

Peace Lost. The failure of conflict prevention in Kosovo

Table of Contents

Chronology / Preface / *I. Introduction: Aim, Method and Structure* / *II. Context of the Kosovo Crisis: The Dissolution of Yugoslavia* - 1. Background: The Dissolution of the SFRY and the Resulting Conflicts - 2. The European Attitude to the Yugoslav Conflict: From Containment to Intervention - 3. Structural Reasons for a Confused Policy: The Issues of Self-determination and Secession- 4. Institutional Impediments to Decisive Action: Which Lead-organisation? - 5. International Action in Relation to Conflict: Organised Inaction and Hope - 6. Challenges for Conflict Prevention in Europe: Affinities with Conflicting Parties / *III. Phases of Crisis and Conflict* - A. Phase I: Unstable Peace to Emerging Crisis (1987-1992)- 1. Background Factors and Root Causes - 2. Aggravating Factors and Trigger Events - 3. Interests, Perceptions and Strategies of the Parties - 4. Opportunities to Engage the Actors (Windows) - a. Window I: Early Preventive and Comprehensive Engagement of SFRY Society - b. Window 2: Diplomatic Intervention after Abolition of Kosovo Autonomy - c. Window 3: Integration of the Kosovo Issue into Overall Yugoslav Settlement - 5. Conclusion - B. Phase 2: Stable High Tension Situation (1992-1997) - 1. Background Factors and Root Causes - 2. Aggravating Factors and Trigger Events - 3. Interests, Perceptions and Strategies of the Parties - 4. Opportunities to Engage the Actors (Windows) - a. Window I: Kosovo Participation in FRY Reform from Within - b. Window 2: OSCE Long-term Mission and Geneva Negotiations - c. Window 3: Dayton - 5. Conclusion - C. Phase 3: Escalating Violence (1996-1998) - 1. Background Factors and Root Causes - 2. Aggravating Factors and Trigger Events - 3. Interests, Perceptions and Strategies of the Parties - 4. Opportunities to Engage the Actors (Windows) - a. Window I: Comprehensive Sanctions against Both Sides - b. Window 2: Presence of Aid Agencies - c. Window 3: Credible Threat of the Use of Force and International Presence - 5. Conclusion - D. Phase 4: Military Diplomacy and Armed Conflict (1998-1999) - 1. Background Factors and Root Causes - 2. Aggravating Factors and Trigger Events - 3. Interests, Perceptions, and Strategies of the Parties - 4. Opportunities to Engage the Actors (Windows) - a. Window I: The Holbrooke agreement - b. Window 2: OSCE Verification Mission - c. Window 3: Rambouillet - 5. Conclusions / *IV. General Conclusions Relating to the Kosovo Conflict* - A. Mismatch between Phases of the Conflict and International action - B. Reasons for Mismatch between Challenge and Response - 1. Systemic Factors: The Kosovo Conflict and the New Post-Cold War Context - 2. Structural Factors: The Impediments of the Normative Framework of International Law - 3. Institutional Factors: Absence of Appropriate International Organisational Mechanisms - 4. Actor-related Factors: External Actors' Preoccupation with their Own Concerns - C. A Transatlantic Divide? Different Approaches to Diplomacy - D. General Conclusions / *V. Lessons Learnt for Conflict Prevention* - A. Concept-related Lessons - B. Means-related Lessons - C. Organisational Lessons - / Bibliography