



EUROPEAN CENTRE
FOR
MINORITY ISSUES

**MINORITIES AND MAJORITIES IN
ESTONIA: PROBLEMS OF
INTEGRATION
AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE EU**

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AND AABENRAA DENMARK
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Preface

In 1997, ECMI initiated several series of regional seminars dealing with areas where inter-ethnic tension was a matter of international concern or where ethnopolitical conflicts had broken out. The first event was an ECMI Black Sea Seminar “From Ethnopolitical Conflict to Inter-Ethnic Accord in Moldova” which brought together policy makers, intellectuals and entrepreneurs from Moldova and its autonomist and separatist peripheries of Gagauzia and Trans-Dniestria. In 1998, three more seminar series were launched: An ECMI West European Seminar “Insular Regions and European Integration: Corsica and the Åland Islands Compared,” an ECMI East Central European Seminar “Inter-Ethnic Relations in Transcarpathian Ukraine,” and an ECMI Baltic Seminar “Minorities and Majorities in Estonia: Problems of Integration at the Threshold of EU.”

This seminar was skilfully organized by ECMI Senior Analyst Dr. Priit Järve, who was efficiently assisted by Mrs Christine Pearce-Jahre, ECMI programme coordinator. It took place from 22 to 25 May 1998 on both sides of the Danish-German border, in Aabenraa (Apenrade), Denmark, and Flensburg (Flensborg), Germany. It brought together representatives of the Estonian government, members of the Russian community in Estonia, officials of international organizations as well as experts from a variety of academic disciplines focusing on the Baltic countries.

The outcome of this intense seminar is contained in this report. ECMI takes full responsibility for the report, which has not been reviewed by the seminar participants. However, the opinions presented in the report do not necessarily reflect the views of ECMI. The target orientedness and constructivity of the seminar participants are best illustrated by three facts: First, a heated controversy between a Western expert and the Head of the OSCE Mission to Estonia resulted in an invitation by the latter to the former to observe the mission on the spot. The result of this exercise, which was co-financed by ECMI, will be published as an ECMI Working Paper. Secondly, the participants of the seminar agreed on the necessity of follow-up seminars, – preferably in Estonia.* And thirdly, in 1998, consultations between ECMI and Estonian Government officials started in order to work out a permanent basis for future cooperation.

Stefan Troebst
ECMI Director 1996-1998

* The first follow-up seminar took place in Tallinn on 8-9 January 1999. The seminar adopted a consensus-backed Statement (see http://www.ecmi.de/activities/tallinn_statement.htm).



Ethnic Composition of the Estonian Population as of 1 January 1998

Ethnic group	Number	%
Estonians	946,646	65.22
Russians	409,111	28.19
Ukrainians	36,929	2.54
Belarussians	21,589	1.49
Finns	13,317	0.92
Tatars	3,271	0.22
Latvians	2,691	0.19
Jews	2,423	0.17
Lithuanians	2,221	0.15
Germans	1,288	0.09
Others	12,003	0.82
TOTAL	1,451,489	100.00

Source: Baltic News Service, 24 August 1998

Note on Terminology

This report reflects the current Estonian usage of terms related to ethnicity and nationality (citizenship). This usage is typical in countries where ethnic nations prevail and civic ones are in formation, especially in the Eastern part of Europe. Although the working language of the seminar was English, misinterpretation might occur if the following semantic peculiarities are not taken into account.

In the text of this report terms such as ‘Estonian’, ‘Estonians’, ‘Russian’, ‘Russians’, ‘German’, ‘Germans’, ‘Jew’, ‘Jews’, ‘Latvian’, ‘Latvians’, etc., follow the usage in the Estonian language by referring to the ethnic origin of persons, not to their citizenship. To avoid misunderstandings, terms such as ‘Estonian citizen’ or ‘citizen of Estonia’, ‘Russian citizen’ or ‘citizen of the Russian Federation’ etc., are used when citizenship is referred to. The terms ‘non-Estonian’ and ‘non-Estonians’ are often used in Estonia to refer to people who are not ethnic Estonians, regardless of their citizenship. Some of them are citizens of Estonia, some of them are not. The main point here is the ethnic origin, which is perceived as different from that of the ethnic Estonians.

The term ‘Russian-speakers’ (or ‘Russian-speaking population’) used in this report is common in contemporary non-academic and academic discourse. In David D. Laitin’s fundamental *Identity in Formation. The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad*. (Cornell University Press, 1998, 417 p.), the term appears in the heading of the book. This term denotes millions of former Soviet citizens who predominantly use Russian in their everyday life and who have been living outside the Russian Federation since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, mostly in the former Soviet republics. However, the term is not precise as to their ethnic origin, mother tongue or current citizenship. For instance, most of the Ukrainians and Belarussians but also many Jews in Estonia, let alone Russians, are Russian-speakers. People are grouped together under the term ‘Russian-speakers’ because they have similar identity problems and have to cope with the official language policies of their countries of residence. The term is often criticized on political grounds for masking diverse needs of various ethnic groups and for promoting the hegemony of ethnic Russians in dealing with minority issues.

While this seminar’s paper-givers are mentioned personally in the report, only the country of origin, as a rule, identifies participants in the discussions.

Background

Estonia has been a multi-ethnic country for centuries. In 1989, when the last census was taken, there were people of about one hundred different ethnic origins living in Estonia (see Table 2 in the Appendix). As of 1 January 1998, according to the Estonian Statistical Board, Estonia's population stood at 1,451,489 of whom 946,646 or 65.2 per cent, were ethnic Estonians. The biggest non-Estonian groups were Russians (409,111 persons or 28.2 per cent of the total population), Ukrainians (36,929 or 2.5 per cent), Belarussians (21,589 or 1.5 per cent), Finns (13,317 or 0.92 per cent), Tatars (3,271 or 0.22 per cent), Latvians (2,691 or 0.19 per cent), Jews (2,423 or 0.17 per cent) and Lithuanians (2,221 or 0.15 per cent). Other ethnic groups were smaller than 1,300 people each. Russians constituted 80 per cent of all non-Estonians living in Estonia. The non-Estonians (504,843 persons or 34.8 per cent of the total population) mostly came to Estonia under the Soviet regime and communicate in Russian, which is why they are often grouped together under the common term 'Russian-speaking population'. No major changes in the ethnic composition of Estonian population have been reported since the beginning of 1998.

However, it should be stressed that, under the Soviet regime, the share of Estonians in the ethnic composition of the population declined significantly from about 90 per cent in 1945 to about 60 per cent in 1989. It happened due to substantial flows of immigration from the Soviet Union – a movement which was engineered from Moscow. Among ethnic Estonians this drastic drop generated existential fears, suspicions about Russians as potential assimilators, and contributed to exclusionist citizenship policies after the restoration of state independence. The strategy of national survival under the Soviets, mostly founded on the Estonian culture and language, added to this exclusionary enterprise.

The history of the Estonians has created their general disposition for ethnicity-based citizenship. This occurred because the Estonian nation was formed and Estonian national identity was constructed largely on the basis of language, before the Estonians were able to establish and maintain their own state in 1918-1940, after which the Soviet Union annexed it.

The political choice that Estonia made during the dissolution of the Soviet Union was not to build a new state but to restore the pre-war Estonian Republic. In the eyes of Estonians this restitution provided the ultimate justification for the subsequent Laws on Citizenship, adopted in 1992 and 1995, which followed the principles of *ius sanguinis* and naturalization. Here restitution means that only persons who were citizens, or at least one

of whose ancestors was a citizen, of the Republic of Estonia on June 16, 1940, when the Soviet troops invaded Estonia and the independent statehood of Estonia ceased *de facto* to exist, have the right to Estonian citizenship, regardless of their ethnic origin.

Therefore, in 1992, almost half a million people in Estonia – immigrants from the Soviet Union – were not entitled to Estonian citizenship. Although they could become citizens through naturalization, they had to meet the requirements of an Estonian language test. Indeed, the latter has proved the main obstacle to naturalization as nearly one quarter of the Russians living in Estonia do not speak any Estonian. This is a legacy of the Soviet period when teaching local languages to Russians was regarded as unimportant and the necessary motivation was lacking. As the poor command of Estonian among Russians was a well-known fact, critics of Estonian citizenship legislation have claimed that the real aim of the language requirements was to exclude as many Russian-speakers from politics and large scale privatization for as long as possible.

While the current naturalization process can be viewed as a politically motivated, cautious and reluctant inclusion, there are cases in which naturalization is ruled out altogether. Explicit refusal to grant citizenship is stipulated in Article 21 of the Estonian Law on Citizenship (adopted on January 19, 1995). It applies to six categories of persons: (1) those who have knowingly submitted false information in applying for citizenship; (2) those who do not observe the constitutional state system of Estonia; (3) those who have acted against the state of Estonia and its security; (4) those who have been sentenced to imprisonment for a period exceeding one year for a criminal offence and who are not considered as rehabilitated with a spent sentence or who have been punished repeatedly for an intentional criminal offence; (5) those who were or are employed by the intelligence or security service of a foreign state; and (6) those who have served in a career position in the armed forces of a foreign state and their spouses. All these persons are not eligible for Estonian citizenship if not Estonian citizens by birth.

The Russian-speaking individuals in Estonia have many problems if their knowledge of the Estonian language is poor or lacking. In addition to blocking their way to Estonian citizenship, it restricts opportunities on the labour market, adding to unemployment. All this gives birth to an acute sense of insecurity regarding the future. Inability to take an active part in political life only deepens the insecurity of non-citizens. Persons without Estonian citizenship can neither belong to the political parties, nor vote or be elected to the parliament. However, in contrast to some other states,

permanent non-citizen residents can vote at local elections. Paradoxically, as noted in the *Estonian Human Development Report 1997* (UNDP: Tallinn, 1997, p.63), while Estonian as an official language should integrate society, in Estonia's multi-ethnic environment it works so far as a culturally, socially and politically segregating factor. It is hoped that the solution will come with time and predominantly through the educational system.

The 1992 national elections resulted in a Parliament (the *Riigikogu*), which was 99 percent ethnic Estonian. There was no formalised dialogue between government and minorities until the President's Roundtable on Minorities was established amid the crisis with local elections of 1993 in north-eastern Estonia where the Russian-speakers constitute a majority. In 1995, when six ethnic Russians were elected to the Parliament, the situation was somewhat relieved but the status of non-citizens remained a serious concern.

In the debate on Estonian citizenship two opposite views have emerged. The Estonian side justifies the existing legislation articulating collective rights of ethnic Estonians on their historical territory, stressing the need to protect Estonian culture and to undo the injustice that the Estonians suffered during the years of Soviet occupation. Thereby, non-Estonians, and particularly Russians, are often explicitly identified as tools of that occupation. The non-Estonian side does not discuss history, rejects all accusations that assume their collective guilt as former occupants and criticises the opponents for not adhering to the international standards of individual human rights and the rights of persons belonging to minorities. While the Estonians underline the importance of learning the Estonian language in the process of acquiring citizenship, the non-Estonian side calls for lower language requirements for citizenship applicants, advocates double citizenship for ethnic Russians and an official status for the Russian language in Estonia.

In parallel to the debate on citizenship, the process of naturalization has brought new members to Estonian citizenry. It is estimated that at the end of 1998 among Estonia's current population almost 80 per cent held Estonian citizenship, 13 per cent (mostly Russian-speakers) were stateless persons, whereas some seven per cent were citizens of other states, mainly of Russia (<http://www.vm.ee/eng/estoday/1999/02cits.html>). This means that among the citizens of Estonia there are about 205,000 of those who are not ethnic Estonians, which represent 18 per cent of all Estonian citizens. Approximately half of them have acquired citizenship through naturalization. This shows that naturalization has achieved certain progress.

At the same time, the Estonian citizenship policy has produced some questionable side-effects. First, almost 100,000 residents of Estonia have become citizens of foreign states (mostly of Russia), which can be considered as a potentially destabilizing factor and a security risk. Second, nearly 200,000 people are still stateless. Large numbers of non-citizens render the political cohesion of Estonian society problematical while their non-participation in the political process on a national level has called the nature of democracy in Estonia into question. This means that inclusion of minority members into the society through national integration remains an important issue for Estonia's political stability, representative democracy, and preparation for accession to the EU.

Until the restoration of Estonia's statehood in 1991, Russians felt they were the majority in Estonia, as they were – though by a narrow margin – in the Soviet Union. Estonians felt that they were a small minority of the Soviet Union. In 1991 the roles were reversed. The mutual, painful process of learning new roles is not yet finished. It is quite complicated for the Russian-speakers since they have to adapt to the situation where the Russian language no longer opens all doors. Instead, they have to learn the local language and strive to integrate. Notwithstanding these challenges, an overwhelming majority of Russians intend to stay in Estonia. Integration will probably prove a serious test for Estonians as well, for it presupposes their readiness, goodwill, and ability to overcome the traumatic experience of the totalitarian past.

Estonia's political elite in its overwhelming majority is striving to make the country a full-fledged member of the European Union. However, in their attempts to meet the requirements for such membership, Estonian decision-makers must, among other requirements, take into account the European Commission's opinion on the issue of the Russian-speaking population residing in Estonia. When discussing the political criteria for membership of Estonia the Commission stated clearly in its Opinion on Estonia's Application for Membership of the European Union that Estonia needs to take measures to accelerate naturalization procedures to enable the Russian-speaking non-citizens to become better integrated into Estonian society. Responding to that challenge, the Estonian Government adopted in February 1998 a policy paper *The Integration of Non-Estonians into Estonian Society. The bases of Estonia's national integration policy* (see Appendix). The main goal of the seminar was to discuss the problems of implementation of these national integration policy guidelines adopted by the Estonian Government.

Introduction of the Seminar

The Seminar was opened by Dr **Stefan Troebst**, Director of the ECMI, in the historical Kompagnietor Building, which the city of Flensburg has provided for the ECMI. Dr Troebst welcomed the participants, calling them a remarkable group of highly qualified experts on Estonia. He stressed that Minister Veidemann had played a crucial role in producing the policy paper of the Estonian Government on national integration. He added that Ambassador Jüri Kahn's previous post was in Moscow, while Ambassador Detlof von Berg is currently the Head of the OSCE Mission to Estonia. Dr. Klara Hallik served as Estonian minister of interethnic relations when the restoration of Estonian statehood had just started. She, along with Mr Aleksander Dushman, Mr Aleksei Semjonov and Mr Sergei Ivanov, MP, all participants of this seminar, is a member of the Estonian Presidential Roundtable on National Minorities. Mr Tiit Käbin is the Chairman of the Constitutional Committee of the Estonian Parliament. Professor Marju Lauristin has been appointed by the Council of Europe as a *Member of the Advisory Committee* (under the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities). Dr Troebst pointed out that the seminar was designed to facilitate the discussion on Estonian national integration taking place in Estonia and beyond. This topic has become more important after Estonia started the process of joining the EU. As evaluated by the European Commission in *Agenda 2000*, "there are no major problems over respect for fundamental rights [in Estonia]. But Estonia needs to take measures to accelerate naturalisation procedures to enable the Russian-speaking non-citizens to become better integrated into Estonian society." In February 1998 the Government of Estonia adopted a policy paper on national integration. By its constructive future orientation this document can be regarded, said Dr Troebst, as a new step in the complex situation in which Estonia found itself demographically and politically after 1991. However, much too often it is extremely difficult to transform even the most carefully considered principles, rules, laws and various other norms into practical improvements. That is why the implementation of Estonian national integration policy might also turn out to be a difficult and time consuming enterprise. The reason that the ECMI has organized this seminar was so that those professionally involved in the implementation process could meet and contribute to the success of national integration in Estonia by scrutinizing the main problems of this process. Dr Troebst concluded his introduction by expressing a wish that the seminar would help the participants achieve a better understanding of the complex problems of national integration in Estonia and would contribute to the success of this process.

The Estonian government's integration strategy

In autumn/winter 1997/98 the Estonian government started developing a strategy for tackling the issue of integration. As a first step a policy paper *The Integration of Non-Estonians into Estonian Society. The bases of Estonia's national integration policy* was drafted within four months by a commission of 18 persons under the responsibility of the Minister of Interethnic Relations of the Republic of Estonia, Mrs. Andra Veidemann. On 10 February 1998 the Estonian government adopted the policy paper (see the text of it in the Appendix).

The first working session of the seminar started with a comprehensive introduction of the policy paper to the audience by Minister **Veidemann**. According to her, the paper is meant to give the Estonian national integration policy a new and clear perspective. It reflects that times have changed since 1991, the year in which Estonia had regained its independence. The Minister emphasized that nowadays the majority of non-Estonians living in the country accept the existence of an independent Estonian state. The attitudes of the Estonians have also developed; they are now much more tolerant to the integration of non-Estonians into Estonian society than just a few years ago. Both developments taken together make integration possible. However, progress in integration of non-Estonians has not only become a possibility but a necessity as well. Integration has to be achieved to counter an unfavourable tendency which can be observed in present day Estonia: the development of two separated societies (language communities) in one state. Bold steps have to be taken to alter this situation.

*Two societies
(language communities)
in one state*

The Minister stressed that there is a consensus on the need for a respective policy of integration, however, not on how this policy should be designed.

*"...ius sanguinis remains
the basis of Estonian
citizenship policy..."*

The adopted policy paper only lays down the overall political context. It is meant to provide guidelines for discussion inside and outside of the government on a national integration policy, finally resulting in the development of a respective programme, or action plan. What, however, is not in question is that Estonian citizenship policy remains conceptually based on *ius sanguinis*. The population of Estonian origin, the Minister argued, is too small (slightly below one million) for keeping its culture and identity alive if a *ius solis* approach were adopted. Further, Estonia can not accept the concept of two official languages (even though Estonian society is multicultural). The Estonian people survived

without statehood over centuries only due to its culture and language; they have to be preserved unbiased. Therefore, the Estonian language has to be regarded as the one and only state language. This means that the core element of integration of non-Estonians into Estonian society has to be learning the Estonian language, which will enhance their chances to participate fully and actively in societal life. This is especially true with respect to children and for that purpose the Russian-language schools have to be remodelled.

Minister Veidemann's view of the integration of non-Estonians into Estonian society was challenged by **Aleksei Semjonov**, Director of the Human Rights Legal Information Centre in Tallinn. He explicitly welcomed the policy paper and acknowledged it as a good first step. Nevertheless, he still regarded the approach as insufficient. A gesture of goodwill is not enough to achieve integration, he stated. Semjonov expressed his astonishment at the fact that not a single member of the Presidential Roundtable, which was explicitly established in order to facilitate the dialogue between Estonian majority and non-Estonian minority, had been invited to participate in the commission which drafted the policy paper. He pointed out the aspects that he regarded important for successful integration but which are missing in the policy paper, such as representation of non-citizens in local government or the linguistic rights of minorities. Essentially the paper, in Semjonov's understanding, lacks a human rights approach even though human rights have to provide the basic orientation for an acceptable integration policy. This becomes most obvious in the fact that the paper, although entitled “bases of integration policy”, excludes from its scope what in fact is currently the strongest

<i>Integration <u>for</u> participation, or integration <u>through</u> participation</i>
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barrier against integration into the Estonian society: the restrictive handling of the citizenship issue. The paper follows a logic of “integration for participation” and indirectly declares the huge majority of non-Estonian permanent residents as not yet being mature enough for enjoying the complete set of civil rights. However, to ask the members of a disenfranchised minority first to integrate with the majority and only then (perhaps) to grant them the right to participate fully in political, societal and economic affairs, contradicts the right to a nationality, which belongs to the group of basic human rights according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights documents. If one really wants to motivate stateless non-Estonians residing in Estonia to integrate into Estonian society and to identify with the Estonian state, the first step has to be granting them citizenship. This would then base integration policy on a logic of “integration through participation”.

However, the respective policy paper only allowed the conclusion that the Estonian government saw no reason for changing anything in its present citizenship policies. This perception was neither agreed upon by international experts nor would it help to speed up the process of integration. Under the present conditions 63 per cent of non-citizens do not regard achieving citizenship as feasible. Pessimism, alienation and orientation towards Russia, not by choice but by need, is growing among this group contrary to the interests of all parties concerned.

Semjonov recited a long list of important international conventions dealing with various aspects of civil, human and minority rights that Estonia has neither signed nor ratified. Although he acknowledged that Estonia has ratified the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, he expressed his dissatisfaction with the restrictive interpretation of the term minority by the Parliament: it includes only citizens of Estonia. Semjonov argued that the norm of non-discrimination of minorities in international law is binding also for Estonia and it is valid for non-citizens as well. Estonian legislation, he concluded, does not facilitate integration. If Estonian politics and society really want to have integration, many existing laws have to be reconsidered and mass statelessness has to be overcome.

The third introductory presentation was given by **Pål Kolstø**, Professor of Oslo University. He discussed the issue of integration/assimilation and diversity/homogeneity of minority/majority societies by sketching various Western social science theories and normative models on the relationship between cultural diversity, stability and democracy. Does cultural diversity of the society and stability of the state fit together and under which conditions? In search for an answer to this question Professor Kolstø

*No consensus on
integration in social
science theory*

referred to the respective research work and theoretical reasoning especially of Leo Kuper, Arend Lijphart, Ian Lustick, Graham Smith, Walker Connor, Ernest Gellner and David Laitin.

Kolstø impressively demonstrated that the answer in the discourse remains ambiguous as no consensus has been reached on it. All respective political positions, may they opt for integration/diversity or assimilation/homogeneity, or may they track ideas of consociationalism, ethnic democracy, domination or plural democracy, can find their arguments in the debate. Therefore, Kolstø warned against taking the present state of research as the final word. According to the findings of David Laitin one may assume that Russian-speakers in Estonia in the course of some generations will at any rate become not only integrated

bilingual speakers, but perhaps even assimilated monolingual Estonian speakers. This process will originate from the individual minority members calculating their economic interests and career strategies, and could be only slowed down, but not stopped, by attempts of the Estonian authorities and of the members of the Estonian society to prevent it. The pace of integration of the non-Estonians may depend more on the success of economic policy of the Estonian government than on its deliberate effort to foster or impede the process.

The presentations by Minister Veidemann, Director Semjonov and Professor Kolstø were followed by a **general discussion**. Not surprisingly, the debate was as lively as it was controversial. Minister Veidemann explicitly contradicted the presentation of Mr. Semjonov. She pointed to the fact that the Council of Europe had ended monitoring of Estonia's human rights policies. In her opinion this indicates that the Council of Europe is satisfied with the development. Further, she matched Semjonov's list of human rights instruments, which Estonia has not signed yet, by an even longer list of respective documents that Estonia has signed and ratified. Last, but not least, the Minister once again insisted on the legitimacy of a citizenship policy based on the *ius sanguinis*, adding that to be a citizen of a state is in the first place a responsibility, not a privilege granted to him. However, one cannot take the responsibility if one is not integrated and has insufficient command of the state language.

Interventions by some other Estonian participants supported the present Estonian citizenship and minority policy not by discussing it in terms of human rights standards, but by justifying it as a reaction to the Soviet past.

Baltic tensions have a negative influence on democratic forces in Russia

It must be acknowledged that it is only since three or four years that Estonia has been living without foreign troops on its territory and that daily Russian pressure has to be taken into account. Nevertheless, it was emphasized that all parties are looking for new solutions. A Russian participant remarked that tensions in Estonia (and Latvia) are negatively influencing the democratic forces in Russia by playing arguments into the hands of the nationalists. She regarded it as important to provide better information on what is going on in the Baltic States to the political elite in Moscow as well as to the Russian media.

Already in this initial phase of the seminar two main controversies became obvious, which remained valid throughout the following presentations and discussions until the end of the seminar. The first controversy may be characterized by Semjonov's terminology of “integration through participation vs. integration for participation”, i.e. the question about

whether or not attempts to reduce radically the existing mass statelessness ought to be regarded as a relevant element in any honest strategy for integrating non-Estonians into Estonian society. The second controversy may be characterized by the catchword “language policy”; it challenged the predominant Estonian understanding of integration as “learning the Estonian language”. The dispute focused on the question of how the knowledge of the Estonian language among Russian-speaking residents may be spread without harming their right to their minority language, or - as it was put in the discussions - without implementing an integration strategy in a way that makes it in fact a strategy of assimilation, an approach for which international law on the protection of minorities does not allow.

The role of the educational system

The next two contributions focused on the role of education in the integration process. It started with Mrs. **Marju Lauristin**, Professor of Tartu University, who reported on two sociological research projects describing the change of basic values among Estonians and non-Estonians and on cultural attitudes of Russian-speaking youth in Estonia. A relatively speedy change from collectivist to individualist attitudes, especially among young Russians in Estonia, was observed. The pace of change among the elderly generation was slower. This constitutes a situation where in the families the old orientations and attitudes are preserved, while at the same time school education already is under revision and new curricula are being introduced. However, Russian-language schools (the schools in which the language of instruction is Russian) as compared to Estonian-language schools are lagging behind in this process due to the fact that the latter already in the Soviet past experienced more internal freedom. The main necessities are changes in school, a re-education, to avoid a development of separation: two language communities are living in two different mental environments creating the danger of ghettoization of the minority and marginalization especially of the younger generation of Russian-speakers. The system of education and the media play a key role in avoiding such a development.

Old attitudes and new curricula

Lauristin's more general considerations were complemented by a detailed report on the curriculum reform in Russian-language schools, presented by Mr. **Meelis Kond**, Head of the Department of Primary and Secondary Education Inspectorate, Estonian Ministry of Education. One of the first priorities of educational reform after 1991 was the unification of the Estonian-language school system and the Russian-language school system. In a first step schooling was brought to the same duration (Russian-medium schools from 10 to 12 years, Estonian-language schools from 11 to 12 years). Further, a curriculum reform was introduced which in case of the Russian-language schools attempts also to increase the number of Estonian lessons and to introduce Estonian subjects such as Estonian literature and history. Instruction in Estonian as a Second Language is compulsory from the 2nd grade, however, may begin already in kindergarten provided qualified teachers are available. The new curriculum will be implemented in Russian-language schools from the 1998/99 school year on. Teaching some subjects in Estonian language will gradually become compulsory. In line with the amendment to the Law on Basic and Upper-secondary Schools, as it was recently adopted by Parliament, at latest in the year 2007 it has to be

Compulsory Estonian from the 2nd grade

guaranteed that all graduates of Russian-language basic school (compulsory school education of nine years) have reached a level of Estonian language skills which will enable them to continue their studies in Estonian language only. Beginning at latest in the 2007/08 school year Estonian shall be the language of instruction in upper-secondary schools, and from all teachers in all schools a high level of proficiency in Estonian will be required. To achieve these aims, a plan of action for the development of Russian-language schools has recently been published by the Ministry of Education.

The presentations by Professor Lauristin and Mr. Kond were followed by a **discussion**. A member of the Russian community in Estonia emphasized that a curriculum reform might not change very much as long as better training for the teachers is not provided. Especially, the professional skills of teachers at Russian language schools were said to be quite poor and the most urgent need would be to train them instead of just calling for them to teach new contents. Further, the priority given to extended language training in school was challenged by the assessment that it might be much more urgent to concentrate the limited resources on the improvement of the

*Teacher training
most urgent*

system of professional training instead as this would give the Russian-speaking youth a much better chance to find a job and to avoid getting marginalized. A Western expert articulated worries that especially in the north-eastern districts of Estonia not only marginalization is the danger, but, even worse, separation may develop. A Latvian participant expressed some doubts whether the line between more or less internal space of manoeuvre for the schools in Soviet time really can be drawn along the distinction between Russian-language schools on the one side and Estonian (respectively Latvian) language schools on the other side.

A German participant referred to what in Germany is at present becoming more and more obvious, namely that the foreign language competencies of the average pupil are insufficient compared to what the ongoing process of

*English instead
of Estonian?*

European integration requires. With this as background, the question was raised whether it would be more future-oriented and more beneficial for the affected young people, as well as for the Estonian society in general, to use the chance of a curriculum reform at the threshold of the EU for “internationalizing” instead of “nationalizing” children by extending second language training in English instead of Estonian. The idea was immediately and decisively rejected by representatives of the Estonian majority as it would end up in accepting a stable Estonian/Russian bilingual society. It was argued that such approach would not serve the aim of

national integration and of reducing the unemployment among Russian-speaking youth. The increasing use of Estonian as the language of instruction also in Russian-language schools has nothing to do with eliminating these schools, it was argued, but is aimed at the standardization of the school system for the sake of providing all children, Estonian and non-Estonian, equal opportunities in the society in general and in the labour market in particular.

However, in the increasingly heated debate several speakers blamed the official Estonian language policy for artificially producing those problems it afterwards pretends to solve. Equal opportunities would exist if restrictive language laws were not discriminating against Russian-speakers in various segments of the labour market. The higher unemployment rate among young non-Estonians as compared to Estonians was regarded as a product of the present language policy. If one is serious about integration and better job opportunities for Russian-speakers, the best to do would be to liberalize the language laws currently in force. Such demands were strictly opposed by the proponents of the Estonian majority in Estonia. The debate made quite clear that “integration” in their understanding means in the first place “speaking Estonian” and accepting it as the only official language in Estonia.

The role of the media

While Mrs. Lauristin and Mr. Kond focused on the role of school education and language training for the integration of the non-Estonian youth, the media were in the centre of the next two contributions by Mr. Raivo Vetik and Mr. Aleksandr Shegedin.

Raivo Vetik, Director of the Institute of International and Social Studies in Tallinn, presented preliminary results from an ongoing research project on the construction of an ethnic 'other' in Estonian news media. The research is based on a theoretical model of semiotic character. Vetik strongly advocated the usefulness of a semiotic approach to the study of ethnic conflict. This focuses on 'subjective' interpretations of the objectives and behaviour of the ethnic 'other' in inter-ethnic relationships instead of being dependent on any political, historical and socio-economic 'objectivity' of the conflict. The latter does not, as Vetik pointed out, operate in an unmediated form but through 'subjective' interpretations of the respective groups. Perceptions of the actions and objectives of the ethnic 'other' are often an independent and important factor in the structure of conflict.

Ethnic 'other' in newspapers

Subjective interpretations construct reality. Therefore, in an ethnic conflict not only one reality and only one discourse are present but multiple realities and divergent discourses exist. The research instrument distinguishes between three semiotic types of 'self-other' relationship: the 'other' is perceived either as a non-group (separation), an alien group (confrontation) or a different group (integration). Based on the respective model a content analysis of two leading Estonian newspapers, the one published in Estonian and the other in Russian, was conducted for the period 1988 to 1996. The data indicate a reversal in the types of construction of ethnic orientations in Estonian media in 1996 compared to those in 1988. In 1996 the Estonian language newspaper predominantly presented both the Estonians and the Russians as being oriented towards integration with each other, while in the Russian language newspaper both groups were characterized by a mode of confrontation and separation. In 1988 it was vice versa: separation was the preferential perception on the Estonian side and an integrationist perception dominated on the Russian side. Vetik regarded the results to be an indication for the success of the strategy not to grant initial citizenship to the immigrants who arrived during the Soviet period: such strategy had put in place the 'non-group' model of inter-ethnic relations (separation) which in turn prevented Estonia from an inter-ethnic clash.

In his presentation Mr. Vetik also applied the semiotic approach to the seminar itself. He reconstructed the dispute in the seminar on the Estonian integration policy as in fact being a matter of two different discourses based on a different understanding of integration and representing different interests. These differences themselves have to be discussed more intensively, not only the subject itself, the integration strategy. Indeed, what the proponents of the government's position point at consists up to now mainly of words, but they are important as words structure reality. On the other hand, the proponents of the human rights position talk about a reality, however, a reality which has been absent since some three years. Therefore, their structuring of the present reality ends up in painting all in black.

The development and present situation of the Russian-language media in Estonia was the topic of the presentation given by Mr. **Aleksandr Shegedin**, political observer of the Russian-language daily newspaper *Estoniya*. He welcomed the government's outline of an integration strategy, however, criticised that it completely fails to touch upon the media and their high importance for the process of integration. To overcome widespread mutual stereotypes and mistrust between Estonians and non-Estonians, it is insufficient to dedicate the whole programme only to the learning of the Estonian language and the educational system. It is equally necessary to strengthen the role of the media. How this could take place with respect to the Russian-language media was the object of various proposals by Mr. Shegedin. Some of them were:

"Policy paper overlooks media"

- A countrywide Russian-language television channel ought to be established. Television is the most influential mass-media, but the present structure of television broadcasting with only very few and qualitatively bad Russian-language programmes is working not for, but against integration of non-Estonians. They simply watch television channels from Russia and, therefore, are often better informed on internal affairs of Russia than of Estonia.
- The informational quality of radio broadcasting in Russian language has to be improved. This could best be done by establishing a second respective radio channel in competition to the existing one (Radio 4).
- In line with the practice in most EU countries, minority language newspapers, especially Russian-language local newspapers in north-eastern Estonia, should be financially supported, to compensate for their loss in sales due to the below average economic situation of their constituency. Also bilingualism of newspapers should be encouraged by financial support (as in Spain) and by introducing a programme of exchange of journalists between Estonian and Russian-language media.

- No Russian-language professional training institution for journalism exists in Estonia. This should be changed immediately to avoid having to send young journalists to Russia for professional training as is the case at present.

In the following **discussion** Minister Veidemann responded to the critique that the integration strategy leaves out the media by informing the audience about a concrete action plan regarding media that is under consideration in the government (however, no specifics were disclosed). The main issue for the further debate was Shegedin's demand to give public support to the Russian-language media. His call was backed by some speakers, opposed by others. Support by the state would equal an under-the-hand re-nationalization. The Russian newspapers should rationalize by mergers. The problem they have is a matter of lacking entrepreneurship, not of lacking subsidies. It was suggested that Russians in general have to learn to act more entrepreneur-like. With respect to Shegedin's reference to the existence of specific support schemes for minority media in many European countries an Estonian participant reacted briefly but typically by stating: "This will never happen in Estonia." Further statements dealt with a legally secure status, i.e. citizenship, as a need for good entrepreneurship, with many Russian residents reading Estonian newspapers, while the opposite is not happening, and with foreign capital in Estonia engaging in the media of the majority, however not in that of the minority.

Politics of integration

Dr. **Erik Andre Andersen** from the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI), Denmark, presented the results of his research on the consequences of privatization for the Russian population in Estonia. He came to the conclusion that all five privatization programmes investigated by him favoured the Estonians as compared to the Russians, regardless whether the legislation or the outcome in terms of statistical data is analyzed (the latter showing an even more clear differentiation). As a result of the privatization process a number of economic and social dividing lines, which previously did not exist and now come close to the ethnic dividing lines, were drawn up in Estonian society. This result was not solely, but mainly caused by the Estonian ethnic policies of the years up to 1995. It was not an accidental result, but deliberately arranged by the ruling parties.

*Privatization
and ethnic
dividing lines*

Starting in 1996 a certain change in Estonian minority politics took place. Seemingly influenced by the international community and the desire of Estonia to become a member of the EU, some improvements can be observed, aiming more at integration than at the separation of the ethnic groups. However, even if the Russian-speaking population can gain more participatory influence and equal rights they are placed under a socioeconomic handicap. The once-established ownership relations and the unequal distribution of influential management positions will hardly change. The free market forces will not by themselves diminish the existing differences between the ethnic groups, but more probably aggravate them. With this background it once again becomes important that at least citizenship is granted to the Russian-speaking population if integration is really desired. Otherwise political and socioeconomic tensions may influence each other negatively and cause further separation and marginalization of the Russian-speaking population, if not an escalation of inter-ethnic conflict.

The attempts to manage the task of integration on the local and regional level were the subject of a report by **Mr. Aleksander Dushman**, Main Expert on Interethnic Relations of the Ida-Viru County Government. He

*The task of integration
of 100 nationalities*

informed about the activities developed by the authorities of Ida-Virumaa. In this county at the Estonian-Russian border only 18 per cent of the population are of ethnic Estonian origin while some 70 per cent are ethnic Russians. Belarussians, Ukrainians, Finns and members of almost 100 other nationalities add up to the remaining more than 10 per cent of the population. In fact, these small groups are larger as the available data show because during Soviet times it was not opportune to belong to the smaller

nationalities. At any rate, the region is multi-national and multi-cultural and it should remain this way also in the future. More than 20 national culture societies are working as NGOs in the county. An integration process must be accomplished by spreading knowledge of Estonian language and culture, by developing the county economically, by preserving the national cultures, restoring the national identities and studying the respective mother tongues, and by organizing inter-ethnic communication. For that reason, a Round Table of National Cultural Organizations was established in the county three years ago. In cooperation with the county government and different national and international organizations and foundations, conferences, supplements to the local newspaper, information material and training seminars for teachers on different nationalities and their cultures, as well as on the idea of multicultural society in general, were organized by the Round Table. The next steps have to be a quick implementation of the state programme for training Estonian language in a way appropriate for the specific situation of Ida-Virumaa, the approval of the national Sunday schools by the state and the local authorities, a more positive reporting on the integration activities by the mass-media, and more support by state and local authorities of the activities of the different national organizations.

*Regional Round
Table of cultural
organizations*

The former Estonian Minister of Interethnic Relations, Dr. **Klara Hallik**, pointed out in her presentation the complexity of the integration process, as well as the heterogeneous perceptions and expectations it is confronted with from the side of the majority and from the side of the minorities. On the official level of Estonian politics a clear distinction is made between integration and assimilation, however, it is beyond doubt that the discussion continues about an Estonian-centred state and society. An ethnocultural existentialism prevails. The aim of integration is to strengthen the ethnic Estonian foundations of society. Mrs. Hallik nevertheless has observed recent changes compared to a much clearer ethnocentric policy cultivated seven years before. Migrants from the Soviet period are now much more often considered belonging to the Estonian society; anti-Russian ethnocentrism has considerably diminished with Estonia integrating more and more into the European structures. Nevertheless, an analysis of programmes and documents of elections campaigns of the Estonian-based political parties led Dr. Hallik to the conclusion that ethno-nationalism is still the ideology of the major Estonian parties. None of the platforms show any plans to organize a political dialogue with the non-Estonians on state matters. Dr. Hallik expressed her hopes that the practical steps of the government towards more intensive inclusion of non-Estonians into society and state-building will result in

*Changes
towards less
ethnocentric
policy*

some revision of the ideology of ethnic conservatism which so far is characteristic of most of the Estonian political parties.

Mr. **Sergei Ivanov**, Member of the Estonian Parliament (Russian Faction of the *Riigikogu*), and Member of the Presidential Roundtable on Minorities, once again welcomed the government's policy paper on national integration. He saw in it a new qualitative attitude and a pragmatic approach to the tasks ahead. He nevertheless regarded it as necessary that more attention be given to the issues of citizenship and naturalization. A clear legal relationship between the individual and the state as well as an undeniable legal indication of equality are most important factors for integration. It would provide what at present does not exist and which has made the numerous language training programmes more expensive than successful: motivation for studying the Estonian language. In addition, easing and speeding up the naturalization process would stabilize not only

Legal equality is most important for integration

inter-ethnic relations but the Estonian state as well. Mr. Ivanov regarded the current number of foreigners and non-citizens residing in Estonia as much too high for a small republic while at the same time the naturalization process due to the high barriers is very slow. On this background Mr. Ivanov suggested in the first place to amend the Citizenship Law to grant citizenship to children born in Estonia to stateless parents; to exempt elderly people, invalids, and persons who are married to an Estonian citizen from the language and constitution examinations. Further, Mr. Ivanov criticized the language exams needed for naturalization as much too tough and too complicated. According to him the requirements should be lowered.

Mr. **Boris Tsilevich**, Director of the Centre for Social and Educational Research "Baltic Insight" and Member of the City Council of Riga, Latvia, presented a comparison of minority-majority relations in Estonia and in Latvia. In his opinion, the political and demographic legacy of the Soviet period in these two countries is similar but not identical. For instance, the percentage of titular ethnic group among the population is higher in Estonia, whereas in Latvia Russians are geographically not separated from the titular group so sharply as they are in Estonia. The share of non-titular pre-war citizens in today's population is also different. In Estonia this share is less than 10 per cent while in Latvia it is 22 per cent. Moreover, according to the data of the 1989 census, 21 per cent of Russians then living in Latvia and 14 per cent in Estonia claimed fluency in the corresponding titular language. In Latvia, the level of ethnically mixed marriages has been traditionally higher than in Estonia. All this brought Tsilevich to the conclusion that at the moment of the restoration of

independence the level of separation – in geographic, linguistic, and social terms – between the titular ethnic group and the Russian-speakers was substantially lower in Latvia than in Estonia.

Given these differences, quite dissimilar political decisions on minority issues were taken in Estonia and Latvia. Although both countries decided to restore pre-war citizenship and introduced naturalization procedures, naturalization in Latvia started only in February 1995 – almost three years later than in Estonia. Again, the initial version of the Estonian citizenship law established much less stringent naturalization criteria than the Latvian

*Dissimilar decisions
on minority issues
taken in Estonia and
Latvia*

one. On the other hand, the legal status of non-citizens in Latvia was defined in a more liberal manner than in Estonia. While non-citizens in Estonia were defined as foreigners who have to apply for residence and work permits, in Latvia their status was determined by a special law on former USSR citizens who have neither Latvian nor other state's citizenship. Though adopted as late as in April 1995, this law guaranteed several important non-citizens' rights. At the same time, unlike Estonia, Latvia has institutionalized ethnicity by mandatory record of ethnic origin in citizens' and non-citizens' passports.

Concerning participation in local elections, Estonia has granted permanent resident non-citizens the right to vote. In Latvia, only citizens can vote at the municipal level, which, to Tsilevich, seems to provoke further exclusion among Latvia's non-citizens rather than help to integrate them. Estonia's non-citizens are much more active both in terms of naturalization and acquiring Russia's citizenship. More than half of the initial number of *de facto* stateless persons have already obtained some citizenship. In Latvia, Tsilevich estimated, this process is very slow.

In Estonia, political activity of the Russian minority follows ethnic lines. In 1995 the Russian electoral list won seats in the Estonian parliament. In Latvia, parties explicitly based on ethnic (Russian) criteria never enjoyed support on the part of the Russian-speaking citizens of Latvia. In both the 1993 and 1995 elections "The Russian list" failed to receive representation in the Latvian parliament. In Tsilevich's opinion, the Estonian authorities have proved to be much more instrumental in setting up a formal dialogue with the Russian minority than have their Latvian colleagues. The Representative Assembly elected by several Russian NGOs was officially registered in Estonia while a similar body established by the Latvian non-citizens – the League of Stateless Persons – was denied registration. Estonian President's Roundtable on Minorities, established in 1993, appeared an effective tool for discussing urgent issues relevant to inter-

ethnic interaction and cooperation, while analogous body in Latvia – the Presidential Nationalities Consultative Council established in 1996 –has not yet arrived at an efficient format of its activities.

Tsilevich explained more flexible policies implemented by the Estonian authorities, such as readiness for dialogue and occasional concessions, by the concentration of the Russian-speaking non-citizen population in Ida-Virumaa region bordering with the Russian Federation, which makes the emergence of separatist and secessionist ideas more real than in Latvia where no such threat exists. Nevertheless, both Estonia and Latvia, according to Tsilevich, still face very serious problems regarding the majority-minority relations and the integration of their societies. However, it seems to him that Estonia is a couple of steps closer to the resolution of these problems than is Latvia.

In the **discussion** following the aforementioned presentations a debate on terminology and its political implications was triggered off. Dr. Andersen was criticized by a member of the Estonian majority for using the terms ‘Russians’ and ‘Russian-speakers’ in his analysis of the privatization process and thereby giving the false impression that there had been an anti-Russian stance in the process and ethnic discrimination had taken place. It was claimed that Estonian politics never followed any ethnic considerations, but only the requirements of the restitution of the Estonian state and its independence. Affected by this were non-Estonian migrants, many of them neither of Russian ethnicity nor of Russian mother-tongue. It was also claimed that Russians do not constitute a specific problem for

<p><i>Did Estonian politics follow ethnic considerations?</i></p>

Estonian politics, which is about the broad spectrum of non-Estonians residing in the country. This view was opposed by some western participants as well as representatives of the Russian minority in Estonia. The emphasis on the many other nationalities with small or tiny communities in Estonia serves the purpose of camouflage and of providing legitimization for not accepting the Russians to enjoy their full rights as a national minority. If only the small groups were existing, there would be no problems. The large Russian community is politically not welcomed. Therefore, it is argued that any support for the Russian community would be a discrimination against the small groups. The ‘non-Estonians’ are talked about, but Russians and Russian-speakers (those with Russian as their first language) are meant.

However, the discussion also touched other aspects of the presentations. It was mentioned that in the privatization of flats a policy change has taken place towards recognition of the interests of the non-Estonians. Information

was given about the existence of an ECOS-Overture programme, which encourages the foundation of small and medium enterprises in Ida-Virumaa also by Russian residents. It was remarked that everybody talks about the problems of minorities but no one deals with the problems of majorities. It was pointed out that integration has to be understood as a two-way road, on which not only the minorities but also the majorities have to move. It was denied that the requirements for successfully passing the language exams are too high, however, it was agreed that the organization of the tests might be not so good and should be reformed.

An expert from Western Europe working in Estonia articulated his impression that a basic problem has to be seen in the fact that many Russians have never learnt to learn foreign languages. It was assessed by an Estonian Russian that despite all measures taken by the Estonian authorities

The EU has positive impact on Estonian national integration

the language situation will not change very much throughout the next years; Estonia will continue to be in fact bilingual. An Estonian researcher and a colleague of her from a Western European country agreed that the beginning of negotiations on the accession of Estonia to the EU had a positive impact on the Estonians' readiness to accept the integration of Russians into Estonian society. It was stressed by an Estonian expert that the Russian residents have in fact to manage not only integration into the Estonian society, but at the same time also integration into the EU (which they are more in favour of than the Estonians are), and finally into their own culture in Russia.

Last but not least, a German participant emphasized that the problem how to achieve integration without harming the rights and the identity of minorities is not only a problem for Estonia. In Germany, for instance, non-Germans permanently residing in the country make up some 10 per cent of the total population and at present nearly two million German citizens have Russian as their mother-tongue. Asked by an Estonian politician how the situation is dealt with in Germany the answer was: "We are only near to the very first step and that is to honestly accept for oneself that one has a problem, but not yet a convincing and consensual solution for it."

International standards and decision-making on the EU

Three contributions discussed the Estonian integration policy and majority-minority relations from the point of view of the provisions, standards and recommendations for the protection and integration of minorities established by the international community.

Dr. **Hanne-Margret Birckenbach**, Senior Researcher at the Schleswig-Holstein Institute for Peace Research (SHIP) in Kiel, Germany, presented a comparative analysis of the Estonian government's policy paper on national integration. She first outlined the understanding of the concept of 'integration' as it is expressed in the recommendations to the Estonian government made by international governmental organizations in several fact-finding reports and other documents on the citizenship issue in Estonia. This international approach to integration was then compared with

*International and
Estonian approaches
to integration*

the Estonian government's concept of national integration as far as it can be drawn from the respective policy paper. The understanding in both concepts of the actors involved, of the aims and the processes of integration as well as of the actions and means for achieving integration were discussed. Dr. Birckenbach concluded that both concepts show many similarities. However, a closer look at the matter makes visible also essential differences. The government's concept is based on ethnic priorities of nation-building ('non-Estonians' as the target group) rather than republican considerations on which the international recommendations are based on ('non-citizens' as the target group). The latter focuses on reforming the legal and political system, whereas the government paper puts the burden on the educational system, which is the weakest and most overestimated element for causing social change as experience in many societies has proved. The government's paper left on Dr. Birckenbach the impression that its authors apparently wanted to solve a dilemma: clear the way for international integration of Estonia through EU membership and at the same time achieve ethnically based nation-building. Therefore, the proposed strategy is more of a symbolic nature and lacks credibility if one considers the means and actions proposed. Despite such a critical view with respect to some important aspects of the policy paper, Dr. Birckenbach explicitly acknowledged that it picked up on some of the international concerns and that the existence of the paper in itself might help to initiate a public debate on how to end the exclusion of a relevant share of Estonian residents from politics and society in Estonia.

Dr. **Maria Lundberg**, Researcher at the Norwegian Institute of Human Rights in Oslo, reviewed developments in international law important for the Estonian case. She stressed that the formulation of internationally binding standards is a continuous process. For some years this process has gone in a direction to make citizenship less a requirement for enjoying minority rights. The latter are increasingly understood as being part of the human rights catalogue, and human rights are valid under all conditions, regardless of citizenship. To read international law on minority rights still in a way that its high standards have to be applied only to the so-called national minorities, but not to non-citizens, ignores the dynamics inherent in the international standard setting process, the Norwegian expert explained. Further, it has to be understood that the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities is oriented to the preservation of minorities, their language and culture, but not to their integration.

The issue of whether the minority rights, codified in public international law, require citizenship of the respective state for being applicable was taken up also by Dr. **Carmen Thiele**, Assistant Professor at the chair of public law, Europe University Viadrina, Frankfurt/Oder, Germany. In her view a distinction has to be made between the universal level (UN system) and the European level. On the universal level, a clear tendency can be seen to understand minority rights as human rights and not merely as civil rights.

Attitudes in international law towards citizenship are changing

However, in the European context, the situation is more ambivalent. Both concepts are existing and one has to wait and see whether the tendency towards abolishing citizenship as a criterion for defining national minorities will prevail. Further, Dr. Thiele discussed the state of the art in international law with respect to the right to a nationality. She identified a clear tendency to substitute the classical view, that the granting of nationality lies solely within the domestic jurisdiction of a state, by a modern, more human rights oriented view. The presentation then focused on the Estonian citizenship law, asking whether it conforms with public international law. With respect to some provisions Dr. Thiele had doubts. Issues of concern were among others the provisions on citizenship for children of stateless parents; the differentiation made in the context of double citizenship which is allowed to citizens by birth, but not to citizens by naturalization; the extent and grade of difficulty of language knowledge required for naturalization (Estonian laws require a level of language proficiency equalling higher education while international law only requires a level of general knowledge).

In the presentation by Mr. **Tiit Käbin**, Member of the Estonian Parliament (*Riigikogu*) and Chairman of its Constitutional Committee, a very specific aspect of Estonian development became topical: the interrelation between inner-Estonian integration and the integration of Estonia into European structures. He acknowledged that a Hamlet's question "To EU, or not to EU?" is already facing Estonia. However, before Estonia can join the EU, Article 1 of the Estonian constitution, which proclaims that "Estonian independence and sovereignty is interminable and inalienable", has to be changed. Its present wording does not allow Estonia to delegate any of its sovereignty. Such change of the constitution can only happen by a lengthy

*"To EU, or not to EU,
this is the question"*

and time-consuming procedure of decision-making, which might demand approval by two subsequent parliaments and/or cumulate in a referendum. At present it is unpredictable what the outcome of such a referendum will be. It might be perceived as the EU membership referendum rather than on the adjustment of the constitution. Many Estonian citizens, even if in favour of EU membership, have reservations against changing constitutional provisions about sovereignty, which were included as a safeguard against being incorporated into something like the Soviet Union once again. Other Estonians, due to their vested economic interests, might have reservations of their own against the EU membership, even though they do not reject constitutional change. Importantly, among the Russian-origin population the EU membership enjoys more support than among ethnic Estonians. However, many ethnic Russians at present are not eligible to vote as they are not Estonian citizens. An improvement of the internal inter-ethnic relations in Estonia and a reduction in number of stateless people would therefore help Estonia's strive for EU membership to gain majority among the Estonian constituency.

In the **discussion** representatives of the Estonian majority opposed the presentations by Birckenbach, Lundberg and Thiele. The notion that Estonia has problems with meeting internationally agreed standards was rejected. In the course of this debate an issue which had been touched upon already earlier in the seminar now became more topical: the question

*Is international
community applying
double standards?*

whether the international community applies double standards when criticising Estonia for not being in line with all existing human rights and minority rights standards. From a representative of the majority in Estonia the question was raised whether the respective conventions are fully applicable to the new democracies as they have to tackle with other problems than the old, consolidated democracies. For countries like Estonia development has to come first, human rights later. Further, an impression was articulated that small states are accused by large

ones for not doing enough to meet the international standards while the large states ignore the same standards themselves. (“The big want to teach the small without taking the lesson seriously themselves.”) For instance, an Estonian participant pointed out that it is much easier for a Russian resident in Estonia to gain Estonian citizenship than for a Turkish migrant in Germany to get a German passport. Further, Germany would also not allow double citizenship.

A participant from Western Europe countered that the Turks in Germany and the Russian-speakers in Estonia are different cases as the Turks are not stateless and they knew they were going abroad when they emigrated to Germany. However, several Western European participants agreed without reservations that double standards indeed exist. The fact is not tolerable and has to be criticized wherever it occurs. Nevertheless, this fact does not

All violations of rights must be criticized

legitimize any violation of international law. Instead, any deficiencies of national legislation with respect to human rights and minority rights have to be subject to criticism, regardless whether they occur in large or small states. To criticize Estonia does not mean to view other states as fulfilling all requirements of international human rights standards. Those people and groups in Germany, for instance, who are struggling for new German legislation on asylum seekers, foreigners and citizenship more in line with international human rights standards, would surely appreciate any honest Estonian support of their case. Instead, it seems that their criticism of restrictive German legislation is misused in Estonia for legitimizing restrictive Estonian legislation.

Further, a Russian participant from Estonia reminded that the Presidential Roundtable on Minorities as well as the Advisory Board of the Minister for Interethnic Relations had formulated recommendations with respect to the citizenship issue which were in line with the international standards in the course of the drafting of the policy paper on national integration. However, they were ignored. An Estonian politician replied that all recommendations had been carefully studied, but not all were adopted because then surely a next list of recommendations would have been drafted. Finally, an Estonian researcher remarked that more thought should be given to avoiding the possibility that in the future Estonia might become subject to trade sanctions by actors in the international environment due to its handling of human and minority rights.

Final Remarks by the General Rapporteur

The seminar ended with remarks by its General Rapporteur, Dr. **Christian Wellmann**, Deputy Director of the Schleswig-Holstein Institute for Peace Research (SHIP), Kiel, Germany, who had followed the debate without intervening. “We are at the end of a seminar, but at the beginning of a process”, Dr. Wellmann stated. It is the process of drafting, adopting, implementing, executing and evaluating a policy aiming at integrating Estonian society, which in Dr. Wellmann's understanding includes all long-term residents in Estonia, regardless of their ethnicity and present status. The beginning of this process was marked by the adoption and dissemination of the February 1998 policy paper and the seminar just ending has to be regarded an important element in initiating dialogue and cooperation necessary between all parties concerned to make integration in Estonia become a success story.

The rapporteur's impression of the seminar was that, compared to only some two to three years ago, the quality of argumentation on all sides has improved and the debate is more oriented to problem-solving, instead of remaining restricted to a mutual exchange of accusations and to lengthy monologues of self-centred legitimization. Emotions are still running high (and why should they not?), but the fruitless debates of former times on “who is guilty” have been widely replaced in this seminar by a notion of constructive controversy on “how to settle the conflict”. The rapporteur expressed his thanks to all participants for having contributed to this progress.

Debate was more focused on problem-solving than before but heavy dispute remains

Furthermore, the seminar made obvious again that the conflict over the appropriate majority-minority relationship in Estonia is still far from being settled. Heavy dispute remains. Nevertheless, it became clear in the seminar that a fundamental consensus is existing which should be recognized by all parties as a solid common ground for further joint efforts: even those participants who articulated the strongest critique on the integration strategy as outlined in the government's policy paper explicitly admitted that the paper marks an important positive step. However, up to now the paper is not much more than an programmatic idea, which still waits

- to be convincingly backed by the Estonian Parliament,
- to be translated into a programme of action,
- to have considerable financial and political domestic resources allocated to it, a step mainly to be taken again by the Parliament (waiting for the

international community to finance the programme of action will not be enough).

As long as these steps have not been taken, it is perhaps a bit early to come up with too much critique on the policy paper. First it has to be substantiated more to see what it really contains. On the other hand, the paper itself invites comments and a critical public should accompany all political moves in any case. Indeed, observation of the further developments is necessary because at any of the three steps mentioned, the programme might fail to come alive or might be turned upside down by depriving it of its present orientation and character. The dangers the programme faces are,

- that its spirit and substance gets lost completely in the power play of domestic politics,
- that it turns out to be an assimilation programme instead of an integration programme,
- that it will be abused as a substitute for progress in citizenship politics instead of amending and complementing it,
- that it will not be implemented accordingly but remains paper work used as a camouflage against the EU and other international bodies calling for improvement of inter-ethnic relations in Estonia (the integration programme as the Estonian variant of Potjomkin's famous villages?).

As soon as any of such developments occurs on the horizon those who are critically accompanying and backing the process have indeed to ring the alarm bell, the rapporteur concluded. Until then, he stated, the government should be given credit and earn support for its move. On the other hand, the government should accept that those groups

“Government should be given credit, its critics should be regarded as allies”

who regard the governmental approach to integration as not reaching far enough are themselves committed to integration and therefore should be treated as being allies in substance not opponents. They have to be regarded as democratic watchdogs instead of troublemakers. To allow them to take a constructive role the government should make sure that the further development of the integration policy happens with a maximum of transparency, which at any rate is the best safeguard against being criticized unjustifiably on the grounds of a lack of information. In order to make such recommendations feasible, the rapporteur suggested that the Minister of Interethnic Relations establish at its office a roundtable on integration policy as an institutionalized channel for the articulation of suggestions as well as critical comments with respect to the design and the implementation of the announced programme of action. Finally, Dr. Wellmann addressed the seminar's various parties

separately by sketching some thoughts they might consider on their return home. For this purpose he distinguished three “parties”.

(1) The “party” representing the Estonian majority and the government's position:

(a) It became obvious at the seminar what the main concern of this faction in the conflict is: it is the preservation of the Estonian language which is regarded as challenged by the Russian language. The rapporteur, however, reminded of what Minister Veidemann said at the beginning of the seminar: the Estonian language survived over centuries without any Estonian statehood protecting it! With this background the proponents of the

“The Estonian language survived for centuries without any Estonian statehood protecting it!”

Estonian language should think about whether they could not relax a bit and take a somewhat more liberal approach based on self-confidence: If their language survived centuries of domination by German, Swedish and Russian rule why should it die under the conditions of Estonian statehood, which protects the language much more even if some elements of bilingualism exist?

(b) It became also obvious at the seminar that the traumas of history still have a strong effect. This is quite understandable. However, those referring to history should make themselves aware of the fact that meanwhile not only one history exists (their history of Soviet rule), but a second history started in Estonia in 1991 which may traumatize again, now the other segment of residents in Estonia (the history of disenfranchisement of the non-Estonians who immigrated throughout the Soviet period).

(2) The “party” representing the Estonian minority position including the proponents of international law standards:

Human rights and minority rights have to be protected consequently, and without bias. The rapporteur recalled the seminar's debate on the existence of double standards. He articulated his impression that this issue is not actively addressed by the “minority party” as it complicates its stance and makes it necessary to think and to talk about more than only the Estonian case. The issue is only dealt with in a defensive manner. Instead it should be tackled offensively, not least because this would strengthen the credibility of ones own position and it could help to make the domestic controversy less accusing by indicating that Estonia is not simply lagging behind but has the chance to gain an international reputation by choosing the role of a forerunner of minority rights.

(3) The European Centre for Minority Issues as a “party”:

The rapporteur expressed his and the participant's thanks to the ECMI for having made this seminar possible in terms of finances but, not less important, in terms of providing a neutral and protective frame for a frank dialogue between conflicting positions. However, as the process has only started and the integration programme itself still has to be drafted and

*Two follow-up
meetings proposed*

implemented the question arises how the process can be accompanied by respective follow-up activities and whether ECMI can again be supportive. The rapporteur recommended to ECMI to check whether it can take initiative for two follow-up meetings:

- a) A smaller seminar, bringing together Estonian and international scholars dealing with the integration issue;
- b) A seminar of the same format as the present meeting, scheduled to be held when the draft programme of action within the framework of the Estonian strategy of integration has been published but is still open for revisions and amendments.

The first follow-up meeting should facilitate a review of the results of respective research work for the purpose of introducing its substance to the consideration of the second meeting. This second meeting should continue the dialogue from the present seminar, however on the more concrete and more precise level possible as soon as the strategy of national integration of non-Estonians starts to materialize. Minister Veidemann welcomed this recommendation and declared her readiness to host the second follow-up seminar, provided the ECMI decides to include this in its plans.

Appendix^{*}

* The authors are grateful to Mrs Viive Aasma, Director of the Estonian Language Strategy Centre, Tallinn, for providing ECMI with statistical materials which were distributed among the participants of the seminar in May 1998 and are used in this Appendix.

List of Participants

ECMI Baltic Seminar 1998

Minorities and Majorities in Estonia: Problems of Integration at the Threshold of the EU

Flensburg, Germany, and Aabenraa, Denmark, 22 to 25 May 1998

Andersen, Erik Andre	Researcher, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, Denmark
Birckenbach, Hanne-Margret	Senior Researcher, Schleswig-Holstein Institute of Peace Research, Kiel University, Germany
Berg, Detlof von	Ambassador, Head of the OSCE Mission to Estonia
Demuth, Andreas	University of Osnabrück, Germany
Dushman, Aleksander	Main Expert on Interethnic Relations of Ida-Viru County Government, Estonia
Hallik, Klara	Senior Researcher, Institute of International and Social Studies, Former Estonian Minister of Interethnic Relations
Ivanov, Sergei	Member of the Estonian Parliament (<i>Riigikogu</i>)
Järve, Priit	Senior Analyst, ECMI, Germany
Kahn, Jüri	Ambassador of the Republic of Estonia to the Kingdom of Denmark
Käbin, Tiit	Chairman of the Constitutional Committee of the Estonian Parliament (<i>Riigikogu</i>)
Kolstø, Pål	Professor, University of Oslo, Norway
Kond, Meelis	Head of Section, Estonian Ministry of Education

Lauristin, Marju	Professor, Tartu University, Former Estonian Minister of Social Affairs
Lundberg, Maria	Researcher, Norwegian Institute of Human Rights, Oslo
Müllerson, Rein	Professor, King's College, University of London, U.K.
Pavlova-Silvanskaja, Marina	Editor of <i>Pro and Contra</i> , Moscow Carnegie Center, Member of the Advisory Council of ECMI, Russia
Pearce-Jahre, Christine	Project coordinator, ECMI, Germany
Shegedin, Aleksandr	Political observer of the newspaper <i>Estoniya</i> , Tallinn, Estonia
Semjonov, Aleksei	Director of the Human Rights Legal Information Centre, Tallinn, Estonia
Thiele, Carmen	Researcher, University of Frankfurt/Oder, Germany
Troebst, Stefan	Director of ECMI, Germany
Tsilevich, Boris	Member of the City Council of Riga, Latvia
Veidemann, Andra	Estonian Minister of Interethnic Relations
Vetik, Raivo	Director of the Institute of International and Social Studies, Tallinn, Estonia
Waack, Christoph	Researcher, Institute of Geography, University of Tübingen, Germany
Wellmann, Christian	Deputy Director, Schleswig-Holstein Institute of Peace Research, Kiel University, Germany

Integration of Non-Estonians into Estonian Society

The bases of Estonia's national integration policy

(Adopted at the 10.02.1998 session of the Government of the Republic of Estonia)

1. Estonia's current policy on non-Estonians and the legislation expressing this policy evolved in a specific socio-political context characterised by the restoration of the independence of Estonia and its emergence from the sphere of influence of its eastern neighbour. (The definitions *muulane* and *mitte-eestlane* are used as synonyms for *non-Estonian* in the Estonian version of this text. Policy on non-Estonians means the steps taken by the state which directly or indirectly influence the position and opportunities of non-Estonians in Estonian society.) This context determined the content and dominant approach of policy. Under current legislation, the non-Estonian segment of society is divided into four legal categories – Estonian citizens, citizens of other states, persons with undetermined citizenship and undocumented persons.
2. By the beginning of 1998 the national and international situation has changed. A mental shift has occurred among the majority of non-Estonians, including the acceptance of Estonian independence as an inevitable fact. Compared to the beginning of the 1990s, the approach of Estonians on issues involving non-Estonians has also developed; attitudes have become more tolerant and open.

New problems arising from the large non-Estonian segment of society have entered the agenda. Nationally this involves, above all, the alienation of an appreciable number of non-Estonians from Estonian society and isolation in a world of their own language and mentality. Sociological research conducted in the 1990s clearly points to the development of a “two societies in one state” model in Estonia. It is not difficult to see the danger of such development to both social and security policy. The situation among non-Estonians youth is of concern, where many talented young people cannot find sufficient employment opportunities, while growing unemployment provides fertile ground for a criminal subculture.

3. The changed internal and external situation requires that Estonia's policy on non-Estonians take a new step forward. This step must be based on our current national and social interests, the goal of ensuing rapid modernisation of society in the context of accession to the European Union, while preserving both stability and commitment to the protection and continued development of Estonian culture. The new step

must mean the replacement of what until now has been largely spontaneous development with a national strategy, which includes a clear orientation to the integration of non-Estonians into Estonian society. (Integration means the engagement of persons in all levels of society. Integration *is not* a change in ethnic identity, but the removal of barriers, which hinder many non-Estonians from participating fully in Estonian society.) This means the implementation of a national programme directed at integration together with institutional and financial support. Above all this will pertain a significant reduction in the number of persons with undetermined citizenship, a substantial breakthrough in teaching of the official language and real participation of non-Estonians in Estonian society.

4. The emphasis of Estonia's national policy on non-Estonians should be as follows:
 - **orientation to the future.** Policy on non-Estonians must be based not so much on the problems of the past as on ensuring a stable future and development potential for Estonia, the need to modernise, and the values of a united Europe.
 - **emphasis on children and youth.** The goal is that the generation growing up in Estonia today will in the next century become citizens who value the Estonian state and country and consider it their home. Attention and tangible resources must be focused above all on nursery schools, schools, hobby groups and summer camps.
 - **integration as a challenge for development** for Estonians and non-Estonians. Integration requires a serious effort on the part of non-Estonians, since language skills and the resulting competitiveness do not come on their own. At the same time it is a challenge to Estonians' openness and democracy. If Estonians do not understand the need for such development and are not prepared to take steps of their own, there is no point in setting goals for integration. Without a doubt, integration strategy is also a difficult task for the Estonian state and politicians since domestic policy objectives for the development of Estonia as a democratic nation state must be defined.
 - **active participation of non-Estonians** in integration as real contributors whose needs and expectations are addressed in the formation of policy on non-Estonians. The distrust and passiveness prevalent among non-Estonians must be replaced by the understanding that each person's potential for a secure future in Estonian society depends on their own activeness and ability to co-operate.

- **confidence as the basis for integration.** Barriers can actually be removed and tolerance can develop only in a situation where all parties feel confident and secure. For Estonians this means guarantees for the preservation and development of Estonian customs, manners and ideals. For non-Estonians this means the confidence that the policies of the Estonian state are not directed at driving them out or their assimilation. The model of two distinct societies increases the level of insecurity for both Estonians and non-Estonians. Integration is the only way to achieve a sense of confidence for both parties.
5. In order to implement a policy on non-Estonians, political consensus is needed to create and launch a national programme. A national integration programme should be prepared by March 1998 and discussed both by political forces and the public so that it can be implemented as a national development programme beginning in 1999. The national programme must become the cornerstone of Estonia's policy on non-Estonians during the next ten years. The programme must be based on the clear specification of goals of the state in this sphere.

The goals of the state in forming a policy on non-Estonians are:

- **to change attitudes** in addressing issues related to non-Estonians. The attitude "non-Estonians as a problem" must be replaced by the attitude "non-Estonians as participants in rebuilding Estonia". The key issue here is expression of the state's interest and attitude toward the potential of non-Estonians in Estonia, particularly of the new generation. Only a clear expression of the interest of the state in issues related to non-Estonians can create the political atmosphere necessary for true integration, including readiness to participate among non-Estonians.
- **significant reduction in the numbers of persons with undetermined citizenship** in the Republic of Estonia. The Estonian state is interested in a population with a clearly defined legal status. We want that non-Estonians in Estonia would be predominantly Estonian citizens. The state is interested in making the naturalisation process more efficient and in providing it with both political and material support. We must promote the development of children born in Estonia into Estonian citizens, regardless of nationality of their parents.
- **development of the Estonian educational system to be the central integration agent.** The future model of the Russian-language school must be clarified. Estonian-language schools also require the preparation of teachers for work with a multilingual and multicultural

student population and the creation of Estonia-centred textbooks and teaching materials. The goal is that a youth who graduates from a non-Estonian basic school will be proficient in the Estonian language and that this will allow him or her, if desired, to become an Estonian citizen without a further exam and he or she will not face linguistic or cultural barriers to furthering education or competing in the labour market.

- **rapid improvement in the Estonian language skills of non-Estonians** over the next few years. The goal is for Estonian to be not only the official language but the predominant language of communication in society. Another goal is that all graduates of non-Estonian basic schools will pass an Estonian language and civics exam, which, for non-citizens, would be equal to the citizenship exam.
- **adaptation of non-Estonians to the Estonian cultural sphere and their active participation in society.** The goal is to reduce the barriers, which hinder the competitiveness of non-Estonians in the labour market and the public life. It is also to create more favourable conditions for their more widespread participation in non-governmental associations, cultural activities and international relations.
- **reduction of regional isolation of non-Estonians.** The mobility of Estonians and non-Estonians within the state should be stimulated and supported in order to change the current trend in which predominantly non-Estonian regions (particularly Eastern-Virumaa) are preserved. The goal is to create multicultural and open social environment in Eastern-Virumaa.
- **political integration of non-Estonian Estonian citizens** in the legislative and executive branches of government. A precondition for the democratic development of Estonia is the emergence of political pluralism independent of national identity, where voting in elections does not follow ethnic lines, rather is based on ideological differences and socio-economic interests.

Re-independent Estonia has been successful above all due to its bold steps and unorthodox solutions. The time is ripe to take such steps in policy related to non-Estonians as well. Estonia's goal is to develop a European, integrated society. Attainment of this goal requires that clear domestic policy goals be established and that we work hard to achieve them.

Table 1

Ethnic Composition of the Estonian Population*

(persons, according to census data)

Year	Total population	Ethnic Estonians	Other ethnic origin	Of which ethnic Russians
1922	1,107,059	969,976	137,083	91,109
1934	1,126,413	992,520	132,327	92,656
1934**	1,061,313	972,750	87,049	50,080
1959	1,196,791	892,653	304,130	240,227
1970	1,356,079	925,157	430,908	334,620
1979	1,464,476	947,812	516,577	408,778
1989	1,565,662	963,281	602,374	474,834
1994***	1,506,927	962,326	544,601	436,562
1995***	1,491,583	957,948	533,635	428,360
1996***	1,476,301	953,547	522,754	420,435
1998***	1,451,489	946,646	504,843	409,111

Ethnic Composition of the Estonian Population*

(percentage of the whole population, according to census data)

Year	Total population	Ethnic Estonians	Other ethnic origin	Of which ethnic Russians
1922	100	87.62	12.38	8.23
1934	100	88.11	11.75	8.23
1934**	100	91.66	8.2	4.72
1959	100	74.59	25.41	20.07
1970	100	68.22	31.78	24.68
1979	100	64.72	35.27	27.91
1989	100	61.53	38.47	30.33
1994***	100	63.86	36.14	28.97
1995***	100	64.22	35.78	28.72
1996***	100	64.59	35.41	28.48
1998***	100	65.22	34.78	28.19

* regardless of citizenship

** recalculation of the 1934 data according to the borders of the Estonian SSR in 1945

*** Data for 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1998 are calculated as of 1 January by the Statistical Office of Estonia.

Table 2

Estonian Population by Ethnic Origin and Ethnic Language as Mother Tongue and Second Language (according to 1989 census)*

No	Ethnic origin	Language group	Total	of which speaking their own ethnic language				Total	%
				as mother tongue		as second language			
				total	%%	total	%%		
	Total population								
	Total		1565662	1471716	94,00	27616	1,76	1499332	95,76
	of which:								
1	Estonian	Finno-Ugrian	963281	953032	98,94	6079	0,63	959111	99,57
2	Russian	Slavic	474834	468216	98,61	5387	1,13	473603	99,74
3	Ukrainian	Slavic	48271	21320	44,17	8933	18,51	30253	62,67
4	Belorussian	Slavic	27711	8841	31,90	4703	16,97	13544	48,88
5	Finnish	Finno-Ugrian	16622	5155	31,01
6	Jewish	Germanic	4613	570	12,36	108	2,34	678	14,70
7	Tatar	Turkic	4058	2248	55,40	456	11,24	2704	66,63
8	German	Germanic	3466	1249	36,04
9	Latvian	Baltic	3135	1794	57,22	442	14,10	2236	71,32
10	Polish	Slavic	3008	601	19,98
11	Lithuanian	Baltic	2568	1610	62,69	252	9,81	1862	72,51
12	Armenian	Armenian	1669	837	50,15	170	10,19	1007	60,34
13	Azerbaijani	Turkic	1238	869	70,19	79	6,38	948	76,58
14	Moldovan	Romance	1215	663	54,57	146	12,02	809	66,58
15	Chuvash	Turkic	1178	563	47,79	161	13,67	724	61,46
16	Mordvin	Finno-Ugrian	985	367	37,26	134	13,60	501	50,86
17	Karelian	Finno-Ugrian	881	262	29,74	129	14,64	391	44,38
18	Gypsy	Indian	665	465	69,92	38	5,71	503	75,64
19	Georgian	Kartveli	606	325	53,63	47	7,76	372	61,39
20	Uzbek	Turkic	595	436	73,28	40	6,72	476	80,00
21	Kazakh	Turkic	424	313	73,82	20	4,72	333	78,54
22	Udmurt	Finno-Ugrian	413	153	37,05	47	11,38	200	48,43
23	Bashkir	Turkic	371	186	50,13	40	10,78	226	60,92
24	Mari	Finno-Ugrian	359	182	50,70	39	10,86	221	61,56
25	Ingrian	Finno-Ugrian	306	74	24,18	31	10,13	105	34,31
26	Swedish	Germanic	297	29	9,76
27	Bulgarian	Slavic	262	85	32,44
28	Hungarian	Finno-Ugrian	241	150	62,24
29	Korean	Korean	202	30	14,85
30	Ossetian	Iranian	201	85	42,29	19	9,45	104	51,74
31	Komi	Finno-Ugrian	196	66	33,67	35	17,86	101	51,53
32	Greek	Greek	182	28	15,38
33	Lezgi	Dagestani	178	124	69,66	9	5,06	133	74,72
34	Taijk	Iranian	113	66	58,41	7	6,19	73	64,60
35	Turkmen	Turkic	106	79	74,53	6	5,66	85	80,19
36	Romanian	Romance	88	37	42,05
37	Kyrgyz	Turkic	81	61	75,31	7	8,64	68	83,95
38	Gagauz	Turkic	69	33	47,83	6	8,70	39	56,52
39	Avar	Dagestani	69	48	69,57	3	4,35	51	73,91
40	Buryat	Mongolian	53	32	60,38	1	1,89	33	62,26
41	Kabardian	Abkhazo-Adyghian	47	28	59,57	5	10,64	33	70,21
42	Chechen	Nakh	45	31	68,89	-	-	31	68,89
43	Dargwa	Dagestani	45	34	75,56	2	4,44	36	80,00

44	Lakk	Dagestani	43	33	76,74	3	6,98	36	83,72
45	Komi-Permyak	Finno-Ugrian	38	12	31,58	4	10,53	16	42,11
46	Czech	Slavic	37	12	32,43
47	Vepsian	Finno-Ugrian	37	7	18,92	7	18,92	14	37,84
48	Yakut	Turkic	36	17	47,22	6	16,67	23	63,89
49	Kumyk	Turkic	32	23	71,88	1	3,13	24	75,00
50	Kalmyk	Mongolian	28	13	46,43	-	-	13	46,43
51	Abkhaz	Abkhazo-Adyghian	25	16	64,00	-	-	16	64,00
52	Turkish	Turkic	23	8	34,78
53	Karachay	Turkic	23	11	47,83	3	13,04	14	60,87
54	Tati	Iranian	22	13	59,09	-	-	13	59,09
55	Circassian	Abkhazo-Adyghian	21	16	76,19	1	4,76	17	80,95
56	Ingush	Nakh	19	13	68,42	1	5,26	14	73,68
57	Adyghian	Abkhazo-Adyghian	16	13	81,25	2	12,50	15	93,75
58	Serbian	Slavic	14	3	21,43
59	Khakass	Turkic	14	8	57,14	1	7,14	9	64,29
60	Altai	Turkic	14	10	71,43	-	-	10	71,43
61	Kurdish	Iranian	13	8	61,54
62	Uighur	Turkic	12	9	75,00
63	Crimean Tatar	Turkic	12	6	50,00	1	8,33	7	58,33
64	Arab	Semitic	11	9	81,82
65	Mountain Jewish	Iranian	11	2	18,18	1	9,09	3	27,27
66	Nenets	Samoyed	11	5	45,45	1	9,09	6	54,55
67	Dutch	Germanic	10	2	20,00
68	Nogay	Turkic	10	5	50,00	1	10,00	6	60,00
69	Spanish	Romance	10	3	30,00
70	French	Romance	10	3	30,00
71	Tabasaran	Dagestani	10	8	80,00	-	-	8	80,00
72	Chinese	Chinese	8	-	-
73	Balkar	Turkic	8	7	87,50	-	-	7	87,50
74	Assyrian	Semitic	8	3	37,50
75	Abaza	Abkhazo-Adyghian	6	2	33,33	-	-	2	33,33
76	Nanai	Manchu	6	2	33,33	1	16,67	3	50,00
77	Austrian	Germanic	5	-	-
78	Karaim	Turkic	5	-	-	-	-	-	-
79	Karakalpak	Turkic	5	1	20,00	-	-	1	20,00
80	Persian	Iranian	5	-	-
81	Lapp	Finno-Ugrian	5	2	40,00	-	-	2	40,00
82	Khanty	Finno-Ugrian	5	4	80,00	-	-	4	80,00
83	Shor	Turkic	4	-	-	-	-	-	-
84	English	Germanic	4	-	-
85	Tuvinian	Turkic	4	3	75,00	1	25,00	4	100,0
86	Even	Manchu	4	1	25,00	-	-	1	25,00
87	Slovak	Slavic	4	2	50,00
88	American	Germanic	4	-	-
89	Tsakhur	Dagestani	4	4	100,00	-	-	4	100,0
90	Danish	Germanic	3	-	-		
91	Italian	Romance	3	-	-		
92	Central Asian Jewish	Iranian	3	1	33,33	-	-	1	33,33
93	Croatian	Slavic	3	3	100,00
94	Cuban	Romance	3	1	33,33
95	Itelmen	Paleo-Asiatic	3	-	-	-	-	-	-

96	Georgian Jewish	Kartveli	3	1	33,33	-	-	1	33,33
97	Swiss	Germanic	2	-	-
98	Indian and Pakistani	Indian	2	1	50,00
99	Vietnamese	Vietnamese	2	2	100,00
100	Guatemalan	Romance	2	1	50,00
101	Angolan	Romance	2	2	100,00
102	Rongao	Vietnamese	2	2	100,00
103	Crimean Jewish	Turkic	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
104	Khalkha-Mongol	Mongolian	1	-	-
105	Mansi	Finno-Ugrian	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
106	Oroch	Manchu	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
107	Guinean	Romance	1	1	100,00
108	Albanian	Albanian	1	-	-
109	Livonian	Finno-Ugrian	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
110	Nganasan	Samoyed	1	1	100,00	-	-	1	100,0
111	Brazilian	Romance	1	1	100,00
112	Walloon	Romance	1	-	-
113	Eskimo	Eskimo	1	1	100,00	-	-	1	100,0
114	Ket	Ket	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
115	Creole	Romance	1	-	-
116	Mozambican	Romance	1	1	100,00
117	Nigerian	Kwa	1	-	-
118	Norwegian	Germanic	1	-	-
119	Selkup	Samoyed	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
120	Rutul	Dagestani	1	1	100,00	-	-	1	100,0
121	Chilean	Romance	1	-	-
	Unknown		7	X		X			
	Nationalities, total		121	X		X			

... = data is not available

* Population of Estonia by Population Censuses, I, Statistical Office of Estonia, Tallinn, 1995, p. 106.

Table 3

**The Education of Teachers of Estonian Language Working in Russian
Language Schools of Estonia**

(Data of the Estonian Ministry of Education as of 01 September 1996)

	EDUCATION	NUMBER OF TEACHERS	% OF TOTAL	NOTES
		687	100	Teachers of Estonian language in only Russian language general comprehensive schools
1.	WITH SPECIALISED EDUCATION - total	138	20	
1.1.	Teachers of Estonian language for Estonian language schools	67	9.7	Philologists of the Estonian language and Estonian language teachers for Estonian language schools
1.2.	Teachers of Estonian language for Russian language schools	40	5.8	Teachers of Estonian language for Russian language schools, and those who are acquiring that profession additionally as a second higher education through advanced courses
1.3.	Primary school teachers - total	31	4.5	Primary school teachers for Estonian language schools
1.3.1.	Incl. with higher education	17		
1.3.2.	Special secondary education	14		
2.	OTHER PHILOLOGISTS – total	218	32	
2.1.	Graduates of Tartu University or Tallinn Pedagogical University – total	180	26	
2.2.	Graduated from other higher educational establishment – total	38	6	
3.	OTHER PEDAGOGICAL SPECIALITY – total	193	28	
3.1.	Graduated in Estonia – total	133	19	
3.2.	Graduated elsewhere – total	54	8	
3.3.	Graduation place unknown – total	6	1	
4.	OTHER SPECIALITY – total	130	19	
4.1.	Higher education	61	9	
4.2.	Secondary special education	27	4	
4.3.	Secondary education	42	6	
5.	SPECIALITY UNKNOWN	8	1	

Table 4 (A;B)

A.

Teaching in the Estonian Language of Other Subjects at Russian Language Schools in 1996/97* (Data of the Estonian Ministry of Education)

City, county	School	Subject taught in Estonian	Number of pupils
Tallinn	1. Tallinn Secondary School No. 14	art	65
		Estonian literature	31
		physical education	31
		manual training	14
	2. Tallinn Secondary School No. 5	drawing	31
		3. Tallinn Ehte Secondary School	natural science
	mathematics		11
	4. Tallinn Pelguranna Secondary School	Estonian literature	42
		Estonian culture	29
		Estonian history	12
		5. Tallinn Secondary School No. 40	regional studies
	art		74
	physical education		74
	Estonian literature		363
	Estonian history		16
	reading		74
	6. Tallinn Humanities Gymnasium	geography	77
		Estonian literature	64
	7. Tallinn Secondary School No. 45	regional studies	60
	8. Tallinn Mustamäe School of Sciences	Estonian literature	304
economics		13	
9. Tallinn Mustamäe School of Humanities	physical education	32	
	manual training	14	
	10. Tallinn Mustamäe Gen. Comprehensive School	regional studies	27
music		117	

		physical education	87
		technical drawing	117
		manual training	87
	11. Haabersti Russian Private Gymnasium	regional studies	87
		cultural studies	9
		Estonian history	19
		Estonian literature	56
Kohtla-Järve city	12. Kohtla-Järve Vahtra Basic School	regional studies	82
		biology	28
		geography. incl. Estonian geography	29
		mathematics	50
		art	50
		handicraft	50
		physical education	50
	13. Ahtme Gymnasium	natural science	76
		music	230
		art	155
		manual training	155
		physical education	324
	14. Kohtla-Järve Tammiku Gymnasium	mathematics	67
Narva city	15. Narva Secondary School No. 6	Estonian language and literature	43
	16. Pähklikmäe Gymnasium	mathematics	102
Tartu city	17. Tartu Secondary School No. 13	regional studies	166
		physical education	131
		manual training	131
		history	35
	18. Russian Private School "Gitika"	literature	32
Harjumaa	19. Kehra Secondary School	Estonian literature	42
Ida-Virumaa	20. Aseri Secondary School	Estonian literature	71
		physical education	86
		regional studies	33
		music	86
Jõgevamaa	21. Mustvee Secondary School No. 2	Estonian literature	24
Läänemaa	22. Haapsalu Russian Gymnasium	manual training	31
		physical education	31

		art	31
		music	169
Lääne-Virumaa	23. Rakvere Russian Gymnasium	Estonian literature	26
		regional studies	26
	24. Tamsalu Gymnasium	art	39
		manual training	30
		physical education	38
Pärnumaa	25. Sindi Secondary School	Estonian literature	47
Tartumaa	26. Ulila Basic School	handicraft	12
		art	21
		technical drawing	9
		manual training	36
Viljandimaa	27. Viljandi Russian Gymnasium	music	12
		physical education	58
Võrumaa	28. Võru Secondary School No. 2	regional studies	20

* There were 59,240 pupils studying Estonian at 129 Russian language schools

B.

Teaching in the Estonian Language of Other Subjects at Russian Language Schools in 1996/97**

Subject taught in the Estonian language	Number of schools
Estonian literature and reading	14
Physical education	11
Manual training and handicraft	10
Regional studies	9
Art	6
Music	5
Estonian history and culture	5
Geography, economics and cultural studies	4
Mathematics	4
Natural science and biology	3
Drawing and technical drawing	3

** Composed and calculated on the basis of Table 4A by François Grin of ECMI.

Table 5

**Language Used at Home of the First Grade Pupils of the Estonian
Language Schools (school year of 1996/97)**
(Data of the Estonian Ministry of Education)

County	Pupils studying in the Estonian language	while their language used at home is:			
		Estonian	%	other language	%
Estonia total	14112	13343	94,55	769	5,45
<i>Bigger cities:</i>					
Tallinn	3190	2975	93,26	215	6,74
including					
Haabersti	239	216	90,38	23	9,62
Kesklinn	765	721	94,25	44	5,75
Kristiine	206	193	93,69	13	6,31
Lasnamäe	575	519	90,26	56	9,74
Mustamäe	573	539	94,07	34	5,93
Nõmme	424	415	97,88	9	2,12
Pirita	90	87	96,67	3	3,33
Põhja-Tallinn	318	285	89,62	33	10,38
Tartu	1279	1240	96,95	39	3,05
Pärnu*
Narva	27	11	40,74	16	59,26
Kohtla-Järve	157	76	48,41	81	51,59
Sillamäe	11	7	63,64	4	36,36
<i>Counties</i>					
Harjumaa	1559	1479	94,87	80	5,13
Hiiumaa	200	199	99,50	1	0,50
Ida-Virumaa	364	316	86,81	48	13,19
Jõgevamaa*
Järvamaa	709	695	98,03	14	1,97
Lääne-Virumaa	1055	988	93,65	67	6,35
Läänemaa	487	407	83,57	80	16,43
Põlvamaa	551	537	97,46	14	2,54
Pärnumaa	787	769	97,71	18	2,29
Raplamaa*
Saaremaa	714	711	99,58	3	0,42
Tartumaa	704	663	94,18	41	5,82
Valgamaa	583	557	95,54	26	4,46
Viljandimaa	1002	990	98,80	12	1,20
Võrumaa	733	723	98,64	10	1,36

* ... - no data was provided

Table 6

**Number of Persons Passing the Language Proficiency Examination
Required for Employment, as of 01 August 1997**
(Data of the Estonian Ministry of Education)

Location	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	Total
Tallinn	3,145	7,621	1,6489	7,974	6,646	4,477	285	46,637
Narva	257	1,255	3,913	4,112	3,099	1,566	768	14,969
Ida- Virumaa	1,217	1,353	4,938	3,081	2,606	1,479	-	14,674
Läänemaa	-	101	482	151	154	86	-	974
Tartumaa	-	-	128	225	159	135	92	739
Jõgeva	-	89	141	30	18	-	-	278
Rapla	-	6	95	6	-	-	-	107
Harjumaa	-	2	1,171	-	-	-	-	1,173
Lääne- Virumaa	39	172	764	575	349	10	-	1,909
Pärnumaa	-	5	63	-	-	-	-	68
Järvamaa	-	51	148	1	10	-	-	210
Saaremaa	3	-	35	3	8	-	-	49
Võru	-	24	17	34	16	-	-	91
Põlva	-	20	239	-	-	-	-	259
Pärnu	43	170	1,423	250	89	57	31	2,063
Tartu	-	551	1,928	514	323	131	-	3,447
Viljandi	122	119	187	5	1	-	-	434
Valga	-	395	694	51	90	-	-	1,230
Hiiumaa	-	-	7	-	-	-	-	7
TOTAL	4,826	11,934	32,862	17,012	13,568	7,940	1,176	89,318

Table 7

**Number of Persons Taking the Estonian Language Examination for
Citizenship Applicants under the New Citizenship Law
(enacted 01 April 1995) as of 01 April 1997
(Data of the Estonian Ministry of Education)**

Date of Examination	Number of Applicants	Passed the Examination	Success Rate %
Sept.-Dec. 1995	168	149	88.69
1996			
January	278	243	87.41
February	247	210	85.02
March	383	317	82.77
April	414	348	84.06
May	410	332	80.98
June	423	357	84.40
July	252	222	88.10
August	169	116	68.64
September	304	235	77.30
October	296	213	71.96
November	245	215	87.76
December	243	196	80.66
Total: 1995-1996	3,832	3,153	82.28
1997			
January	264	195	73.86
February	309	255	82.52
March	299	247	82.61
Total 1997	872	697	79.93
Total 1995-1997	4,704	3,850	81.84