Introduction

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1. The impact of the ‘new migration’

By 2016 the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated 65.6 million displaced persons worldwide, increasing by about 300,000 a year. 40.3 million displaced persons remained within their own countries. 22.5 million were refugees—the most ever in human history. 5.5 million were Syrians, leaving Syria at a rate of 750,000 a year. 2.8 million were asylum-seekers. The potential for further exodus from the Middle East is enormous: an estimated 54.5 million migrants still remained in Middle Eastern countries; Syria contained 7.1 million, Iraq 4.7, Jordan 2.9, Yemen 2.8, Turkey 2.8, and Lebanon 1.5 (according to a report of the Pew Research Centre in Washington, D.C. in October 2016). Turkey now claims that as many as 3 million (primarily Syrian) refugees are left in that country. At least half a million people have lost their lives in Syria since the commencement of the present revolution and ISIS.

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Europe has received vast numbers of refugees from the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. Over a million refugees and economic migrants reached Europe (initially mainly Greece and Italy) across the Mediterranean in 2015—more than twice as many as during the previous year (according to data collected by the UNHCR and International Organization for Migration). This flow was expected to slow down during the harsh winter months—it did, but over 100,000 migrants arrived in Europe during January and February of 2016; this represented more than in the first six months of the previous year.

During 2015, 839,561 maritime arrivals were recorded in Greece out of a total migrant influx of 885,386. 200,000 arrived just in October. Over half were Syrian, the others from other Middle Eastern countries and South Asia.

Between 1999 and 2013, an estimated half a million illegal or ‘irregular’ migrants entered Italy by sea; yet since then as many as 600,000 migrants have landed in Italy by sea (according to various estimates in the media). More than 153,000 arrived in 2015, another 181,000 the next year. Italy now has the highest number of arrivals by sea (according to the European Council on Refugees and Exiles). Most are male economic migrants from West Africa (Nigeria, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Senegal, Mali), the Horn of Africa (Eritrea, Sudan, Somalia), with some from North Africa (Tunisia, Libya) and the Middle East (Syria), setting off from Libya, a failed state. Thousands have drowned in their attempt to reach Italy—at least 13,000; 700 drowned in just three days in May 2016; in fact, at one point the Italian navy was saving 10,000 a week; more than 2,000 had drowned so far by mid-2017. They continue to come at the rate of over 130,000 a year—a thousand migrants on an average summer day. Migrant smugglers are arrested, and their boats set on fire or blown up.

7,164 ‘irregular’ migrants arrived in Spain and Portugal during 2015 (mostly Guineans, Moroccans, and Algerians), however Spain has attempted to plug the hole presented by Ceuta and Melilla, Spanish exclaves on the Moroccan north coast, a simple ferry ride away from Spain itself. The sea route between Morocco and Spain is currently claimed to be the fastest growing sea route. More than 8,000 sea-borne asylum-seekers have been recorded by Spain between January and mid-August 2017, compared to approximately 2,500 during the same period the previous year. In fact, 1,600 were intercepted and rescued by the Spanish coast guard in the Strait of Gibraltar in just a single day in August.
An increasing list of countries have been blocking migration routes: by March 2016 Greece, Macedonia, Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia, Austria. Although Greece had only 10,200 official applications, most migrants didn’t wish to stay there anyway; moreover, Greece has felt mounting pressure from the EU to halt the flow of refugees by increasing border restrictions. During 2015 Hungary reluctantly received 174,425 applications for asylum, but again the vast majority of migrants had no intention to stay there—they were heading farther north, especially to Germany and Scandinavia; to stop the flow Hungary put up barbed wire fences all along its border with Macedonia and Croatia. Germany admitted 441,800 ‘first asylum’ applicants during 2015 among 1.5 million migrants; from 2013 to 2016 Germany has experienced the highest inflow of foreign population of any country (increasing from 1.1 million in 2013 to 1.3 million in 2014 and over 2 million in 2015), as well as the greatest number of asylum applicants (according to European Commission/Eurostat, OECD, and Migration Policy Institute data). Yet the German government has specified that Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia should be considered ‘safe’ countries, so asylum should not be available for migrants from these countries; a minimum two-year waiting period would be necessary for family reunification; benefits are to be confiscated unless migrants learn German and indicate integration; and some states are seizing assets over 750 Euro. With the closure of the border with Denmark, Germany has been obliged to scatter its migrants throughout smaller communities. The problem of integration is well illustrated by almost as many migrants recorded passing through the small city of Flensburg (pop. 85,000), on the Danish border, as the entire residential population. Sweden received 156,120 applicants in 2015 (actually less than 163,000 the previous year); however the government has warned (January 28, 2016) that 60-80,000 may be rejected; complicating matters, 35,000 were unaccompanied children. In other Scandinavian countries, Finland has announced that it may reject two-thirds of 32,000 applicants; Norway, with 30,460 applicants, has initiated a government anti-refugee campaign; Denmark, with 18,160, has placed advertisements in newspapers in Lebanon to dissuade Syrian refugees from coming. Part of the Brexit campaign in Britain was directed against immigrants. Meanwhile, refugee camps on the Channel coast in France have been cleared or burned to the ground. Switzerland, faced with 33,300 applications, has been confiscating possessions worth more than 1,000 Swiss francs. All told, the EU countries received 1,211,830 ‘first asylum’ applicants during 2015, of whom 73% were adult males and less than 10% were children, but that included more than 100,000 who arrived alone (UNHCR and IOM data).
What is driving such massive migration? The answers are very complex, and must take into consideration ‘push’ factors (driving migrants away from their original countries—such as revolution and warfare, ethnic cleansing, poverty, recruitment into indenture and the sex trade) as well as ‘pull’ factors (luring them to resettle in new receiving countries—such as perceived economic benefit, improved living conditions, peaceful conditions in which to raise a family) (e.g. Loescher, 1993; Richmond, 1994; Stalker, 2001; Moorhead, 2006; Sanders, 2011; UNHCR).

2. The ‘new migration’ and ‘minority rights’

During the past several decades, and especially at present, throughout Europe the traditional nation-state has been challenged by rapidly increasing ethnic diversity. European countries have increasingly become less homogeneous and more pluralistic. Now millions of refugees and economic migrants have been arriving. This special issue focuses on the impact and implications of this most recent influx on the possible (re)definition of ‘minority rights’.

Relating to this general theme, the following specific problematic issues could be addressed:

*Differential state recognition of ‘minority rights’ for different types of ethnic/linguistic/cultural minorities.*

Are state policies to be directed differently toward traditional ‘national minorities’ and ‘indigenous minorities’, longer-settled ethnic groups lacking a territorial base (including ‘metropolitan minorities’ having a former or extant colonial origin), ‘diaspora minorities’ (such as Roma, who may/may not be considered a ‘national minority’), new migrants and refugees from ‘non-traditional’ origins, etc.?

*The possible effect of the ‘new migration’ on attitudes and changing state policies toward ‘national minorities’.*

Are state policies toward ‘national minorities’ changing, or will they likely be affected by nationalistic recriminations stimulated by the ‘new migration’ adding to the ethnic complexity within traditional nation-states?

*The complicated situation of ‘new minorities’ settling within traditional national minority areas.*
Are newcomers who are different culturally (and perhaps racially) from both national/nation-state populations and traditional minority populations, who settle within minority areas, obliged to learn, and have their children educated in, either the minority language or national language, or both?

*Whether new refugees and economic migrants may be entitled to the same basic rights as longer-established minorities, including both regional minority populations and older ethnic minority populations concentrated within urban areas.*

Given the increasing complexity of defining ethnic minorities within European countries (ranging from ethnic groups/nationalities claiming a traditional homeland to the current influx of new migrants—both economic migrants and refugees), how does or should state policy differentially recognize minority rights?

*The policy implications of the ‘new migration’ serving to re-enforce long-existing urban ethnic concentrations in certain neighbourhoods, and possibly to develop new concentrations.*

The historic ‘national minorities’ emphasize preservation of their traditional territories, languages and cultures as a basic right, whereas new migrants are subjected more to a policy of integration than cultural maintenance or geographical concentration (although certain concessions may be made, at various levels of government, to longer-settled primarily urban minorities for at least some education, services, etc. in their traditional languages).

*Recognition of ‘minority rights’ within traditional or re-established nation-states compared to states built on the basis of ethnic pluralism in Europe.*

Most countries in Europe developed historically as virtual nation-states; moreover, some which had formerly been an integral part of ethnic federations based on more than one nationality have more recently become independent nation-states. The concept of the nation-state has implied a significant degree of presumed ethnic homogeneity, with relatively limited national government interest in or appreciation of ethnic pluralism and diversity. Some European countries have varying degrees of political recognition of historic ethnic minorities, often considered as regional or localized populations with varying degrees of self-government or autonomy, yet still within broader nation-states dominated by a particular ethnicity, while relatively few countries could still be considered officially bicultural or multicultural at the national level.
Multiculturalism/ethnic pluralism policies in Europe compared to primarily immigrant-origin countries with diverse populations (including indigenous) beyond Europe.

How and why do European national or sub-national/regional policies differ from primarily immigrant-origin countries (such as Canada) which emphasize a broader multiculturalism policy inclusive of all ethnicities?

3. The populist backlash

Doubtless, attacks by self-defined Muslim terrorists in many European cities have stimulated anti-Muslim counter-attacks and anti-immigrant passions. These Jihadi-inspired terrorist attacks have included: Madrid (March 5, 2004) and Barcelona and Cambrils (August 17-18, 2017); the assassination of Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam (November 2, 2004); Stockholm (December 11, 2010, April 7, 2017); Paris (January 7 and November 11, 2015) and Nice (July 14, 2016); Brussels (May 2014, August 21, 2015, March 22, 2016, June 20, 2017) and Verviers (January 15, 2015); Berlin (December 19, 2016); London (July 7 and 21, 2005, June 29, 2007, May 22, 2013, October 20, 2016, March 22, 2017, June 3, 2017) and Manchester (May 22, 2017); Helsinki (August 18, 2017)—apart from many lesser attacks and incidents (other planned attacks by Muslim extremists have been foiled in Britain, France, the Netherlands and Belgium during the past couple of years).

All over Europe, recently and currently a populist backlash to this ‘new migration’—to what they perceive to be too much immigration and too many refugees—has become almost omnipresent, concomitant with increasing ‘Euroscepticism’ (i.e. opposition to the EU) and rise of conservative ‘ultra-nationalism’ often driven by right-wing (and indeed sometimes by left-wing) political parties and movements (Sanders, 2012; Daniel and Knudsen, 2015; Murray, 2017).

In Germany, anti-immigrant ultranationalism has been pushed by the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), and specifically anti-Muslim demonstrations organized by PEGIDA—Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West); other far-right or neo-Nazi groups have included the NPD—Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (National Democratic Party of Germany), DVU-Deutsche Volksunion (German People’s Union), and Die Republikaner (the Republicans).
In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders led a separation from the right-wing VVD – Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (Party for Freedom and Democracy) to form his even more radical PVV – Partei voor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom); however, he did not fare particularly well in the national election of March 2017.

In Belgium, the right-wing conservative nationalist Vlaams Blok (Flemish Bloc) gave birth to the more recent Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest), while among Walloons the Front National paralleled its anti-immigrant namesake in France.

In France, the Front National, led by populist Marine Le Pen, has been making significant gains in national politics; in fact, in April 2017 Le Pen achieved the highest result (34%) for her Front National in its forty-five-year history in any national election (the election was won by centrist Emmanuel Macron, leader of the En Marche movement—strikingly, not an established political party). Other anti-immigrant and nationalist parties and movements cover the political spectrum: to the right, the Mouvement pour la France and Debout la France, and to the left the Leftist Front, led by Jean-Luc Mélenchon and Mouvement Republicain et Citoyen.

In Italy, the sudden rise of the Movimento 5 Stelle (Five Star Movement), led by Beppe Grillo, has overturned national politics. So, too, in Greece have left-wing Syriza, led by President Alexis Tsipras, and far-right ultra-nationalist Chrysi Avgi (Golden Dawn). As in Greece, in Turkey the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) of Recep Tayyip Erdogan has had to deal with vast numbers of Syrian and other refugees.

A strong stand against refugees has come to increasingly characterize the ultra-nationalist Jobbik Magyarorszagert Mozgalom (Movement for a Better Hungary) party of PM Viktor Orban; so too have Fidesz, Magyar Polgari Szovetseg (Hungary for Civic Alliance), Magyar Igazsag es Elet Partja (Hungarian Justice and Life Party), and Hatvanegy Varmegye Ifjusagi Mozgalom (64 Counties Youth Movement).

Other Balkan and East-Central European countries have followed suit, including Kotleba (Our Slovakia People’s Party).

Next door, in Austria the Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs (Austrian Freedom Party), led by Heinz-Christian Strache, has advocated right-wing populism, and Team Stronach für Österreich
advocated Euroscepticism. In Switzerland, anti-migrant demonstrators have carried placards saying ‘send them home!’ and ‘enough is enough!’.

Meanwhile, up north in Scandinavia, both Denmark and Sweden have recently adopted refugee deterrence policies, influenced by the right-wing conservative nationalist Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People’s Party) and Sverigedemokraterna (Swedish Democrats Party).

The British Brexit movement, pushed most strongly by UKIP – the UK Independence Party, led by Nigel Farage, has been officially adopted by the governing Conservative Party of Prime Minister Theresa May; however strongly opposed by the Scottish Nationalist Party, led by First Minister Nicola Sturgeon, and Northern Ireland. Following the terrorist attack on June 3, 2017, no less than 120 Islamophobia incidents were recorded by police just in London; and a violent counter-attack against Muslims at a London mosque occurred on June 19.

In Spain, Catalan ethno-nationalism has been pushed by a wide variety of separatist political parties, including PODEMOS (‘We Can’) and the PSC – Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (Socialist Party of Catalonia), led by Miquel Iseta, which tend to be pro-EU.

How much influence the election of Donald Trump of the Republican Party in the United States may have had on populism and restricted immigration policies in Europe remains controversial. But in Poland, government leader Andrzej Duda has currently expressed admiration for Trump; while the claimed while cautious mutual admiration between Trump and Vladimir Putin of Russia seems rather more complex.

4. The dilemma

In sum, a rising tide of majority ethnic nationalism is stimulating a re-emphasis of the nation-state in Europe.

This renewed nationalism is largely directed against immigrants and refugees, especially Muslims and other ‘visible’ minorities who have been arriving in unprecedented numbers. These ‘new migrants’—as well as their predecessors—are perceived as diluting traditional dominant nations and people, changing national traditional values and culture, and taking jobs from existing citizens of the dominant ethnicity (Carr, 2016; Verhofstadt, 2017).
However, tolerance of longstanding ‘indigenous’ (i.e. non-immigrant) minorities lessens, when these minorities fit awkwardly into the nation-state concept. Moreover, there is less tolerance for accommodation of any people who seem ‘different’, less interest in unique ethnic cultures, much less ‘rights’.

There is increasing victimization of ‘different’ people, overt attacks and discrimination directed not only at unwanted ‘newcomers’, but perhaps also longstanding immigrant minorities (with generations born and raised in a country, for example Turks in Germany and North Africans in France, whose younger generation may no longer speak the traditional language and who may have never been in the country of origin); and even ‘indigenous’ minorities mostly with a territorial base in the country.

5. Solutions?

To repeat an important point: ‘indigenous’ minorities wish to preserve their unique cultures, whereas immigrant minorities are expected to integrate. This may well be seen as a rather artificial distinction, but has obvious bearing on exactly what sort of minority rights should be considered—remember: most types of ‘indigenous’ minorities claim a territorial base, whereas immigrant minorities cannot. But what, exactly, is ‘integration’? Doesn’t it imply conformity? A young Turk, say, in Germany may be completely German culturally, socially, and speak only German…but still looks Turkish, so unfortunately may often be attacked or discriminated against by nationals who are intolerant of strangers (typical of xenophobia and ethnocentrism).

How to change this? Perhaps political and social emphasis of a welcoming society….but this only goes so far. Re-education, with an emphasis at least on tolerance and acceptance….but this can often be begrudging rather than genuine or sincere, and tolerance or acceptance may be short of interest in, much less encouragement of ethnic minority cultures. As for the problem of social integration, opportunities abound, but how much interaction is there on a personal level (on both sides)?

As European countries become more pluralistic, obviously the multiculturalism model would seem most appropriate and beneficial—if complex and controversial (Kymlicka, 2007; Meyer, 2012; Joppke, 2017). But this model is admittedly far easier to apply in predominantly
immigrant-origin countries such as Canada, the United States, and Australia than in European nation-states. Still, isn’t Europe increasingly in need of moving away from, rather than increasingly toward, a traditional nation-state concept?

How ready is Europe to change? Change is not only necessary but inevitable….it is obviously happening, and at a faster pace. Granted, a strong argument has long been made for better control of immigration, and especially for improved international collaboration in dealing with refugee settlement (e.g. Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield, 1995; Jacobson, 1997; Rodier, 2012) and more effective integration (e.g. Krane, 1975; Sassen, 1996/99; Legrain, 2002).

Europe’s nations (in the sense of dominant/majority peoples) will obviously predominate for centuries to come…minorities are certainly not “taking over” (as some nationalist/populist politicians would suggest). Whereas acceptance of and interest in minorities, both traditional and newer, could immeasurably benefit the host political states where they could prosper.

So protection and enhancement of minority rights (now largely within the EU) seem as fundamental in former (re-created or re-emphasized) nation-states as in pluralist countries. Yet the essential question must be whether multiculturalism policies respecting pluralism could be accommodated within a more liberalized, much less traditional nation-state model, while ‘indigenous’ minority ethno-nationalism, politicization and separatism further complicate minority rights.

As Kjell Anderson has written, ‘Tolerance must be ingrained in the “national ideology” of the state and in the concept of citizenship. Nation-states, founded on the notion of making the nation synonymous with the state, are premised on an intolerance of alternative identities. In contrast, states rooted in civic nationalism emphasize common citizenship as being the core identity of the state and that all bearers of citizenship are full bearers of rights’ (K. Anderson, 2017).

6. This issue
The four articles comprising this special issue focus on four topics relevant to the general question of how the ‘new migration’ may affect ‘minority rights’—not only the established rights of long-existing (i.e. traditional) ethnic minorities, but also the presumed rights of new migrants settling
largely in European countries which may still tend to be viewed—or view themselves—as ‘nation-states’, yet which are fast becoming increasingly transformed into virtual ethnic pluralist (i.e. multicultural) states by this very migration.

First, Armillei and Mansouri probe into the real meaning of ‘ethnic democracy’, and—comparing Italy and Australia—question what form contemporary policies toward increasing numbers of ‘boat people’ (migrants who arrive ‘illegally’ or ‘irregularly’ by sea) may take, given an authoritarian legacy in both countries.

Second, Carlsson delves into the problem of new migrants settling in existing traditional minority areas—including choice of language of integration, and how this relates to perceived economic benefits and national mobility—not only in Finland but also, comparatively, in Quebec, Catalonia, Flanders, and South Tyrol; in this discussion the changing meaning of multiculturalism is explored.

Third, Andreva ponders whether migration is jeopardizing human rights; specifically, how reaction to increased mass migration into the European Union (particularly the Schengen Area) is affecting the constitutional right of Roma to leave Macedonia.

Fourth, Boulter analyses, through three theoretical/methodological approaches, how media discourse pertains to the problematic question of redefining minorities and their presumed rights, given the ‘new migration’.

References


UNHCR. *The State of the World’s Refugees*, annual reports.