

ECMI

WORKING PAPER



EUROPEAN CENTRE
FOR
MINORITY ISSUES

ETHNIC MINORITIES AND MINORITY RIGHTS IN EUROPE: THEORETICAL TYPOLOGIES

Alan B. Anderson

ECMI WORKING PAPER #99
September 2017



The European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) is a non-partisan institution founded in 1996 by the Governments of the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the German State of Schleswig-Holstein. ECMI was established in Flensburg, at the heart of the Danish-German border region, in order to draw from the encouraging example of peaceful coexistence between minorities and majorities achieved here. ECMI's aim is to promote interdisciplinary research on issues related to minorities and majorities in a European perspective and to contribute to the improvement of interethnic relations in those parts of Western and Eastern Europe where ethno-political tension and conflict prevail.

ECMI Working Papers are written either by the staff of ECMI or by outside authors commissioned by the Centre. As ECMI does not propagate opinions of its own, the views expressed in any of its publications are the sole responsibility of the author concerned.

ECMI Working Paper # 99

European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI)

Director: Prof. Dr. Tove H. Malloy

© ECMI 2017

ISSN 1435-9812; ISSN-Internet 2196-4890



ETHNIC MINORITIES AND MINORITY RIGHTS IN EUROPE: THEORETICAL TYPOLOGIES

Based on earlier work (Anderson, 1989,1990) which was partially included in a presentation, "Defining Ethnic Minorities and Minority Rights in Europe: Implications of the 'New Migration'" , at ECMI on May 4, 2017, this working paper describes and exemplifies four theoretical typologies, respectively on types of 'indigenous' (i.e. non-immigrant) minority situations; 'immigrant' minorities; alternative state policies; and minority responses to state policies.

Prof. Dr. Alan B. Anderson

September 2017

ECMI Working Paper # 99

I. TYPES OF 'INDIGENOUS' MINORITY SITUATIONS

In this paper, by 'indigenous' is meant non-immigrant ethnic minorities, often called 'ethno-linguistic', 'regional', 'traditional', or 'national' minorities, distinguished from ethnic minorities of immigrant origin.¹ Such minorities are found in ten types of situations:

First, a **compact 'homeland'** territory within a specific country (which may even be a nation-state), yet not where minority status

is created by the drawing of international frontiers.

For example, within France Bretagne is entirely within France; Corsica is politically in France yet beyond continental France; and Occitanie, the territory of the Occitan language² is almost entirely within France, except for the Val d'Aran in Spain and the Vals Vaudois in Italy. Lusatia, the Sorb homeland within Germany, also



exemplifies this type of minority situation.

Second, **cross-border minorities** occur when a language minority may culturally – but not necessarily politically – represent the linguistic majority across the border in the neighbouring country; ie. the international boundary does not precisely coincide with the ethno-linguistic frontier, thus creating what may be called an ‘overspill effect’.

Numerous examples are found in Europe:

In Scandinavia, Swedish-Finns and Aland Islanders in Finland; conversely, Tornedalian Finns in Sweden. A Norsk dialect is spoken in Jamtland and Bohus in Sweden, while the Scania dialect in southernmost Sweden has Danish affinity.

In Belgium, Flemish is related to Dutch, Walloon to French, while German-speakers concentrate in the east. Similarly, in Luxembourg French is an official national language and widely spoken, whereas the prevalent local dialect is Letzeburgesch, a form of German.

In France, Flemish has been spoken historically in French Flanders/Frans-Vlaanderen, German dialect in Alsace-Lorraine/Elsass-Lothringen, and Italian in frontier areas of Alpes-Maritimes (created by border changes after the Second World War).

The British Channel Islands (Iles Normandes) have to some extent retained Norman French.

In Spain, Gallego is related to Portuguese; predominant in Galicia, it is also

spoken across the provincial border in neighbouring Leon and Asturias; while Spanish dialect-speakers (Mirandais) are found in a small frontier area in Portugal. Similarly, Catalan is spoken across the provincial border from Catalonia into the frontier zone called La Franja in Aragon.

In Switzerland, German predominates in seventeen fifteen cantons and demi-cantons, French in four, three cantons share German and French, one is Italian, and one is mixed German, Romansch, and Italian.

In Italy, a Franco-Provencal dialect related to French predominates in Aosta, Occitanien – again related to French – in the Vals Vaudois, and German in Südtirol.

Remnants of Italian settlement are found in Istria and Dalmatia, along the Adriatic coast of Slovenia and Croatia.

Hungarian (Magyar)-speakers extend all across the frontiers between Hungary and all seven neighbouring countries: Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania (Transylvania), Serbia (Voivodina), Croatia (Baranja), Slovenia (Prekmura), and Austria (Burgenland). Hungarian-speakers in Romania (represented by a strong political party, the Democratic Union of Magyars of Romania), Szeklers and Csangos form a strong historic presence in Transylvania and Moldavia.

Frontier areas of Serbia speak Romanian and Bulgarian.

Beyond the border with Croatia, ethnic Serb concentrations are found across the border (in Krajina and Slavonia); and



Kosovo – predominantly Albanian-speaking and Islamic – contains a large Serbian minority.

Polish is spoken in one frontier district of Moravia, in the Czech Republic.

Ruthenian (related to Ukrainian) is spoken in eastern Slovakia, Ukrainian and Russian among ethnic Ukrainians and Lipovenes (Old Believers) in the Danube estuary in Romania.

Poles, Ukrainians, and Russians predominate in certain border areas of Belarus.

Russian-speakers form substantial proportions of the populations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.³ Conversely, Livonians (speaking an Estonian dialect) are historic settlers of Courland in Latvia. Ingrians (also related linguistically to Finns and Estonians) are settled between St. Petersburg and the Estonian border. Finns and Karelians predominate in the area between St. Petersburg and the border with Finland. Russians also predominate in eastern Ukraine and Crimea, form a substantial minority in Transnistria in Moldova, and are numerous in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

A good example of ethnic minorities across international frontiers in the Caucasus would be ethnic Armenians in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and (at least historically) Turkey.

Third, the situation becomes more complicated when minorities exist in both directions at the same point across the boundary, ie. when the predominant population of one country constitutes a

minority across the border in a neighbouring country and vice-versa. This unique situation may lead to a ‘trade-off’ in recognizing minority rights.

We could distinguish further between ‘bipartite minority reciprocity’ and ‘tripartite’.

A classic case of **bipartite minority reciprocity** is exemplified in southern Jutland/Sønderjylland. In 1864 all of southern Jutland was annexed by Prussia. After the defeat of Germany in the First World War, in 1920 a referendum on exactly where to determine the international border between Germany and Denmark was imposed by the victorious Allies; the border was moved southward to follow the demarcation between predominantly Danish-speaking population and predominantly German. However, this left a substantial German-speaking minority north of the new border within Denmark and conversely a substantial Danish-speaking minority to the south within Germany. A 1949 statute was intended to assure mutual protection of these minorities, evidenced in a network of German-language schools, institutions, and churches within Denmark and the same for Danes in the neighbouring region of Germany. Following the Second World War (and German occupation of Denmark) there had been considerable diminution of the Danish minority in Germany and an exodus of Germans from Denmark. Today the Danish minority in the Land of Schleswig-Holstein, Germany, is estimated at



approximately 50 thousand of Danish ethnicity, but variously between 15-40 thousand Danish-speaking; whereas the German minority in Sønder Jyllands amt, Denmark, is about half that number, 25 thousand.⁴

Other obvious historic cases have been Turks in Greece vs. Greeks in Turkey; Serbs in Croatia vs. Croatians in Serbia; Slovenes in Hungary vs. Hungarians in Slovenia; Ukrainians in Poland vs. Poles in Ukraine; Belarussians in Poland vs. Poles (Eg. Kashubes) in Belarus; Slovaks in Poles in Moravia vs. Czechs in Slovakia; Ukrainians south of the border in the Romanian part of Bukovia vs. Romanians north of the border in Ukraine; the concentration of ethnic Turks in southern and eastern Bulgaria vs. ethnic Bulgarians in eastern Thrace in Turkey; Russians in eastern Ukraine vs. Ukrainians in the Kuban region of Russia; and so forth....

Tripartite minority reciprocity is exemplified by an even more complicated three-way situation of minorities across international borders. For example, where the borders of Austria, Italy, and Slovenia meet, on the Italian side there are historic Slovenian and German-speaking communities as well as Friulian (the Val Canale in Italian is known as das Kanaltal in German, Kanalska Dolina in Slovenian, and Chianal de Fele in Friulian); across the border in Slovenia there are historic Italian and German communities in or near the Val Soci-Trenta/Soca; while in Austria there is a

substantial Slovenian minority in Carinthia. Again, across the frontiers of Greece, Macedonia, and Albania are similar minorities: Greeks, Vlachs, and Macedonians in Albania; Albanians, Vlachs, Macedonians, and Turks in Greece; a large number of Albanians, as well as Greeks, Rom, Turks, Torbesi and Goranci (Islamized Macedonians) in Macedonia.

Fourth, what could be termed '**imposed minority internationality**' occurs where an ethno-linguistic minority indigenous to a specific territory (like a compact homeland) has been divided between two or more countries: Catalans are divided between Spain, France, Andorra, and even Italy; Basques, between Spain and France; Frisians, between the Netherlands, Germany and historically Denmark; Sami, between Norway, Sweden, Finland, Russia; Macedonians, between Macedonia, Greece, and Bulgaria; the Setu minority (Estonian-speaking but Russian Orthodox in religion) straddles the border between Estonia and Russia; and in the Caucasus Ossetians are divided between Severo (north) Ossetia ASSR in Russia and Yugo (south) Ossetia Autonomous Oblast in Georgia (now occupied by separatist forces supported by Russia).

Fifth, a **diaspora** situation characterizes widely scattered minorities (Cohen, 1997; Van Hear, 1998), who may nonetheless have a traditional homeland, such as Armenians and Jews; or who may not recognize such a homeland, such as



Roma/Gypsies, Vlachs/Aroumanians (scattered throughout the southern Balkans in Greece, Albania, and Macedonia), Tatars (although some of whom may consider Crimea to be such a homeland). The German-speaking Walser are named after their original homeland, the canton of Wallis/Valais in Switzerland, from which they migrated during the late medieval period to re-establish their unique communities across the high Alps of Italy, the cantons of Graubunden and Ticino in Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and Austria.

The Jewish population of Europe was thoroughly redistributed after the Holocaust. The largest number of Jews today are in France, Russia, Ukraine, and Britain, followed by Germany, Hungary, Belarus, Belgium, Turkey, Italy, and the Netherlands.⁵

Rom or Gypsies in Europe were similarly reduced during the Second World War genocide. Current estimates tend to range widely, from more than two million in Romania, to hundreds of thousands in Spain, Bulgaria, Hungary, Turkey, Serbia, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Greece, Germany, Macedonia, Britain, Italy, Albania.⁶

Sixth, **linguistically and culturally interrelated minorities** (typically advocating linguistic revival) may merit unique consideration, such as Celtic peoples⁷, Frisians⁸, and Rhaeto-Romansh peoples⁹.

Seventh, there are **minorities within minorities**. Some interesting cases are Ladins within Südtirol¹⁰; Walser in Aosta¹¹;

and the Val d’Aran¹².

Eighth, there are **isolated ‘language islands’**, ie isolated ethno-linguistic communities: Walser communities (speaking Walser-Deutsch/Walser-Titsch, a unique Swiss-German dialect) are scattered in high Alpine settings from Switzerland through Italy, Liechtenstein, and Austria.¹³ Other isolated ethnic German communities are situated in Trentino and Friulia in Italy.¹⁴ And other ethnic communities - Albanian, Greek, and Croatian – are found in southern Italy.¹⁵

Volksdeutsche (ethnic German) settlements were scattered throughout Eastern Europe for centuries. Apart from the contiguous German areas in what is now Poland (East and West Prussia, Silesia), Russia (Königsberg/Kaliningrad), and the Czech Republic (Sudetenland), these have notably included major settlements in Slovakia, Slovenia, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, and Russia.¹⁶

Tatars have settled widely in Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria. Moreover other minorities in Ukraine have included Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Jews.

Ninth, a special case could be **minorities in pluralist states or regions**, notably: Voivodina in Serbia¹⁷, perhaps Bosnia¹⁸, or Graubunden/Grisons canton in Switzerland¹⁹.

And finally, tenth, there has been the transformation of former ‘homeland territories’ into **recreated nation-states**,



exemplified in major territorial components of former ethnic federations: Yugoslavia (member republics with the exception of Bosnia), and the USSR (14 member republics – SSRs...of course, Russia remains a complex ethnic federation).

So, in sum, what we have called ‘indigenous minorities’ in the European context (alternatively equated with ‘traditional’, ‘regional’, ‘national’, or ‘ethno-linguistic’ minorities) may be classified or differentiated by a variety of types of situations.

II. IMMIGRANT MINORITIES

‘Immigrant minorities’ are ethnic minorities which have originally come from other countries, thus lack a territorial base within an adopted country where they have resettled.

Again, a number of distinct types may be distinguished:

First, what could be called ‘imperial relics’ are remnants of imperial settlement policies, representing ethnic kinship with the colonizing power, yet remaining behind after de-colonization or independence. Obviously these are more characteristic of colonial empires, however are also found in Europe, for example in the former Yugoslavia, ethnic Germans and Hungarians (settled within the historic Austro-Hungarian Empire) and Turks and other Moslems (settled within the former Ottoman Empire); or perhaps in a

sense the former USSR (resulting in ethnic Russian concentrations in the republics outside of Russia).

Imperial/colonial settlement policies have created ethnic settlements not representative of the colonizers but of the colonizing powers. For example, Czechs, Slovaks, and Ruthenians in Voivodina; or perhaps Volksdeutsche in Ukraine and Russia (insofar as they were originally settled in newly acquired territories of the Russian Empire during the 18c).

‘Metropolitan migrants’ are colonial migrants from former colonies to the ‘metropolis’ – the home country of the colonizer. Such migrants may represent the ethnicity of the colonizing power, as in the case of ‘les Pieds Noirs’, ethnic French from Algeria resettled in Corsica. Or (far more often the case) they may not represent the ethnicity of the colonial power: as in France, Francophone Africans, Indochinese, Lebanese, Pacific islanders, Reunionais, Haitians, Algerians, Tunisians, Moroccans; in Britain, West Indians and Indo-Pakistanis; in the Netherlands, Surinamese and Dutch Antillien migrants and Moluccans; in Belgium, Congolese.

So-called economic migrants are distinguished from refugees essentially by their lack of a claim of persecution back home; they are migrating for economic advantage. Clearly most of the current African migrants crossing the Mediterranean could be considered economic migrants. A particular type of economic migrant are



‘middleman minorities’ who have sought a commercial or economic niche in an adopted country, such as Chinese and Vietnamese in Paris, or the Lebanese and Armenian networks.

Such ‘middleman minorities’ can be distinguished from far more massive migrant labour – cheap or skilled migrant labour imported into industrialized countries to supplement a labour shortage and/or allow for the expansion of industrial enterprises on a limited term contract basis. Originally such migrants are allowed into a receiving country presumably on a temporary basis (whatever that may mean), hence the German term ‘gastarbeiter’ – guest workers. However, they have tended to stay in receiving countries for generations. Obvious examples have been particularly Turks in Germany and Mediterranean migrants (Spanish, Portuguese, Italian) in France and Luxemburg.

‘Permanent’ migrants – distinguished from ‘temporary’ contract workers – are regular immigrants mainly from less to more developed countries.

Granted, it has become increasingly perplexing to attempt any realistic distinction between ‘regular’ or ‘economic’ immigrants and ‘refugees’. The latter could be considered primarily urban immigrants who effectively bypass regular immigration procedures. This is not new to Europe – historically they have included Russians, Jews and other East Europeans in Paris. More contemporary refugees have

concentrated in well-defined ethnic neighbourhoods in larger West European cities. And the most recent influx has been of vast numbers of Syrian refugees.

Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that, just as there are various types of non-immigrant minority situations, so too may immigrant-origin minorities be differentiated various ways; they are not all of one type.

III. ALTERNATIVE STATE POLICIES

Alternative state policies toward ethnic minorities have ranged along a continuum from negative to positive treatment.

Obviously the most negative policies would be **physical genocide**, complete extermination of a minority – exemplified in Europe in the Holodomor (famine) in Ukraine²⁰, the Holocaust²¹, as well as Nazi policies to get rid of Gypsies²², and earlier the Turkish genocide against Armenians²³, and most recently the Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia²⁴.

Of course, it is possible to get rid of a minority short of killing all of them, as in **‘ethnic cleansing’ or expulsion** (Bell-Fialkoff, 1996). This has been exemplified repeatedly in the Balkans: During the Balkan Wars in 1912-13, 150 thousand Moslems were transferred from Greece and Bulgaria to Turkey²⁵; then during the 1990s in Bosnia the forced removal of Moslems and Croats from lands claimed by Serbs, and vice-versa; while



other forced ethnic population removal or extermination was occurring in Croatia, Serbia, and Kosovo.

The mass expulsion of Volksdeutsche and even Reichsdeutsche from Eastern Europe following the Second World War; an estimated 17 million Germans from what would become Poland (West and part of East Prussia, Pomerania, Posen, Silesia) plus 3.5 million from Czechoslovakia (primarily Sudetenland)²⁶.

An interesting variation on ethnic cleansing is **population exchanges** – one of the largest being between Greeks and Turks following the Balkan War and First World War. In an ‘unofficial’ sense, the exodus of Danes from formerly Danish territory which became part of Germany after 1864, and of Germans from territory which was returned to Denmark in 1920, could also be illustrative of this process. On a far larger scale, during the First World War more than a million Germans from Pomerania and Prussia were replaced by some 900 thousand Poles, then following the Second World War millions of Germans left territories which would become part of Poland to be replaced by a million and a half Poles transferred from what had been eastern Poland.²⁷

Following the First World War and again in 1923 the forced exchange of 1.4 million Greeks from Turkey with at least half a million mostly Turkish Moslems from Greece occurred.²⁸

Moreover, Joseph Stalin was directly responsible for authorizing the transfers of at

least ten million people from 1929 to 1945 (initially with ‘de-kulakization’ – the dispossession and deportation of millions of peasant families, and collectivization, the abolition of private property in land and the concentration of the remaining peasantry in collective farms under strict Communist Party control, then later with deportation of vast numbers of ethnic Germans to Siberia and central Asia) - and subsequently even more.²⁹

Other, slightly less negative policies have been ‘**repatriation**’ (‘politique de retour’) – sending unwanted migrants ‘home’; and **refusal of entry** – refusing ‘permanent’ residency (apart from short-term work contracts) or citizenship.

What has been called ‘**cultural genocide**’ – **forced assimilation** – still, like all the foregoing policies, represents an attempt to get rid of a minority, in this case by forcing minority members to adapt to the extent that they are obliged to completely lose their ethnic identity (if indeed this is even possible).

In the middle of our continuum would be **conservative policies**, found in countries exhibiting strong centralism. Assimilation may not be as explicit as implicit: minority languages may be recognized to a limited extent yet restricted to private schools in lieu of public financial support . In France, for example, the strongly centralist national government accepts only limited recognition, in various ways, of the peripheral minorities: Flemish, Alsatian –Lorrigan, Corsican and



Italian, Occitanien, Breton (all of whom – with the exception of Italians in Alpes Maritimes – fly their own flags). Other examples of relative non-[territorial] recognition may arguably be Rom; Jews; ethnic Germans; Crimean Tatars; Pomaks in Bulgaria; etc.

More moderate policies may be found in countries with relatively weaker or more limited centralism, where assimilation is abandoned as a general state policy, yet still advocated by conservative political factions. Ethnic minorities may have gained limited recognition – but short of full autonomy – by the national government. Such is the case for designated ethnic regions in Germany: Danes in South Jutland, North Friesland, Saterland, Ost Friesland, and Lusatia (the Sorb homeland)(Bundesminister des Innern, 2012). The Sami across four countries in Scandinavia and Russia possess their own parliament, which acts as quite an effective political lobby yet has limited – if any – national state recognition.

Yet notable cases of **regional autonomy** are found in Europe – explicit recognition of minority territorial rights, thus a minority forms a virtual ‘state-within-a-state’, so a minority language is official at this regional level. Of course, just as there is wide variation in state treatment of ethnic minorities, there is a variety of degrees of state recognition of ethnic minorities in the form of political autonomy or self-government. What could be considered intermediary recognition of minority rights,

thus limited or partial autonomy, may include, for example:

- Formal recognition of an ethnic minority’s right to fly their own flag – but perhaps only in special circumstances or on certain relevant occasions. A minority’s flag could variously have official status (nationally, regionally, or locally); such a flag could be used by regional or local institutions; it could represent a political or revendicative movement; or perhaps it is completely unofficial.
- The right of an ethnic minority to teach their own traditional language in their own separate schools, to develop their own unique curriculum in these schools and to run these schools; concomitantly the right of minority children (and perhaps older students) to attend such schools.
- The right to utilize their traditional language on commercial and institutional signage (whether exclusively or together with the prevalent national language). However, this can become complicated – for example in predominantly English-speaking Canada ethnic minorities are not restricted in visibly using their languages, whereas in the province of Quebec – where French is dominant – signage must always be



predominantly in the official provincial language (ie. French).

- And the right to have public signage, such as road or traffic signs and signs identifying communities in the minority language (at least together with a national language).

The actual degree of self-government may be highly variable, ranging from limited control over narrowly-defined jurisdictions which may be very localized, to virtually or almost all aspects of governance over broad regions. (see, for example, Moynihan, 1994; Cassese, 1995)

In Spain, full autonomy is recognized for the Basque Region and Navarra, Catalonia, and Galicia, and limited autonomy for Aragon, Asturias, and Andalucia.³⁰

Other examples of varying degrees of autonomy would be Friesland in the Netherlands (where Frisian is a mandatory school language, even for the children of non-Frisian families); Aosta, Trentino-Alto Adige, Friulia, and Sardinia in Italy; Voivodina in Serbia; Greenland and the Faroe Islands in Denmark; the Aland Islands in Finland; Scotland, Northern Ireland, and to a limited extent Wales, as well as the Channel Islands and Isle of Man within the UK; the German minority in eastern Belgium; Transylvania in Romania (officially autonomous from 1952 to 1968).

At a national rather than regional level, **official bilingualism or even trilingualism** is found in Belgium (Dutch and French at a national level, German at a

regional level) and Luxemburg (officially French and German whereas a localized Germanic dialect, Letzeburgesch, is widely spoken and recognized).³¹ Finland is defined as an officially bilingual country (in Finnish and Swedish). Cyprus, too, is divided between two virtually independent states.

In an **officially pluralist state**, of course, there is by definition no dominant ethnic group. Within **ethnic federalism**, a national state as a whole is viewed essentially as a partnership between ethnic/ethno-linguistic minorities (and possibly a dominant group, such as in Russia), so principal minority languages are officially recognized. The former Yugoslavia and USSR encompassed far-ranging ethnic federalism, and Russia still does, however not all ethnic minorities are permitted territorial, linguistic or political rights (as already noted, large numbers of ethnic Germans, Jews, and Roma are excluded, while Crimean Tatars and Karelian-Finns lost their onetime autonomy). Within the former Soviet republics, autonomous status was granted at three levels: an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR), an Autonomous Oblast(AO), and a Nationality Okrug(NO). Today Russia remains a complex ethnic federation; moreover three Caucasus countries, as well as Moldova, which were republics within the USSR have also inherited this complex structure granting varying degrees of political recognition to ethnic minorities.³² (Kaufman, 2001; Boniface and Védrine, 2016).



On this theoretical continuum, in progressing from autonomy to the most positive policy would have to be complete independence, in which case a minority now forms a **recreated nation-state**. Thus, the autonomous republics within former Yugoslavia have become independent countries in their own right (with Bosnia-Hercegovina now divided and Montenegro and Kosovo added), as have all of the republics comprising the former Soviet Union; however this could be disadvantageous to other ethnic minorities.

In sum, to repeat, there are many sorts of minority policies affecting the question of minority rights, ranging from disastrous to very liberal. Moreover, it is important to understand that minority ‘rights’ in the view of minorities themselves – and possibly in varying degrees of governments – may be considered to be not necessarily ‘rights’ but ‘privileges’ by others. Traditional rights of national minorities in Europe have been well documented (for example, by Kühl, 2000; Gal, 2002; ECMI, 2005; Malloy, 2013; Medda-Windischer, 2009).

IV. MINORITY RESPONSES TO STATE POLICIES

It is one thing to suggest a continuum of state policies from negative to positive, another thing to suggest that minorities tend to react to state policies along a continuum ranging from active to passive.

The most active form of minority response is clearly violent terrorism, exemplified among ‘indigenous’ minorities in Europe by ETA in the Basque country (perhaps until April 2017, when they agreed to surrender their arms), IMRO (advocating a Greater Macedonia), the Breton Liberation front, Front National de Libération Corsicain, the IRA and the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland, etc. Increasingly among immigrant minorities, just in recent months we have witnessed acts of terrorism in several European countries – yet not all terrorist acts have been committed by immigrants, nor have they represented entire minorities.

Further along this continuum would be well-organized, actively mobilized political parties or factions advocating separatism (ie complete independence or increased autonomy). These have been winning extensive concessions to language rights and autonomy – for example, Basques, Catalans, Galicians, Flemings and Walloons, South Tyrolese, and nationalist parties such as the Scottish Nationalist Party in Scotland and Plaid Cymru in Wales.

Somewhat docile, but better organized, exhibiting latent ethno-nationalism and ethnic solidarity – but short of political recognition of autonomy and limited politicization could be – for example – Flemish, Alsatians, and the Mouvement Occitanien in France; Sami, Sorbs, North Frisians, Volksdeutsche, Kashubians, etc.

And lastly, rather submissive or disorganized, exhibiting relatively little (or



even no) politicization, could arguably include Gypsies, Vlachs, Ladins?

The point here is that there is a broad range in minority politicization. Moreover, this is constantly changing.

V. CONCLUSION

This working paper has concentrated primarily on what could be termed ‘indigenous’ minorities – equated with what have variously been called ‘ethno-linguistic’, ‘regional’, ‘traditional’, or ‘national’ minorities. Four theoretical typologies were outlined and exemplified. The first typology described ten types of ‘indigenous’ (ie. non-immigrant) minority situations, whereas the second typology focused on ‘immigrant’ minorities. Then a third typology analyzed several types of alternative national state policies toward ethnic minorities, ranging along a continuum from negative to positive treatment. Here our attention was mainly on non-immigrant minorities, however of course immigrant minorities could also be analyzed through such a schemata. It is one matter to have state policies, quite another to discern how any given minority might react to such treatment; so this is suggestive of another continuum ranging from relatively stronger reaction to weaker. Again, obviously this is

applicable to both non-immigrant and immigrant minorities.

As the original talk, upon which this working paper is partially based, suggested, distinguishing especially between ‘indigenous’ (ie. non-immigrant) minorities, on the one hand, and new migrants and refugees from ‘non-traditional’ origins, on the other hand, could lead into a timely debate on the possible effect of the ‘new migration’ on attitudes and changing state policies toward ‘national minorities’. Specifically, will new refugees and economic migrants be entitled to the same basic rights as longer-established minorities, including both regional minority populations and older ethnic minority populations concentrated in urban areas? What may be the policy implications of the ‘new migration’ serving to re-enforce long existing urban ethnic concentrations in particular neighbourhoods (and possibly to develop new concentrations)? The recognition of perceived minority rights within traditional or re-established nation-states can be compared to states built upon the basis of ethnic pluralism in Europe,; and multiculturalism and ethnic pluralism policies (or lack of them) in Europe may be informatively compared with primarily immigrant-origin countries with diverse populations (including indigenous in the narrower sense of the term) beyond Europe.



Endnotes

¹ On varieties of ethnic identification and definition of ethnic minorities, see, for example: Medda-Windischer's (2009) differentiation between 'old' and 'new' minorities; Jackson-Preece's (2014) analysis of "past and present definitions of 'minority' in order to evaluate current trends and future opportunities regarding the identification of minority rights holders"; the discussion of 'connections' and 'disjunctures' in defining ethnicity, race, and nation in Fenton and May (2002); and the description of ethnic, national, cultural, multicultural, and diasporic identities in Halpern (2016).

² Occitanie, the territory of the Occitan language, consists of Moyen Occitan – the Gascon, Languedocien, and Provençal varieties, and Nord Occitan – the Limousin, Auvergnat, and Provençal-Alpin dialects.

³Russians comprise more than a quarter of the population of Estonia (but as high as 75-94% in some northern coastal towns), about a third of the population of Latvia (but outnumber ethnic Latvians in five cities); and less than 10% in Lithuania (but 25-30% in the major cities of Vilnius and Klaipeda). Russian Old Believers are found all along eastern border areas. (Plasseraud, *Atlas des Minorités en Europe*, 2005).

⁴ At the time of partition, Germans were concentrated in the larger cities and towns in this region of Denmark: Tondern (in German)/Tønder (in Danish), Apenrade/Aabenraa, Hadersleben/Haderslev, Sonderburg/Sønderborg, as well as Kolding; and particularly in smaller communities and rural districts: Lügumkloster/Løgumkloster, Hoyer/Højer, Osterhorst/Osterhøjst, Bulderup/Bylderup, Pattburg/Padborg, Kollund, Kragelund, Wilsbek/Vilsbaek, Feldstedt/Felsted, Rothenburg/Rodekro, Rapstedt/Ravsted, Sundewitt/Sundeved, etc. Conversely, south of the border in Germany, Danes were concentrated in cities and larger towns: Flensburg (in Danish)/Flensburg (in German), Slesvig/Schleswig, Egernfjord/Eckernförde, Husem/Husum; and in many smaller communities and rural districts: Angel/Angeln, Bredsted/Bredstedt, Vestreland/Westerland, Nibøl/Niebull, Laek/Leck, Rendsborg/Rendsburg, Danevirke, Hedeby, Jernved/Danischer Wohld, Svans/Schwansen, Kappel/Kappeln, Sønderløgum/Süderlögum, Braderup, Lindholm, Sorup, Rieseby, Bramstedlund, Achterup, Osterby, Weesby, Medelby/Holt, Ladelund, Karlum..... (See Wikipedia; the Official Website of Denmark; Südschleswigscher Pressedienst/Sydsjællands Pressetjeneste, 2017).

⁵ The largest numbers of Jews today are in France (estimated 600 thousand), Russia (450 thou.), Ukraine (310 thou.), Britain (300 thou.), Germany (60-180 thou.), Hungary (70 thou.), Belarus (45 thou.), Belgium (40 thou.), Turkey (30-40 thou.), Italy (30 thou.), and the Netherlands (30 thou.); others are widely scattered in almost every European country. (These data from *Atlas*, 2005).

⁶ Estimates of Rom/Gypsies are: in Romania (1.8-2.5 million), Spain (700-800 thou.), Bulgaria (700-800 thou., many concentrated in Sofia, Plovdiv, Varna, and Slivem), Hungary (550-600 thou.), Turkey (400-500 thou.), Serbia with Montenegro (400-450 thou.), Slovakia (480-520 thou.), Czech Rep. (250-300 thou.), Greece (200-300 thou.), Germany (150-200 thou.), Macedonia (120-160 thou.), Britain (90-120 thou.), Italy (90-110 thou.), Albania (90-100 thou.); tens of thousands are found in Ireland, Netherlands, Belgium,



Portugal, Bosnia, Croatia, Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova; and smaller numbers (less than 10 thou.) in Finland, the Baltics, and Slovenia. (These data from *Atlas 2005*; also see Medda-Windischer, 2014; ECMI, 2014; STP, 2014).

⁷ What are now considered to be Celtic peoples are divided into two major linguistic groupings: Goidelic languages – Scottish Gaelic (still spoken in the Highlands and Hebrides) and Irish (an official national language of the Irish Republic, but largely restricted to the official Gaeltacht zone, primarily along the western coast), and Brythonic languages – Welsh (official and commonly spoken), Breton (taught and spoken in Bretagne, France), Cornish and Manx (long dead but being revived).

⁸ Frisians are separated into three major linguistic divisions: West, East, and North. West Frisian (Westfrysk, Westerlauwersk), primarily in the Province of Friesland in the Netherlands, consists of five specific dialects (as well as subdialects): Klaaifrysk (including Westereendersk), Waldfrysk (including Noardhoeks), South Frisian/Sudhoeks, Sudwesthoeksk, and Hindeloopen/Hylpersk in the mainland. Out in the West Frisian islands, the Skiermuntseagersk dialect – spoken on Schiermonikoogs/Skiermuntseach - is best preserved; the Aastersk and Westersk dialects were found on Terschelling/Skylge, whereas “island Frisian” (actually now primarily Dutch) is spoken on Vlieland/Flylan and Ameland/Amelan. On Texel/Teksel and the adjacent mainland district called West Friesland, within the province of Noord Holland/Noard Hollan, a Dutch dialect with some Frisian influence is spoken. The dialects of It Bildt and Kollumerland in Friesland are essentially Dutch, while Stadfries – spoken in the city of Leeuwarden/Ljouwert – is a mixture of Frisian and Dutch. Frisian is also spoken across the provincial border in the neighbouring province of Groningen around Marum/Marearum.

In East Friesland/Ostfriesland/Easter Fryslan, in Lower Saxony/Niedersachsen, Germany, the predominant local language is a variety of Low German/Plattdeutsch, yet out on the East Frisian Islands, Frisian influence is found in the Wangerooge and Warsten Frisian dialects. The best preserved East Frisian language is still found to the south in Saterland/Saeterlound, around the communities of Strücklingen/Strukelje, Ramsloh/Roomelse, Sedelsberg/Seeidelsbierich, Scharrel/Schäddel, and Friesoythe.

North Frisian/Nordfriesisch/Noardfrysk consists of five mainland dialects (including subdialects): Wiedingharder, Bokingharder, West- and East-Mooring, Karrharder, and Norder-, Mittel-, and Süder-Goesharder; plus five dialects spoken on the North Frisian Islands: Sölring on Sylt, Fering on Föhr, Oömrang on Amrum, Hallig-friesisch on the Halligen islands, and Halunder/Hollilonj on Helgoland. The Strand and Eiderstedt dialects are now regarded as essentially historical. The historic North Frisian area extends up into Denmark: the northernmost of the North Frisian Islands (Rømø, Mandø, and Fanø, where elements of Frisian have been mixed with the local Jutish regional dialect). Communities in the North Frisian region coastal region have tended to be trilingual in Frisian, German, and Danish.

⁹The linguistically related Rhaeto-Romanish/Rhaeto-Romance minorities in Switzerland and Italy similarly represent considerable linguistic complexity. The Romansch/Rumantsch/Romauntsch languages in the Swiss canton of Graubunden/Grisons (standardized as Rumatsch Grischun) may be subdivided into distinct dialects: Engadinish (further subdivided into Puter/Upper Engadinish and Vallader/Lower Engadinish),



Surmiran, Sutsilvan, Sursilvan, Jauer/Val Mustair Romansch, Tujetsch/Val Medel Romansh. The Val Bregaglia dialect is Lombard Italian with Puter influence.

In Italy, Ladin dialects may vary from valley to valley: in South Tyrol, unique dialects of the Athesian-Sella group are spoken in the Val Gardena/Val Gherdeina, Badiot in Val Badia and Maro in Mareo; in the province of Trentino, dialects of the Trentinian-Sella group (Moenat, Brach, Cazet) in Val Fassa, and Ladin dialects mixed with localized Italian dialects in Val di Non, Val di Sole, and other valleys; in Belluno province, dialects of the Agordino-Sella group (Livinallongo-Fodom/Livinallese), Ampezzo-Cortinese/Anpezo and Caderino , and a variety of localized Ladin-influenced Venetian dialects. Farther east, in Friulia, the related Friulan/Friulano/Marilenghe language is spoken, with local variations from Italian (Venetian). German, and Slovenian admixtures.

¹⁰ See Eisenberg and Spinner-Halev, 2005. The Ladin-speaking minority in valleys within South Tyrol/Südtirol are situated in a region of Italy where German is an officially recognized language; thus Ladin is the group's traditional language, German an official regional language, while Italian is the national language.

¹¹In the autonomous region of Aosta in northwestern Italy, the linguistic complexity becomes even greater. Several communities in the Val Gressoney are Walser, so speak the unique Walser dialect of German, very different from standard German; yet the region of Aosta speaks the Franco-Provençal dialect, whereas standard French is official; and their Italian neighbours use the Piemontese dialect , again distinct from Italian, which is the national language. So, incredulously, it is possible that a Walser in the Val Gressoney would be familiar with three dialects and three standard languages.

¹² Again, the local (and demi-official) language in the Val d'Aran in Spain is the Aranese dialect of Gascon, a form of Occitan; yet this valley is situated within Catalonia, where Catalan is the official regional language while Spanish is the national language.

¹³ Walser settlements include, in Italy: Gressoney-la Trinité/Greschonei-Dryfaltigkeit, Gressoney-St-Jean/Greschonei-Sent-Johann, and Issime/Eischime in the Val Gressoney/Greschoneital in the province of Aosta; and Alagna/Lann, Rima, Macugnana/Makana, Rimella/Remalljo and Grondo/Grund, Ornavasso/Urnafasch-Turm, and the Val Formazza/Pomattal in Piemonte. In Switzerland, besides their original homeland in the canton of Valais/Wallis, Walser settled Bosco-Gurin/Griin in the canton of Ticino; the Hinterrhein and Averserhein valleys and around Davos. In Leichtenstein, they settled Triesenberg and the Alpine interior. And in Austria, among several Walser settlements is the Klein Walsertal.

¹⁴ The Mocheni dialect is spoken in the Fersental, in Trentino province; Zimbern (Cimbrian) dialect in several historic German settlements (eg. Luserna/Lusern, Folgaria/Vielgereut, Lavarone/ Lafraun/, Giazza/Glietzen/Ljetsan, and around Asiago/Sleghe) in Veneto; while other German language islands are found in Friulia (Sauris/Zahre, Sappada/Bladen, and Timau/Tischlwang).

¹⁵ Italo-Albanian/Arbëreshë communities are widely scattered throughout the Mezzogiorno (southern Italy): Sicily (3 communities), Calabria (31), Crotone (3), Campania (1), Basilicata (5), Apulia (3),



Abruzzo-Molise (6).

There are 15 Greek/Griko communities in Grecia Salentino plus another 13 in the rest of Salento Province, and 46 in Calabria and Monteleone.

Three Croatian settlements are found in Molise. (Wikipedia, July 2017)

¹⁶ Notable German settlements have been: the Zipser settlements in Slovakia; the Gottschee settlement in Slovenia; the Donau-Schwaben (Danube Germans) in Serbia; the Banat, Transylvanian Saxon, and Banat settlements in Romania; the Tulscha settlement in Dobruja, Bulgaria; the Schwarzmeer-Deutsch (Black Sea Germans) and Volhynian Germans in Ukraine; and Wolgadeutsch (Volga Germans) in Russia.

¹⁷ The incredibly diverse autonomous region of Voivodina, in northern Serbia, contains – besides Serbs – Hungarian, Croatian, German, Romanian, Roma, Ruthenian, Czech and Slovak minorities.

¹⁸ Bosnia, now divided between the Serb (Srpska) Republic of Bosnia and the Croatian-Moslem Federation of Bosnia, historically contained - before ‘ethnic cleansing’ during the 1990s – a mixture of Serbs, Croatians, Bosniaks (Bosnian Moslems).

¹⁹ The Swiss canton of Graubunden is largely German-speaking, however contains areas where various Romansch dialects or Italian predominate.

²⁰ The Holodomor (famine) in Ukraine explicitly due to the harsh Stalinist policies of 1932-33 is the greatest genocide ever inflicted upon mankind – if the famine is acknowledged as being an intentional policy of attrition (as is now the prevalent case); an estimated 7-10 million people died. (See Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow*, 1986)

²¹ The attrition of the Holocaust had a profound effect on the Jews of Europe (estimated to have numbered at least 9.6 million before the war. Half of all Jews killed were in Poland, representing 90% of the Jews in that country. Approximately 700 thousand (30%) of Jews in the Soviet Union were exterminated, 270 thou. (40%) of Jews in Romania, 260 thou. (80%) in Czechoslovakia, 180 thou. (50%) in Hungary, 130 thou. (90%) in Lithuania, 120 thou. (25%) in Germany, 100 thou. (80%) in the Netherlands. (*Atlas*, 2005)

²² According to the Holocaust Encyclopedia, “It is not known how many Roma were killed during the Holocaust. While exact figures or percentages cannot be ascertained, historians estimate that the Germans and their allies killed around a quarter of all European Roma. Of slightly less than one million Roma believed to have been living in Europe before the war, the Germans and their Axis partners killed up to 220,000.” (U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2017)

²³ An estimated 1.5 million Armenians lost their lives during the 1915 genocide. Large numbers were also expelled from Turkey, or obliged to change their identity to survive.

²⁴ In the massacre of July 1995, ethnic Serb forces killed over 8,000 Bosniak (Bosnian Moslem) men and boys in this one event.



²⁵ This estimate is derived from *Atlas*.

²⁶ This has been documented in detail in Anderson (1977); also see Bessel and Haake (2011).

²⁷ See Anderson (1977) and *Atlas* (2005) on the exodus of Germans from these territories with border changes.

²⁸ This estimate is from *Atlas* (2005).

²⁹ Persecution of the kulaks is described by Conquest (1986). The deportation of ethnic Germans from Ukraine is detailed in Anderson (2016).

³⁰ The Basque homeland (Euskal Herria/Pais Vasco/Pays Basque) is rather complicated politically: it consists of the Basque Autonomous Region in Spain, comprised of three provinces (Bizkaia/Biscaya, Gipuzkoa/Guipuzcoa, and Araba/Alava), as well as the Comunidad Foral de Navarra/Nafarroa (officially bilingual in Spanish and Basque) in Spain, plus Ipar Euskal Herria (the portion of the Basque country in France), consisting of three traditional Basque districts (Lapurdi/Labourd, Nafarroa Beheria/Baxe Nabarre/Basse Navarre, and Zuberoa/Xibero/Soule), all within the official Département de Pyrénées-Atlantiques.

The Catalan homeland consists of the autonomous region of Catalunya in Spain, comprised of four provinces (Barcelona, Gerona, Tarragona, and Lleida/Lerida). Valencia (largely speaking a variant of Catalan) is a separate autonomous region. And in France, Catalunya-Nord, the former province of Roussillon/Rossello is now the Département de Pyrénées-Orientales. Andorra is independent and Catalan is the national language. The autonomous Val d'Aran is officially Occitanien-speaking, within Spanish Catalunya. The Franja strip in Aragon along the border with Catalonia also claims limited autonomy. In Spain, limited regional autonomy is also granted now to Aragon, Galicia, Asturias, and Andalucia.

³¹ Belgium is divided between four French-speaking provinces (comprising Wallonia) and four Dutch-speaking provinces (Flanders); each region has virtual autonomy, with Brussels - the national capital – officially bilingual. In eastern Belgium, the German-speaking minority is represented by the Deutschsprachigen Gemeinschaft Belgiens; in 1993 constitutional reforms created a German community parliament in Eupen within a federal structure. However, excluded from this jurisdiction have been the German-speaking population of what is called ‘Alt Belgien’ (the parts of Belgium never annexed by Germany), using a Frankish dialect in the north and Letzeburgesch in the south.

³² In the Russian Federation, Finno-Ugrian groups having former ASSR status were Mari, Mordovian, and Komi-Permyak (which also had an NO). Altaic groups having former ASSR status were Udmurt, Chuvash, Tatar, Bashkir, Kalmyk, Kabardin-Balkar (partly), while Karachai-Cherkess (partly) had AO status. Caucasian minority autonomous states were Kabardin-Balkar (partly) and Chechen-Ingush (both ASSR), Karachai-Cherkess (partly) and Adyghen (both AO). An Indo-European minority state, Severo Ossetia had ASSR status. Daghestan (ASSR) was pluralist.

In Georgia, the Abkhaz and Adzhar regions had ASSR status, and Yugo Ossetia was defined as an



AO; today all have separatist inclinations supported by Russia.

An ethnic Armenian enclave, Nagorno Karabakh, was an AO within Azerbaijan, however continues to be regarded as a virtual separatist enclave of Armenia, while Nakhichevan (ASSR) was an enclave of Azerbaijan.

Within Moldova, the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzie (UTAG) is an autonomous state of the Gagauz minority (who are Orthodox Turks).



References

- A.B. Anderson, "Emigration from German Settlements in Eastern Europe: A Study in Historical Demography", *Proceedings of the First Banff Conference on Central and East European Studies*, Banff, Alberta, 1977.
- A.B. Anderson, "Comparative Analysis of Language Minorities: A Sociopolitical Framework", Fourth International Conference on Minority Languages, Fryske Akademy, Ljouwert/Leeuwarden, Netherlands, June 1989; subsequently published in the Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development, 11(1-2), 1990: 119-136.
- A.B. Anderson, "The Origins and Changing Identities of Ethnic Germans in Ukraine and Their Descendants in Canada", *Questions of German History*, Oles Gonchar Dnepropetrovsk National University , Ukraine, 2016.
- Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, *Ethnic Cleansing* (New York : St. Martin's Press, 1996).
- Richard Bessel and Claudia B. Haake (eds.), *Removing Peoples: Forced Removal in the Modern World* (London: The German Historical Institute/Oxford University press, 2011).
- Pascal Boniface et Hubert Védrine, *Atlas des Crises et des Conflits* (Malakoff, France : Armand Colin, 2016).
- Bundesminister des Innern, *Nationale Minderheiten – Minderheiten und Regionalsprachen in Deutschland* (Berlin: 2012).
- Antonio Cassese, *Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal* (Cambridge University Press, 1995).
- Robin Cohen, *Global Diasporas* (University College London Press, 1997).
- Robert Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine* (Edmonton: The University of Alberta Press in Association with the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986).
- ECMI, *ECMI's Work on and with Roma* (Flensburg: ECMI, 2004).
- ECMI, *Minority Guide to Ethnic and National Minority Issues in Europe* (Flensburg: ECMI, 2005).
- Avigail Eisenberg and Jeff Spinner-Halev (eds.), *Minorities Within Minorities: Equality, Rights and Diversity* (Cambridge University Press, 2005).
- Steve Fenton and Stephen May (eds.), *Ethnonational Identities* (New York: Palgrave, 2002).
- Kinga Gal (ed.), *Minority Governance in Europe*, LGI/ECMI series on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues (Budapest: Open Society Initiative, 2002).



Catherine Halpern (ed.), *Identité(s): L'individu, le groupe, la société* (Auxerre: Sciences Humaines Editions, 2016).

Jennifer Jackson-Preece, “Beyond the (Non) Definition of Minority”, ECMI Brief No. 30, Feb. 2014.

Stuart J. Kaufman, *Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War* (Cornell University Press, 2001).

Jørgen Kühl, *The Federal Union of European Nationalities: An Outline History 1949-99* (Aabenraa: Danish Institute for Border Region Studies, 2000).

Tove H. Malloy (ed.), *Minority Issues in Europe: Rights, Concepts, Policy* (Berlin: Frank and Timme, 2013).

Roberta Medda-Windischer, “Old and New Minorities: Diversity Governance and Social Cohesion from the Perspective of Minority Rights”, in *Old and New Minorities: Reconciling Diversity and Cohesion: A Human Rights Model for Minority Integration* (Bolzano/Bozen: Institute for Minority Rights, EURAC, 2009).

Roberta Medda-Windischer, “A Non-Territorial Minority: The Case of Roma, Sinti and Travellers”, UNO-Innsbruck Summer School lecture series, Austro-American Society, Tyrol, 2014.

Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics* (Oxford University Press, 1994).

Yves Plasseraud pour le Groupement pour les droits des minorités, *Atlas des Minorités en Europe*, Paris: Editions Autrement, 2005.

STP report, *Lost in Transition: The Forced Migration Circle of Roma, Ashkali and Balkan Egyptians from Kosovo*, 2014-15.

Südschleswigscher Pressedienst/Sydslesvigsk Pressetjeneste, *Die Dānen in Südschleswig* (Flensburg/Flensborg, 2017).

U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, *Holocaust Encyclopedia* (accessed July 2017).

Nicholas Van Hear, *New Diasporas: The Mass Exodus, Dispersal and Re-grouping of Migrant Communities* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998).



ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Prof. Dr. Alan B. Anderson

Professor Emeritus of Sociology and former Chair of the International Studies Program at the University of Saskatchewan in Canada

Contact: alan.anderson@usask.ca

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION SEE

EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR MINORITY ISSUES (ECMI)

Schiffbruecke 12 (Kompagnietor) D-24939 Flensburg

☎ +49-(0)461-14 14 9-0 * fax +49-(0)461-14 14 9-19

* E-Mail: info@ecmi.de

* Internet: www.ecmi.de