener to support his domestic endeavours against the possibility of partition and annexation of Cyprus by the respective NATO member guarantors. A unitary and independent Cyprus, outside NATO, could have proven to be much more beneficial to the Soviet and non-aligned powers. Indeed, the collapse of the L-Z agreements fuelled broader international security concerns in the Eastern Mediterranean, prompting the UN Security Council to recognize the rump government as the formal interlocutor and deploy a peacekeeping force to prevent a complete political vacuum and to supervise efforts for the return of Turkish Cypriots in the existing constitutional framework. The peacekeeping force dispatched into Cyprus was ultimately tasked with the maintenance and restoration of law and order and with the aim to facilitate a return to normal conditions.^{xv} However, it lacked the authority and the political gravitas to prevent escalation or coerce parties to negotiate a return to the constitutional order.

Isolated within ethnic enclaves and living under an internally imposed Greek Cypriot embargo, the conditions of Turkish Cypriot depravity worsened dramatically after 1964. Turkish Cypriots describe the ten years of living in enclaves (1964-1974) as being the source of a massive trauma, and reference it to justify Turkey's right to intervene to save them from being annihilated (Volkan, 2008:97). Yet Greek Cypriots comprehend the 1963 state collapse as a deliberate "Turkish Mutiny"; a premeditated attempt to paralyse the state in favour of partition, making it unworkable by abusing institutional rights and refusing to negotiate unworkable provisions. From 1964 to 1967, intercommunal hostilities in the form of insurgency and counter-insurgency operations between separatist Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriot-controlled government forces resulted in numerous casualties and population displacements, forcing the communities to grow fully apart. Tense relations were further aggravated after airstrikes were carried out by Turkey in 1964, while at the same time the government of Greece authorized the covert arrival of a large mainland Greek military force (1964-1967) in Cyprus. These events were coupled with President Makarios' hazardous diplomatic brinkmanship due to his controversial engagements with socialist regimes, including the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia (1964-1974), resulting in deteriorating relations with the US and the pro-western government in Athens. The Turkish Cypriots' constitutional fallout with the Greeks, their isolation, and Makarios' alienation with both the

US and Greece, facilitated the synergy between Turkish Cypriots and Turkey to partition the island, whereas in Washington the idea of defending the island's unitary character under Makarios was starting to weaken. At the same time, Turkey's financial lifebelt and organizational support proved vital to the survival of the enclaved Turkish Cypriots, thus increasing public support for the Turkish Cypriot communal chamber leader, Rauf Denktaş; a staunch partitionist with considerable access to Turkey's operational and decision-making apparatus (Bryant & Hatay, 2015, pp. 26-29).

Cyprus received the knock-out blow on 20 July 1974, the day Turkey landed its troops on the island (Operation Attila I) following a failed *coup d'état* on 15 July 1974 orchestrated by an offshoot of the military junta in Athens and executed in collaboration with local Greek Cypriot anti-Makarios factions (die-hard anti-communists and pro-*enosis* members of the National Guard). Within a month (from mid-July to mid-August) and despite the all-party talks held in Geneva to discuss measures of de-escalation, Turkey deployed its forces ahead into the island's interior, occupying its northern part and wiping away its Greek Cypriot inhabitants. Contrary to the issuing of previous warnings against the possibility of Turkish intervention in 1964 and 1967, this time, the US State Department had been convinced of the need to endorse a more radical solution to the problem in Cyprus, and thus did little to contain the dire repercussions of Turkey's military offensive. For the Turkish Cypriots, however, Turkey's military intervention lifted a 10-year-long depravity.^{xvi} Turkish Cypriots regard Turkey's military intervention in 1974 as the end of a long-lasting state of humiliation, dehumanization, and annihilation (Volkan, 2008, p. 98).

On the one hand, Turkey's military *fait accompli* created a separate territorial space for the scattered and enclaved Turkish Cypriot population, but on the other, the military operations resulted in the forceful mass expulsion of thousands of Greek and Turkish Cypriots (those who remained still in the south) from their original settlements and brought about a definitive end to the island's ethnically mixed configuration by establishing a clear-cut territorial division between the two communities. The territory that was carved off by Turkey after the invasion, and which until today remains under Turkish military control, corresponds to the self-declared Turkish Cypriot state ("TRNC" 1983 – "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus").^{xvii} The de facto state has ever since remained internationally unrecognized, constituting according to international law a continuous violation of the Republic of Cyprus' territorial integrity and political sovereignty. Although ideas of dividing Cypriot soil, either through partition or federal partnership date back in the 1950s, the idea of cantonizing or federalizing the island resurfaced even more forcefully in the form of an ultimatum by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot

delegations during the post-invasion peace talks in Geneva in July-August 1974.^{xviii}

Since 1974, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community have established a symbiotic relationship with strong and mutually-serving interdependencies upon which Turkish Cypriots were assured they would not return to their previous minority-vulnerability status, while being able to assert more convincingly and on an equal standing a settlement with their Greek Cypriot counterparts. The Turkish Cypriot case was built around the fundamental idea of vulnerability and the perceived threat of subordination, which dictated the need for political equality, co-ownership, and protection. Although the core argument of subordination and vulnerability constituted the key mobilization impetus in three consecutive periods of conflict (1950-1960, 1963-1974, and post-1974) it is nevertheless manifested differently in the successive historical-political contexts. This is to suggest that what makes a minority vulnerable can be understood and measured on a set of different empirical criteria, both internal and exogenous, and corresponds to a group's capacity to project it successfully. During the 1950s, Turkish Cypriots projected their vulnerability to assist Britain's geopolitical engagement on the island and stir up Turkish involvement. The Turkish Cypriot sense of *potential vulnerability* was linked skilfully with an accurate grasp of the geopolitical opportunities and limitations. Turkish Cypriots have successfully projected their need for protection and acted in their capacity to consociate with British reservations and re-engage Turkey in Cyprus. The generous provisions offered to the Turkish Cypriot community by the 1960 consociational state validated their strategy of empowerment.

From 1960 to 1974, the projection of the Turkish Cypriots' vulnerable status stemmed from their traumatic experience caused by the rift with the Greek Cypriots, which resulted in the practical loss of their privileged constitutional status. Drawing on their partnership status attributed to them by the 1960 constitution, and despite their separatist policy, Turkish Cypriots have held on ever since to the idea of equal co-ownership as a prerequisite for any bi-communal state settlement that will jointly involve Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The collapse of the London-Zürich constitution in 1963 and the intermediate events until 1974 increased the severity of threat and vulnerability felt by the Turkish Cypriots on the island. With Turkey engaged in Cypriot affairs, the mounting Greek Cypriot pressures against them necessitated cooperation with Turkey, whereas Turkish Cypriot calls for protection formed the backbone of Turkey's moral justification for its military involvement in Cyprus.

4. A hostage community: post-1974

Without a shred of doubt, Turkey's active role as kin-state and security guarantor has enabled the Turkish Cypriot leadership to pursue its security objectives. At the same time, territorial control over north Cyprus has allowed Turkey to obtain a steady foothold at the heart of the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey's national security interests in the periphery and its growing geopolitical ambitions in the region indicate that Cyprus will continue to preoccupy Turkey's geopolitical planning. Since 1974, the separatist Turkish Cypriot administration has been heavily relying on Turkey's military, financial, and diplomatic support. On the one hand, Turkey's military *fait accompli* and the presence of Turkey in Cyprus have granted Turkish Cypriots a separate and secure sphere of existence, but on the other, the island's partition has created new, and perhaps even more unpredictable challenges and vulnerabilities to the Turkish Cypriots.

Backed by Turkey's insistence on preserving the guarantees, Turkish Cypriots continue to bring forth their vulnerability status vis-à-vis the Greek Cypriots, calling upon the necessity of instituting Turkey's military presence and guarantees as a *sine qua non* to any political settlement.^{xix} However, the very outcome of the illegal partition itself has gradually become the primary source of sociocultural vulnerability for the Turkish Cypriots. Swiftly after the consolidation of military and territorial control in north Cyprus, patron-client relations began to solidify between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots on a range of vital administrative and social sectors, including the economy, foreign relations, security, culture, demographics, and education (Koktsidis, 2023). Since the partition, Turkish Cypriots have been cut off internationally from all legal, commercial, and diplomatic transactions. Enclaving and marginalization have continued to form part of their daily routines and mentality. Additional to the reduction of its autonomous capacity, Ankara's suffocating political, economic, and social patronage has been steadily growing over the decades (Koktsidis, 2023). Nonetheless, through inducements, coercion, and propaganda, Turkey has portrayed itself as the only credible security reliant and as the only diplomatic channel through which Turkish Cypriots can increase their international visibility. In contrast, Turkish Cypriots are becoming steadily more absorbed by Turkey, giving in to a costly trade-off in return for security. Finally, the shrinking Turkish Cypriot population faces its own demographic minoritization within the separatist entity; a result of the settlement-migration policies engineered by Turkey.

Conclusion

The analysis highlights the dialectic nature between a weak but resolute minority and its powerful kin-state. The interdependency between the fears of the Turkish Cypriot minority and

Turkey's growing geopolitical concerns over Cyprus, formulated a strategy of empowerment through kin-state intervention. Capitalizing on the long-standing Turkish Cypriot insecurities, Britain and Turkey stepped in to prevent a geopolitical shift in favour of Greece and deter a radical change in the regional balance of power. Turkish Cypriot insecurities were cleverly put forward by Britain to legitimize Turkey's direct involvement in Cyprus as an interested third-party against Greek Cypriot demands and against Greece's perceived expansionism in the Eastern Mediterranean. The early manifestations of Turkish Cypriot mobilization demonstrated a sufficiently autonomous will and effective capacity to coordinate with nationalist actors in Turkey and raise public and government awareness of their demands. However, from 1960 to 1974, relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots degenerated dramatically. In this period, social depravity became a norm for the barricaded Turkish Cypriots and calls for Turkey's financial and security provisions intensified. The suffocating conditions provoked economic exhaustion, raising the possibility of surrender under Greek Cypriot terms. In the absence of any serious prospect for a return to constitutional normality, and with the Greek Cypriots immersed in a bloody civil strife over union (with Greece) or independence, partition had clearly become the preferred option for Turkey. Our case study shows that vulnerable minorities possess enough autonomous agency to induce powerful kin-states in the pursuit of mutually-serving security objectives. Minorities are neither passive nor powerless in the development of conflict. In contrast, they actively participate in the formulation of their security prospects. Furthermore, the analysis shows that the composition of security mechanisms can critically affect the course of implementation. Security mechanisms that include kin-states as security guarantors can be highly precarious. Kinstates with declared geopolitical objectives are usually drawn by the opportunities to affect broader power correlations to their advantage, and thus can easily become more antagonistic and more susceptible to confrontation. Competitive kin-states have more incentives to derail the delicate and often ill-conceived systems of power-sharing governance. The rift between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots reveals the significance of effective security and monitoring mechanisms. Such mechanisms require a strong multilateral international framework with credibility and the means necessary to secure people in times of crisis through law enforcement, canalize disagreements, and accommodate the possible concerns of interested parties during the implementation of a peace agreement. Finally, from 1974 onwards, the dependency of Turkish Cypriots on Turkey has deepened Ankara's political, demographic, and military grip over Cyprus in ways that clearly resemble hegemonic patronage. However, without Turkey's

military and diplomatic involvement, it would have been impossible for the Turkish Cypriots to pursue their domestic strategic empowerment during the investigated period.

Notes

- ⁱOfficial 1960 Cyprus census: [https://library.cystat.gov.cy/Documents/KeyFigure/POP_CEN_1960-POP\(RELIG_GROUP\)_DIS_MUN_COM-EN-250216.pdf](https://library.cystat.gov.cy/Documents/KeyFigure/POP_CEN_1960-POP(RELIG_GROUP)_DIS_MUN_COM-EN-250216.pdf). The Department of Statistics and Research of the Republic of Cyprus set the total population of the island in 1974 at 641 000, 506 000 (78,9%) of whom were Greek Cypriots and 118 000 (18,4%) Turkish Cypriots. The figure for the Greek-Cypriot population includes a total of 2% Maronite, Armenian and Latin Christian minorities. Source: Report on the demographic structure of the Cypriot communities, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Doc. 6589, 1403-23/4/92-4-E, 27 April 1992. See: <https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewHTML.asp?FileID=6916&lang=EN>
- ⁱⁱ See: Curftan (1948).
- ⁱⁱⁱ Republican government headed by PM Hasan Saka [1947-1950] and later by PM Mehmet Şemsettin Günaltay [1949-1950]
- ^{iv} As noted by the British political correspondent Charles Foley: “In summer 1955 Mr Hikmet Bil had recently come from Ankara on an important mission to help reorganize the Turkish-Cypriots’ political party. Mr Bil explained that it was a perfectly proper title: ‘If, and only if, Britain decides to abdicate in Cyprus, then we shall put forward our claim to regain the island for Turkey.’ Was this done with the approval of the Turkish Government? But naturally, nothing would be done without that.” See: Foley (1964, pp. 29-30).
- ^v No. 380 Position Paper Prepared in the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, SD/A/C.1/448, 14 September 1954. US State Department Archives. See: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v08/d380>
- ^{vi} For more on his partitionist proposal see: Küçük (1957).
- ^{vii} See: Erim (1974).
- ^{viii} TMT: Turkish Cypriot ultra-nationalist, anti-enosis, and anti-communist organization founded by local Turkish Cypriots Burhan Nalbantoğlu, Rauf Denktaş, and Kemal Tanrısevdi in collaboration with officers from Turkey’s Special Warfare Office.
- ^{ix} For an outline of the MacMillan Partnership Plan see: Commons and Lords Hansard, the Official Report of Debates in Parliament, 19 June 1958, Vol 589: cc1315-20. See: https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1958/jun/19/cyprus#column_1315
- ^x For the 1960 settlement in Cyprus see: James (1998), Hatzivasileiou (2019), Salem (1992).
- ^{xi} Turkey ceded all claims, rights and sovereignty over Cyprus to Britain in the Lausanne Treaty in 1923.
- ^{xii} For a more critical assessment on the failure of power-sharing in Cyprus see: McGarry (2021).
- ^{xiii} “Cyprus Problem = Makarios Problem”, *New York Times*, 18 October 1964. [From the NYT Archives]. See: <https://www.nytimes.com/1964/10/18/archives/cyprus-problem-makarios-problem.html>
- ^{xiv} No 440 Telegram from the US Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, New York, 25 January 1964, 2851. US State Department Archives. See: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v33/d440>. For more on the peacekeeping force in Cyprus see: Aksu (2003); Sakkas & Zhukova (2013); Tudor (2021).
- ^{xv} S/RES/186(1964). See: <https://peacemaker.un.org/cyprus-resolution186>
- ^{xvi} During the Turkish military invasion of Cyprus, mass killings of Turkish Cypriot civilians by Greek Cypriot militants took place in the villages of Tochni, Maratha, Santalaris, Aloa, Alaminos on 14 August 1974. For more see: Cassia (2007).
- ^{xvii} “TRNC” [Turkish Republic of North Cyprus or Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti, KKTC] refers to the self-declared and internationally non-recognized Turkish Cypriot separatist administration, established in 1983 on the territory occupied by the Turkish military forces in 1974. According to International Law, the international community considers the entity’s declaration “null and void” of any legal international status.
- ^{xviii} See: Küçük (1957); Turkish Cypriot newspaper *Halkın Sesi* Map, 19 January 1957 (translated and republished by Greek Cypriot newspaper *Phileleftheros* on 20 January 1957). For an in-depth analysis of Nihat Erim’s proposals for the Cyprus problem see: Akgün (2017).
- ^{xix} “Turkish-Cypriot leader Akinci: We shall not accept minority status”, *INGR*. 26 December 2018. See: <https://www.in.gr/2018/12/26/english-edition/turkish-cypriot-leader-akinci-shall-not-accept-minority-status/>; “Turkish Cypriots only community working towards solution on island, says Akinci”, *Ahval*, 1 January 2019. See: <https://ahvalnews.com/cyprus/turkish-cypriots-only-community-working-towards-solution-island-says-akinci>; “President Ersin Tatar holds press conference and evaluates his meeting with the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres”, 24 September 2023, Presidency of TRNC. See: <https://kkctb.org/en/president-ersin-tatar-holds-press-conference-and-evaluates-his-meeting-11521>
- “Cyprus will not be a Hellenic island, Turkish Cypriot president says”, *Daily Sabah*, 31 March 2022. See: <https://www.pressreader.com/cyprus/cyprus-today/20220402/281870121956060>

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