ECMI Minorities Blog. A silent response from Central Asia about human- and minority rights violations in Xinjiang

Authors: Niginakhon Uralova and Sergiusz Bober

* Niginakhon Uralova is a student of a Regional Master’s programme in Human Rights and Democratization in the Caucasus at Yerevan State University, Centre for European Studies. She also holds MA degree in Politics and Security (Central Asia) from the OSCE Academy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Her key areas of interest concern human rights issues in post-Soviet space, Sino-Central Asian relations, and questions surrounding legitimacy of a government in contemporary Islamic political philosophy.

* Sergiusz Bober is a Senior Researcher at the ECMI

A member of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Gay McDougall, described the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) as ‘no rights zone’. Thus, she expressed concerns about large-scale human- and minority rights violations the Chinese state has inflicted on the Uyghurs and other Muslim minority groups. In 2018, over a million of Xinjiang’s inhabitants were reported to be held in internment camps. While most of the detainees belong to the region’s main Turkic Muslim group — the Uyghurs — members of other minorities such as Hui Chinese, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Tajiks have been reported as imprisoned as well. Xinjiang’s links with Central Asia are reflected not only in large diasporas residing there (circa 1.5 million Kazakhs and 220,000 Kyrgyz) – some hold dual citizenship of China and respective kin states - but also in sizeable Uyghur communities living throughout the region. Importantly, before the recent crackdown by Chinese authorities the cross-border movement of people was not considered a problematic issue. However, already in 2017 it was reported that ethnic Kazakhs had been placed in internment camps, in some cases only because of contacts with their relatives or acquaintances living in kin states. Despite such developments, Central Asian states prefer to maintain positive relations with China, instead of confronting it over the human- and minority rights situation in Xinjiang. This blog piece aims to answer what are the reasons behind their silent response?

Xinjiang, an autonomous region of the People’s Republic of China in the north-western part of the country, is home to around 13 million Turkic (e.g. Uyghurs) and non-Turkic Muslims (e.g. Hui Chinese). Violence in the region has deep roots in long-standing tensions between Uyghurs who frequently seek self-determination and the Chinese state. In July 2009, Uyghur demonstrations against the Han Chinese migration to the region orchestrated by the state, as well as systemic economic, cultural, and religious discrimination, turned into riots lasting several days, and resulted in around 200 deaths, mostly of Han Chinese. The Tiananmen Square incident of 2013, coupled with knife attacks and suicide bombings in Kunming and Urumqi in the following year, served as a turning point that culminated in the commencement of brutal state crackdown against Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang.

In 2014, the Chinese government initiated a “Strike Hard Campaign against Violent Extremism” which significantly intensified after Chen Quanguo, a hard-liner previously responsible for the pacification of Tibet, was moved to the position of the Communist Party Secretary of XUAR. Since then the Uyghurs, as well as other Xinjiang Muslims, have been subjected to arbitrary detentions, mass surveillance, torture, violations of sexual and reproductive rights, and travel restrictions. Children, whose parents were detained or are in exile, were held in child welfare institutions without any formal consent. In addition, policies such as beautification projects and home visits were introduced, while cultural heritage is frequently destroyed. Although the Chinese government initially denied existence of political indoctrination camps, currently it maintains they are “Vocational Education and Training Centers”, justifying their existence as protective measures against the “three evils” of separatism, terrorism and religious extremism. Some scholars and activists, as well as politicians, consider it an example of ethnic cleansing and/or cultural genocide.

Recently a new phase of the campaign has begun, with former camp detainees being frequently either sent to work in factories across China (forced job placements) or given lengthy prison sentences in order to formalize their status and thus provide some form of legal legitimacy to the authorities’ actions.

The western world has been speaking up about the issue. On 8^th July 2019 over 20 member states of UN Human Rights Council issued a joint statement expressing their concern about repressions targeting Uyghurs and other minority groups in Xinjiang. In December 2019, the European Parliament approved a resolution not only condemning China’s actions in Xinjiang, but also calling for targeted sanctions against responsible officials and unrestricted access to the region for journalists and international observers. In the autumn of 2019, the US government blacklisted Chinese surveillance companies associated with repressions in Xinjiang. On 14^th May 2020 the US Senate approved a bipartisan bill “Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020” where it urges the government to sanction Chinese officials who are responsible for human rights violations, including Chen Quanguo.

Yet the Central Asian countries behave differently. In 2001, upon the inception of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, four Central Asian states (Turkmenistan excluded) signed the “Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism”, which is considered a tool that helps China to prevent the rise of what it perceives as Islamic fundamentalism and ethnic separatism in Xinjiang. Consequently, when the 2019 joint statement was issued, none of the signatories were from the Islamic world, including the Muslim majority countries of Central Asia. In contrast, on 12^th July 2019, along with other 37 states, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan (Uzbekistan joined later), signed another joint letter, this time defending China’s policy towards Uyghurs and praising it for its “contribution to the international human rights cause.”

As some experts point out, state responses to the Xinjiang crisis in Central Asia can be divided into two groups – Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan openly defend ‘the inner policy of China’, while Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have to thread more carefully due to the raising public pressure and anti-Chinese sentiments in both countries. In both scenarios, human- and minority rights can be considered a problematic issue. For instance, Kyrgyzstan struggles to properly address the legacy of the 2010 Kyrgyz-Uzbek interethnic clashes, while Kazakhstan supports the repatriation of ethnic Kazakhs residing elsewhere. Therefore, it can be argued that in both countries the so-called titular nations are considered of primary importance within a broader landscape of ethnic diversity. At the same time, both countries sustain secular profiles, which significantly limit any possibility of policies inspired by pan-Islamic solidarity.

Certainly, economic reasons explain at least in part general reluctance to act of the Central Asian states  (Murat, 2019. “Reactions to the Claims of Persecution of Ethnic Minorities in Xinjiang: Case Studies of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan” unpublished M.A. Thesis OSCE Academy in Bishkek). China holds $12 billion of Kazakhstan’s external government debt, $1.8 billion of Kyrgyzstan’s (almost half of Kyrgyzstan’s total debt), and $1.2 billion of Tajikistan’s (a total proportion similar to Kyrgyzstan). At the same time, China significantly invests in the Kazakh industrial sector and vital infrastructure; has become Bishkek’s main trade partner; plus in 2011 Dushanbe ceded almost one percent of its land to China under demarcation and delimitation of borders. Turkmenistan exports nearly 80 percent of its gas to China, reportedly for a very low price, calculated against the cost of pipelines financed by China. Recently Uzbekistan also tried to gain access to Beijing’s vast financial resources.

Although China’s economic might significantly limits maneuvering space of Central Asian governments, their passivity regarding the situation in Xinjiang is challenged by pressure from civil society. The Xinjiang issue was first brought to public attention in 2018 by activists of Atajurt Eriktileri (Atajurt) – an Almaty-based association, which grew from a small organization to a forefront voice rising awareness on Kazakhs and other ethnic Central Asians detained in Xinjiang. A committee to protect ethnic Kyrgyz in China was established in Kyrgyzstan in 2018, while several anti-Chinese protests took place in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan in 2018 and 2019. Protests were as much about the Xinjiang issue as about growing presence of Chinese nationals in both countries, Chinese-funded companies, and government loans from China.

As a result, Kazakhstan, although it does not openly criticize China and initially ignored the issue, has been working hard to have both its citizens and other ethnic Kazakhs released from the camps, with relative successes. So much so that early last year the Ministry of Foreign Affairs even announced that China will let 2,000 ethnic Kazakhs drop their Chinese citizenship and leave for Kazakhstan. Kyrgyz government stated in early 2019 that it cannot interfere with China’s internal affairs, although earlier it has acknowledged that it is “monitoring the situation … and it needs to be treated very carefully”. Uyghurs, in contrast, cannot hope for a similar kind of limited help as they do not have a kin state.

It is therefore clear that Central Asian states do not want to antagonize their powerful partner over human- and minority rights, also because the region is a ground for great power rivalry among Russia, US, and China, where Beijing seems to have gained an advantageous position. In February 2020, the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo tried to unite the region by focusing on the situation in Xinjiang. Unsurprisingly, the Foreign Minister of Uzbekistan, Abdulaziz Kamilov said “we would really not like to feel on ourselves the unfavorable political consequences related to the competition in our region between large powers”. Kazakhstan’s new president Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, when referring to the Xinjiang issue, claimed that reports do not reflect reality on the ground as it is part of geopolitical game, with the US and China involved in a trade war. According to him, “Kazakhstan should not become the territory of the so-called global anti-Chinese front”.

In conclusion, five Central Asian countries have differing approaches regarding the Xinjiang crisis, with only two - Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan – not being entirely passive vis-à-vis China. Kazakhstan – the strongest economy in the region - has been trying to help its kin-community and Kazakhstani citizens, although only by using behind the scenes diplomacy. Kyrgyzstan’s margin for action, due to unresolved minority issues in the country and structural factors (economic dependency on China) remains even narrower. If current trends continue, this situation is not going to change dramatically. Washington’s confrontational approach to China is not received with enthusiasm in the region, while Russia’s presence might be the factor preventing Central Asian countries from becoming Beijing’s client states, and thus preserve their limited capacity to act. In this context, internal social pressure can at best achieve more governmental focus on the groups already close to Bishkek and Nur-Sultan’s hearts. At the same time, as authoritarian and illiberal regimes neither is going to be principled about wider issues linked to human- and minority rights, a position which already shapes their foreign policy towards China. Therefore, they will not take any risks on behalf of the Uyghurs.

It could be argued that despite the scale of human- and minority rights violations in Xinjiang, China has not yet reached the point of no return. As its international reputation is obviously suffering, at some point the space for dialogue concerning minority issues in the country might be created, with the involvement of external actors. If that happens, two things are certain. On the one hand, the world should brace itself for a long march towards the normalization of the situation of minorities in China. On the other, Central Asian countries will neither initiate, nor play leading roles in this process.