News from ECMI InfoChannel

In July 2022, unprecedented demonstrations took place in Uzbekistan’s Autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan. These demonstrations followed proposed constitutional amendments which would remove Karakalpakstan’s right to freely secede from the Uzbek Republic. Thousands of Karakalpaks joined together for peaceful demonstrations to protest against the changes concerning their homeland. Tashkent reacted in line with what seems to have become a Central Asian formula: military troops were sent to suppress the demonstrations, which led to multiple deaths and injuries; the Internet was shut down; curfews were introduced; and checkpoints were set up around the region. The President of Uzbekistan, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, came to Karakalpakstan to promise that its status would not change as the proposed amendments would be removed. The probability of Karakalpakstan seceding through a referendum remains low: it is the poorest region of Uzbekistan, and Karakalpaks are not even the majority of the population there. However, the status and the right to secede seem to play a significant symbolic role to the Karakalpak people, as their quick and coordinated mobilisation has shown.

In 2022, Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan Region saw several demonstrations of the non-recognised Pamiri minority. The government, unsurprisingly, reacted with force: the internet was shut down in the whole region, many local leaders were detained and persecuted. This is not the first time that confrontation between Pamiris and governmental representatives appointed by the capital Dushanbe takes place, with similar events happening in 2012, 2014, and 2021. In this blog piece ECMI Researcher Aziz Berdiqulov looks more closely at those events, puts them in a long-term perspective, and offers a possible way out of the fatal cycle of tensions.   

One of the consequences of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the imposition of western economic sanctions on the country and further autocratization of its political system. Both factors have resulted in a significant outward migration of Russian citizens, with Central Asia being one of frequent destinations due to the geographic proximity and widespread use of Russian language. At the same time, for many Russians the region remains a terra incognita, perceived primarily through the presence of the Central Asian labour migrants. In this blog piece, ECMI Researcher Aziz Berdiqulov examines this recent phenomenon by discussing specifically the cases of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as receiving countries, through the prism of different initiatives addressing the influx, social attitudes concerning the newcomers and reactions of the Russian minorities present there. Furthermore, the author tries to assess whether the new situation has the potential for changing the hitherto pattern of relations between Russians and Central Asians.

Where do European minority issues stand following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine? What are the dimensions of this crisis that pose a particular challenge to the European minority rights regime? Does the renewed sense of purpose among liberal democracies augur a revitalization of minority issues or continued business as usual? The ECMI’s Director Vello Pettai looks at the stakes involved with the war in Ukraine. Already before the crisis, minority issues were operating in an increasingly crowded landscape of societal concerns: populism, climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic. Russia’s aggression has brought together a further cocktail involving autocratization, kin-state activism and geopolitical disorder. Key institutions governing and promoting the European minority rights regime will need to be regrouped before a new impulse for minority issues can be found.

In Sweden, the Roma have the right to contribute to and influence policy measures that affect them. Authorities often fulfil their obligation to include Roma through the so-called reference groups. The authors see several problems with this model. First, the reference groups are deprived of agency, as they are often not involved at early stages in the planning, but rather informed and consulted on ready-made decisions. Second, an emphasis is placed on “Romani organisations” when nominating and selecting representatives, which encourages rapid creation of new organisations with few members and activities, little transparency, and affected by gate-keeping as the power is kept between a few individuals. Last, the emphasis on linguistic and cultural competence deprives many individuals of influence and the possibility of being heard, especially those who have been subject to harsh assimilation

The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine has triggered the unprecedent human displacement crisis with more than 13 million individuals uprooted from their homes. It is estimated that among 5,7 million people who fled abroad, at least 100,000 belong to Roma minority – one of the most vulnerable and marginalized minority groups. In this blog entry, the author examines how the international institutions and Roma civil society organisations stepped in to support Roma refugees and combat discrimination in their accessing rights and resources granted to those fleeing the war in Ukraine.

In this blog entry, the author continues looking into the effects of the war against Ukraine on its minority communities, by highlighting the cases of two minorities with traditional residence areas in the western part of the country - ethnic Romanians and Hungarians. The author concludes that both minorities, either through the engagement of their civil society, religious, and educational institutions or individuals, have become a well-integrated part of an overall civil society architecture in western Ukraine emerging during the war. Moreover, all-Ukrainian civic identity features prominently in relation to both communities. 

On February 24, 2022, Russia launched an offensive against Ukraine simultaneously in the north, east and south of the country. Thus, Russian troops expanded their temporary occupation of Ukrainian territories, which began in 2014. Millions of Ukrainian citizens, including indigenous peoples and national minorities, found themselves in the temporarily occupied territories. Residents of those regions are suffering from lack of food, utilities and medical care, and live under the pressure of the Russian troops. Their opposition to the invasion is met with detentions, intimidation, torture and executions. Under such conditions, the usual policy of diversity management is reduced to the struggle for the life of every citizen. This blog piece is dedicated to the current situation in the temporarily occupied regions of Ukraine and pays particular attention to the communities of indigenous peoples and national minorities.

The Hungarian minority in Ukraine living mainly in the region of Transcarpathia (Zakarpattia Oblast) has not yet been directly exposed to the horrors of the war. However, roughly since 2014, it has been targeted by online propaganda and disinformation serving the interests of the Kremlin in both Russian and Hungarian media. Several studies have demonstrated how the right-wing media supporting the Hungarian government have come increasingly under Russian influence either directly by translating pieces from Russian media outlets, or indirectly by channeling the talking points of the Kremlin. This digital propaganda has merged with the offline diffusion of ideologies supporting the illiberal democracy that Viktor Orbán declared official policy in Hungary in his infamous speech from 2014. This blog post explores the intricate web of nationalisms that influence  political opinions among the Hungarian minority in Ukraine.