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The FCNM at 20: Is There Indeed a Crisis?

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The FCNM at 20: Is There Indeed a Crisis?

The occasion of the 20th anniversary of the entry into force of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) has called for recapitulation of its effects and provoked debates about the current state of affairs in the European system of minority protection. The general tune of the comments/observations is rather cloudy: although the significance of the FCNM has been acknowledged, it has been often remarked that the system is in a crisis and stuck in a dead-end. It has been argued that states are more reluctant to the concept of a multicultural society and to the minority protection, that bilateral relations increasingly affect the position of respective minorities and, consequently, multilateralism has ceased to be the dominant method to solve issues in minority protection. The monitoring system has also been subjected to criticism, suggesting it is inefficient and unable to enforce the principles set out in the FCNM.

The purpose of this Issue Brief is to outline some basic tendencies in the dynamics of the FCNM in the past 20 years, with the aim to explore whether the FCNM is indeed in crisis, as it has often been argued. The first part shows the quantitative dynamics of the FCNM: the timeline of the process of submitting instruments of signature and ratification, as well as reservations, declarations or communications. It also addresses the problem of the delays in the monitoring process that have been observed and rightly criticized. The second part focuses on the qualitative impact of the FCNM on the protection of national minorities in its states parties. Here, some general positive and negative trends have been pointed out, which the Advisory Committee has brought up in several of its Activity Reports. The Issue Brief is part of the ECMI larger research project seeking to assess the impacts of the FCNM and the effectiveness of the monitoring of its implementation. As such, the Issue Brief presents some central (though still preliminary) findings of the study that will be published in 2019.

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I. The Dynamic of the FCNM

Signatures and Ratifications

20 years after its entry into force,¹ the FCNM has a score of 39 ratifications and four signatures without ratification

(Belgium, Greece, Iceland and Luxemburg). Four states members of the Council of Europe (Andorra, France, Monaco and Turkey) have fully remained out of the “FCNM-club” and not even signed it. The vast majority of the states (31) have signed the convention in the year when it was



opened for signature (1995). The number of new signatures has significantly dropped in the following years (three signatures each in 1996 and 1997 and one signature each in 2000 and 2001), and since 2001 no new signatures have been submitted.² These data show the strong support of the states for the FCNM, indicated with 31 signatures right after it was opened for signatures. This is not surprising as the momentum was right: the issue of the protection of national minorities was high on the political agenda in Europe and the drives of the democratic transformation and of European integration have created a supportive environment to address the issue at a multilateral level. The number of signatures in the following years has drastically dropped, but this development should not be interpreted as showing decreased interest in minority protection and taken as discouraging. As a matter of fact, out of the 47 member states of the Council of Europe, only four have not signed (or accessed) the FCNM. Among these four states, two (France and Turkey) object signing the FCNM for “ideological” reasons, perceiving the concept of national minorities as contrary to the very core of their understanding of the nation. The other two states (Andorra and Monaco) are micro states and their signature of the FCNM could bring symbolic support to the FCNM, but could not make a substantial change on its scope of application. Taking this into consideration, the FCNM has reached its limits when it comes to the number of countries which have sign it. In this respect, no further dynamic can be expected. One could contemplate the circumstances under

which France and/or Turkey would access to the FCNM, but this remains unrealistic to expect. However, such development would, without any doubt, make a new breakthrough for the FCNM, bearing in mind the (geographical and political) relevance of these states and the ethnic structure of their populations.

Although the window of opportunity for new signatures is (almost) closed, the prospect of enlargement of the FCNM could be found beyond the Council of Europe. According to Article 29.1 of the FCNM, the Committee of Ministers may invite any non-member state of the Council of Europe to accede the FCNM, but this has not occurred so far. There are some arguments that expanding the FCNM outside the Council of Europe could bring new life to it and refresh its legitimacy within Europe as well. Generally, this is a solid argument, but the question remains over whether this would genuinely bring more benefit to the protection of national minorities in Europe. The positive effect might be short-term, but in the long run such an enlargement bears a risk of additional burden to its monitoring and a general loss of focus. However, the idea remains worth considering, especially with regards to the OSCE member states, which have already made relevant political commitments in the field of minority protection.

When it comes to the ratification process, this reached its peak in 1997 and 1998. Up to 1998, when the FCNM has entered into force, 24 states had ratified it. The period



from 1999 to 2002 shows a constant, although decreasing, pace of ratifications, and in 2005 the last ratifications were made. The year 2005 marked some sort of closure of the process and ever since there were no new signatures, ratifications or accessions to the FCNM. At the end, four states that have signed the FCNM have still not ratified it: Belgium, Greece, Iceland and Luxemburg.³ In Belgium, the deadlock rests on the question of the personal application of the FCNM. In Greece, the situation is to some extent similar to the ones in France and in Turkey, and the deadlock is grounded in the objection to the concept of the “national minority”. In contrast to some (although modest) attempts to promote ratification of the European Language Charter, there are no measures aimed at the promotion of ratification of the FCNM. The issue is “frozen”, not present in the discourse and left aside waiting for a better time to come. New ratifications (especially, by Belgium and Greece), would certainly bring new energy and backup to the FCNM that are of significant symbolic value. More importantly, they would expand its scope of application and thus bring more groups and individuals under the protection. This would without any doubt improve the quality of (minority) rights for these individuals and groups. Unfortunately, the prospects of new ratifications are blurry, but nevertheless, at least revitalising the debate is worth considering.

Out of 39 states parties, 18 have submitted a reservation or a declaration together with the instrument of signature or the instrument of

ratification. Only Belgium and Malta have submitted reservations and 16 other states have submitted declarations, which in most cases refer to the personal scope of application of the FCNM in the respective state. Submission of reservations and declarations has gone in line with the dynamics of signatures and ratifications, thus also ended in 2005.⁴ Yet, an interesting development occurred in 2016,⁵ when Spain submitted a “communication”, 21 years after ratifying the FCNM. Interestingly, Spain has resolutely communicated that “no national minority exists on its territory”. The communication has stirred-up some ghosts and caused fears of a possible domino effect, but it still remains an exception to the rule. It has not encouraged other states to take similar action and has not endangered the stability of the FCNM.

The climax of signatures in 1995 and the climax of ratifications in 1997 and 1998, together with the “closure” of the process in 2005, should not be interpreted as a sign that after 2005 the FCNM entered into a period of crisis. No state party has denounced it and no formal steps were taken to limit its application. Furthermore, the possibilities for its (geographical) expansion are limited. However, the question (and criticism) remains as to why the process of enlargement to the eight remaining member states of the Council of Europe has been neglected to rest in deadlock and why the perspectives of the enlargement outside the Council of Europe have not been seriously considered.



Delays in the Monitoring

The most significant “procedural” feature of the FCNM is the monitoring. The monitoring process goes in a cycle, in which the State Report, the Opinion of the Advisory Committee and the Resolution of the Committee of Ministers are the central phases. The regular monitoring cycle lasts five years and the fifth monitoring cycle will start in 2019. This however does not mean that all states parties have completed the fourth cycle: 14 states are still in the fourth monitoring cycle and four states are in the third monitoring cycle.

The delays are the main quantitative characteristic of the monitoring process. These are not so severe and the rhythm of the monitoring is not so disrupted as with regards to the monitoring of the European Language Charter, but nevertheless they remain a rule and not an exception. Indicative in this respect is the fact that throughout the four monitoring cycles, only eight state reports have been submitted in due time (one in the first cycle, two in the third and five in the fourth cycle).⁶ Interestingly, only one state has managed to submit a report in due time in two cycles (Sweden, in the third and the fourth cycles). Most of the states have managed to submit a report within a year (24 in the first cycle, 25 in the second cycle, 27 in the third cycle and 23 in the fourth cycle). These numbers show that generally there is no trend of decline throughout the cycles, but rather a trend of certain constancy (with slight ups and downs that do not affect the general trend). The

delays of individual states throughout monitoring cycles also indicate that there is no trend of constant subsequent prolongation of delays, in the sense that the shortest delay is in the first cycle and the longest in the fourth. So far, most of the states have had the longest delays in the report submission either in the first or the second monitoring cycle.

When it comes to the adoption⁷ of the Opinions of the Advisory Committee, the timeframe is set between six months and year and a half from the reception of the state report. The cases of adoption of the Opinion around or within three months are exceptional, the same as the one in which the Advisory Committee has needed two to three years to adopt the Opinion. In most of the cases, the Advisory Committee has needed the longest time to adopt the Opinion in the first monitoring cycle. This reflects the problems with resources that the Advisory Committee and the Secretariat of the FCNM faced at the beginning. This data is important because it shows that there is no tendency that with every subsequent monitoring cycle the time needed for the adoption of the Opinion gets prolonged. Yet, the opposite tendency is also not to be observed, and the time does not get shorter. As a matter of fact, there are ups and downs throughout the monitoring cycles that vary from state to state.

When it comes to the time needed to complete the monitoring process (measured from the date the Advisory Committee has adopted the Opinion to the date the



Committee of Ministers has adopted the Resolution), the dynamics throughout the four monitoring cycles show a certain tendency of decline. In the first monitoring cycle, in the case of 28 states the time needed to complete the monitoring cycle was roughly about one year. This number declines to 23 states in the second monitoring cycle, 15 states in the third monitoring cycle and 9 states in the fourth monitoring cycle.⁸ Thus, generally, the time needed for completion of the monitoring cycle gets prolonged with the subsequent monitoring cycles. Yet, the clear trend of constant decline with every subsequent monitoring cycle can be observed in 11 states. The data regarding other states show tendencies of ups and downs throughout the cycles, whereas in most cases the longest time was needed in the third monitoring cycle.

The data about the delays reveal that they are existent as a rule and not the exception. They are generally stable, and extremes are exceptional. When it comes to the submission of state reports and the adoption of the Opinions of the Advisory Committee, there is no tendency of extension of delays throughout the monitoring cycles, which would indicate regression in the monitoring process. On the other hand, time needed to complete the monitoring cycle gets generally longer throughout the monitoring cycles.

Follow-up Dialogue

One of the most commonly expressed critiques towards the monitoring process

refers to the lack of dialogue after the Committee of Ministers has adopted its Resolution. The instrument of the “follow-up” dialogue exists, but it is not an obligatory step in the monitoring process and as such it does not occur on a regular basis. Consequently, not all states get engaged in a follow-up dialogue throughout all monitoring cycles. As a matter of fact, when it comes to the follow-up dialogues, the numbers show the tendency of decline. First, the number of states engaged in a follow-up dialogue is in constant decline throughout the monitoring cycles: 25 states in the first cycle, 19 in the second, 12 in the third and two in the fourth. Second, out of 25 states that have been engaged in a follow-up dialogue in the first cycle, only eight have been engaged in all subsequent dialogues. On the other end, 7 states of these 25 have not been engaged in a follow-up dialogue in any of the subsequent monitoring cycles. The remaining 10 states have been involved in some subsequent follow-up dialogues. Interestingly, two states that were not involved in a follow-up dialogue after the first monitoring cycle have done so in the later monitoring cycles.

The numbers on the follow-up dialogue can support the criticism expressed towards the lack thereof. Indeed, the follow-up dialogues are obviously the weak point of the monitoring process.

Thematic Commentaries

Worth mentioning here are the Thematic Commentaries of the Advisory Committee, because they also contribute to the dynamics



of the FCNM. The Advisory Committee has issued four such commentaries so far: in 2006,⁹ 2008,¹⁰ 2012,¹¹ and 2016.¹² The gap from 1998 (when the FCNM entered into force) and 2006 is not surprising, bearing in mind that thematic commentaries rest on the experiences and findings of the Advisory Committee resulting from the monitoring. Since 2006, the Advisory Committee keeps the pace with the thematic commentaries: the second was issued two years after the first, and the third and the fourth in four years respectively. This stable dynamic is positive, because it ensures that through the prism of different thematic aspects, the FCNM periodically gets back into the focus.

II. The Impact of the FCNM on the Protection of National Minorities in the States Parties

With the adoption of the FCNM, the standards for the protection of national minorities in Europe have been set and it is used as a benchmark to assess the quality of protection of national minorities in 39 member states of the Council of Europe. The FCNM, being the only international legal document for the protection of national minorities, is certainly the most important international leverage to influence the protection of national minorities at the state level in Europe. Yet, it is not the only international leverage, and exactly the synergy with other international instruments, contributes to the effects it produces in the state parties. In this respect, the most worthy to mention are certainly the European

Language Charter, the work of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), the political documents of the OSCE (first of all, the Copenhagen Document) and the work of the OSCE HCNM (especially the recommendations and guidelines they has issued), and the policy of the conditionality of the EU. Indeed, the EU was (and to a lower extent, still is) the most significant external player in supporting the implementation of the FCNM, due to the fact that protection of national minorities is part of the political criteria for EU membership and the implementation of the FCNM is used as a central benchmark to assess the fulfilment of this criterion. The lack of similar leverage once the state has joined the EU and the current deadlock in the EU enlargement process leave the FCNM without an important backup, causing, according to many, the backlash in the quality of its implementation.

Monitoring as the Leverage

The most significant “internal” leverage of the FCNM on the states parties is the monitoring process. The monitoring is conceptualized as a dialogue between the state parties and the Council of Europe, the latter being represented by the Advisory Committee as the expert body and the Committee of Ministers as the political body. This concept of monitoring through dialogue has often been debated with the main question being whether it is effective or not. For the critics, the main argument is that the recommendations (developed by the



Advisory Committee and formally adopted by the Committee of Ministers) are not enforceable and that their implementation is left to the will of the state parties. On the other hand, the supporters claim that the authority of the Advisory Committee and the political influence of the Committee of Ministers should not be underestimated and that the dialogue process should not be perceived per se as weak and ineffective. Indeed, the monitoring system of the FCNM is not so strong as the one established for the European Convention on Human Rights (with the special court as the monitoring body), but nevertheless it cannot be considered ineffective: there can be no doubt that the monitoring of the FCNM has significantly contributed to the implementation of the FCNM.

Identifying general trends in the implementation of the FCNM is not an easy task, not only because states have their individual dynamic, but also because this dynamic is not linear. First, the quality of minority protection is not on the same level in all areas (for example, national minorities might have full access to education in their own language, but be limited in using that language in communication with the authorities), although spill-over effects should not be neglected and the improvement in one area has positive effects on the other areas and vice versa. Second, the trends are not constant, steadily increasing or steadily decreasing, but rather characterised with ups and downs and tendencies of both improvement and regression in different periods. Against this

background, here only several findings on “trends and challenges for minority protection in Europe” can be pointed out, which the Advisory Committee has briefly addressed in some of its Activity Reports (Seventh,¹³ Ninth,¹⁴ Tenth¹⁵ and Eleventh¹⁶).

Positive Effects

When it comes to the positive effects, two major developments can be identified. The first one refers to the legitimacy of the FCNM. As the Advisory Committee has put it in its Seventh Activity Report of 2010:

“The fundamental role of the Framework Convention, as a key European instrument on national minorities, is now well recognised by national and international actors. (...) These standards [set out in the FCNM] have stood the test of time in the last decade and have shown how they are of real benefit to states and minorities to regulate their relationships in a changing Europe.”¹⁷

Indeed, over the 20 years, the FCNM has never been (strongly) contested and the general commitment of the states to the principles of the FCNM was never seriously put in question. Although every now and then states express their criticism towards a too wide and flexible interpretation of the text of the FCNM on side of the Advisory Committee, they have never challenged the concept of the protection of national minorities as such. In recent years, the tension between diversity and unity has



become greater, but it has not affected the very core of the concept of the national minority protection.

In addition to this more conceptual positive effect of the FCNM, the major “practical” positive outcome of the FCNM is bringing domestic legislation and policies in line with the principles set out in it. As the Advisory Committee has put in its Ninth and Tenth Activity Reports:

“Since the Advisory Committee began its monitoring work, we have seen commendable activity by states parties to bring domestic legislation and policies into line with the principles enshrined in the Framework Convention. We have welcomed the enactment of numerous national minority laws and seen the creation by many states of mechanisms designed to create a forum for dialogue and facilitate consultations with national minorities on matters of concern to them. These developments constitute fundamental stepping stones in creating favourable conditions for the protection of minority rights.”¹⁸

The Eleventh Activity Report of 2018 addresses the positive trends in more detail and offers some examples that reflect the efforts of the states to comply with the principles of the FCNM. In addition to acknowledgment of “new legislative developments, be it a new law on minority protection or a legislative change regarding the use of more than one official language”,¹⁹ the Advisory Committee has also appreciated some decisions or

programmes that have brought positive changes. These refer mainly to expanding the scope of application of national minority rights (through opening possibilities for more persons belonging to a larger number of national minorities to access their rights, through expanding the protection to more groups or through extending the protecting to persons who have moved from traditional areas to urban centres), addressing past crimes and injustice through an open public apology and compensation schemes, new ways of assuring the effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities in decision-making processes, and more sophisticated approaches to minority rights (taking into account gender equality, the needs and interests of aging populations, and socio-economic preconditions for the minority protection).²⁰

Negative Trends

The implementation of the FCNM does not go smoothly and problems with the minority protection exist throughout Europe. There are several, more general, problems worth mentioning here. There is the lack of the adequate implementation of the legal provisions on minority rights. As the Advisory Committee has put it in the Ninth Activity Report, “[c]hanges to the law to accommodate minority rights are not always implemented or applied equally throughout a state. Just as importantly, they also do not automatically lead to a change in political culture”.²¹ There are also persisting problems in issues around education in minority languages and the use of minority



languages.²² These problems mainly result from the tensions between the protection of the state language and the protection of minority languages. The tensions seem to be more intense in the context of a revival of nationalism and new trends of exclusive nation-building,²³ which can be observed (though to various extents) throughout Europe. One of the persisting problems is also the situation of disadvantage of the Roma and denial of minority rights to them, that still exists throughout Europe,²⁴ despite all the strategies and programmes for Roma inclusion. The economic crisis and austerity measures have caused cuts to the budgets for minority issues (education, media, cultural activities and similar), which also can be observed as a general negative trend.²⁵ Finally, 20 years after the FCNM is in force, deep polarisation of society along ethnic and linguistic lines is still present in some states and prevents serene discussions of minority issues.²⁶ In addition to these more general negative trends, some negative trends in specific areas are also worth mentioning. One such trend is restrictions with regards to work of NGOs (established by persons belonging to national minorities or dealing with minority issues) that have led to the reduction in the scope of their activities.²⁷ The media has also been identified as problematic issue, with regards to unprofessional reporting about national minorities and minority issues and the presence of hate speech in the social media.²⁸ In general, hate speech, same as hate crime, the scapegoating of persons belonging to national minorities as well as using extreme violence against some of

them, cause a lot of concern as manifestations of the climate of intolerance that can be observed.²⁹ Finally, worth mentioning are also the potentially destabilizing effects of the unilateral measures taken by the kin-states in favour of kin-minorities as well as the practice of misusing of the FCNM monitoring process to heighten tensions around sensitive issues.³⁰

As the main contextual causes for the negative trends in minority protection, the Advisory Committee identifies: the rise in racist, xenophobic and extremist discourse and of political parties relying on such rhetoric,³¹ the rise of populism,³² the revival of nationalism,³³ the economic crisis,³⁴ and increased relevance of geopolitics and to it related security concerns.³⁵

No Clear Linear Tendencies

The response of the states to the FCNM is not simply black and white, with clear linear tendencies of constant improvement or constant regression. In some areas the states are more responsive and open for changes that bring improvement, but in some areas they remain conservative and stick to regulations or policies that are not fully in line with the standards of the FCNM. As already mentioned above, every state has its own dynamic with regards the implementation of the FCNM and its own ups and downs. Usually, the focus of the Advisory Committee, same as of the commentators, is on the challenges, regressing developments and factors that



have negative effects on the protection of national minorities. This is understandable, because the identification of the problem is the first step towards solving it. Thus, the aim is to identify the areas that need more attention and further intensive action, in order to improve the situation. But, laying the focus on the challenges may create the wrong impression of the failure of the FCNM, as being unable to provide adequate answers to the challenges and to mitigate their negative effects. Such an approach can unintentionally “give material” to the opponents to the minority protection and negatively effect the legitimacy of the FCNM. This in no case means to neglect the negative effects, but these should also be put in the context of positive outcomes that the FCNM has managed to achieve. The advocates for the FCNM should never miss the opportunity to point out that FCNM works and that protection of national minorities has not failed in Europe.

Conclusions

The quantitative and qualitative aspects briefly outlined above show that there is no tendency of linear regression of the FCNM. The quantitative dynamics indicate that the FCNM has remained stable and entered into a routine that some might interpret as a crisis, but this seems to be too harsh of a qualification. Two weak points can be

identified in respect of the quantitative aspect. One is the stagnation in respect of new signatures and ratifications. Here, the process really seems to be frozen. But this is not a new development caused with the rise of populism and revival of nationalism, although the lack of encouraging environment has certainly contributed to the situation to remain in the status quo. The other weak point is the decrease of the follow-up dialogues, and generally the insufficient dialogue on the progress (and problems) between the monitoring cycles. The qualitative dimension, the impact of the FCNM on the quality of the minority protection in states parties, shows that it is not possible to identify a general tendency of overall decline. The situation varies from state to state, and from issue to issue, and both positive and negative trends can be observed. The impression of the crisis results to a great extent from the frustration that 20 years after the FCNM has entered into the force, problems in minority protection are still present throughout Europe. This frustration comes on the one hand from the high expectations of the FCNM, and on the other hand from the dynamic interpretation of the FCNM, which is adequate and justified, but can cause the perception of the FCNM as a “moving target” and lead to fatigue. But, the very core of the FCNM has remained intact, and the ups and downs in its implementation are just “business as usual”.



Recommendations

- Revitalise dialogue with(in) Belgium and Greece about the ratification of the FCNM;
- Explore the possibilities for some member states of the OSCE and non-members of the Council of Europe to access the FCNM;
- Explore and address the causes of delays in the monitoring process;
- Strengthen the dialogue between the states and the Council of Europe between the two monitoring cycles; Encourage follow-up dialogues;
- Promote positive outcomes of the implementation of the FCNM;
- Better communicate recommendations resulting from the monitoring.



Notes

¹ The FCNM was opened for signature on 1 February 1995 and entered into force on 1 February 1998. “Chart of signatures and ratifications of Treaty 157”, at: <https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/157/signatures> (accessed 13 December 2018).

² The source for the data is the “Chart of signatures and ratifications of Treaty 157”, at: <https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/157/signatures> (accessed 13 December 2018).

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ The source for the submission dates are data available for each state party provided in the scope of the “Country-specific monitoring on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities”, at: <https://www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/country-specific-monitoring> (accessed 13 December 2008).

⁷ For the analysis, the date of the adoption of the Opinion has been used as the indicator, because it reflects the time the Advisory Committee has needed to assess the situation and to adopt the Opinion. When it comes to the Opinions, there is also the date of its publication, but because it is out of the control of the Advisory Committee, it has not been considered in this analysis.

⁸ It has to be born in mind that 14 states are still in the fourth monitoring cycle and four states are in the third monitoring cycle, for which reason these data are not final.

⁹ “Commentary on Education under the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities”, ACFC/25DOC(2006)002, available at:

<https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016800bb694> (accessed 18 December 2018).

¹⁰ “Commentary on the Effective Participation of Persons Belonging to National Minorities in Cultural, Social and Economic Life and Public Affairs”, ACFC/31DOC(2008)001, available at:

<https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016800bc7e8> (accessed 18 December 2018).

¹¹ “Thematic Commentary No. 3. The Language Rights of Persons Belonging to National Minorities under the Framework Convention”, ACFC/44DOC(2012)001 rev, available at:

<https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016800c108d> (accessed 18 December 2018).

¹² “The Framework Convention: a key tool to managing diversity through minority rights. Thematic Commentary No. 4. The Scope of the Application of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities”, ACFC/56DOC(2016)001, available at:

<https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806a4811> (accessed 18 December 2018).

¹³ Advisory Committee, 7th Activity Report (Covering the period 1 June 2008 – 31 May 2010),

ACFC/INF(2010)001, available at

<https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016800c00b3> (accessed 13 December 2018).

¹⁴ Advisory Committee, Ninth Activity Report covering the period from 1 June 2012 to 31 May 2014, Strasbourg: Council of Europe 2014. Available at

<https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680097ec4> (accessed 13 December 2013).

¹⁵ Advisory Committee, Tenth Activity Report covering the period from 1 June 2014 to 31 May 2016, Strasbourg: Council of Europe 2016. Available at

<https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806a9ae5> (accessed 13 December 2018).

¹⁶ Advisory Committee, Eleventh Activity Report covering the period from 1 June 2016 to 31 May 2018, Strasbourg: Council of Europe 2018. Available at <https://rm.coe.int/prems-113118-gbr-2568-11erapportd-activiteprotectionofnationalminoriti/16808df0ae> (accessed 13 December 2018).

¹⁷ 7th Activity Report, p. 6 points 26-27.



¹⁸ Ninth Activity Report, p. 9; similar statement also in the Tenth Activity Report, p. 9.

¹⁹ Eleventh Activity Report, p. 12.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ninth Activity Report, p. 10.

²² See 7th Activity Report, p. 4, point 18; Ninth Activity Report, p. 11, Eleventh Activity Report, p. 11.

²³ Eleventh Activity Report, p. 11.

²⁴ 7th Activity Report, p. 5, point 23; Ninth Activity Report, p. 12, Tenth Activity Report, p. 10.

²⁵ 7th Activity Report, p. 5, point 20; Ninth Activity Report, p. 11; Tenth Activity Report, p. 10; Eleventh Activity Report, p. 12.

²⁶ Ninth Activity Report, p. 11; Tenth Activity Report, p. 10.

²⁷ Eleventh Activity Report, p. 10.

²⁸ Seventh Activity Report, p. 4, point 14, Ninth Activity Report, p. 11, Tenth Activity Report, p. 10, Eleventh Activity Report, p.p. 10-11, 14.

²⁹ See 7th Activity Report, p. 4, point 14; Ninth Activity Report, p. 11, Eleventh Activity Report, p. 14.

³⁰ Ninth Activity Report, p. 13.

³¹ Ninth Activity Report, p. 11, Tenth Activity Report pp. 9-10, to some extent also 7th Activity Report, p. 4, point 14.

³² Eleventh Activity Report, pp. 9, 10, 14.

³³ Ibid., pp. 9 and 11.

³⁴ 7th Activity Report, p. 5, point 20.

³⁵ Eleventh Activity Report, p. 9.



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