News from ECMI InfoChannel

Ukraine recognizes Romanian and Moldovan as distinct minority languages, even though the official language of the Republic of Moldova is Romanian. This distinction between Romanian and Moldovan is not merely a symbolic matter, it has practical, negative consequences for members of the minority communities concerned. Since the 1990s, Ukrainian-Romanian relations have been affected by mutual distrust rooted in historical resentments, stereotypes, and prejudice at the level of both political elites and the general public. Moldova and Ukraine have experienced ups and downs in their bilateral relations due to the complex geopolitical context and growing Russian interference. The ongoing Russian war against Ukraine has had a strong impact on Moldova and Romania as well as on their kin minority communities in Ukraine. This war marks a turning point in history. It has caused tectonic shifts in global affairs, in the Euro-Atlantic community, and in national politics and interstate relations. Ukraine, Romania, and Moldova can turn the ongoing crisis into an opportunity to reset their (dysfunctional) bilateral relations. It is high time for a paradigm shift towards a new, enhanced triadic partnership which is able to ensure an effective system of minority protection.

In this blog post, the author examines the specifics of the work of minority media and minority journalists during the first six months of the war of aggression against Ukraine. The text is based on the author’s interviews with representatives of different types of minority media outlets – printed, digital, as well as the public broadcaster – operating in different regions of Ukraine. The key findings indicate a tendency towards scarcer reporting about the daily lives of ethnic communities and a more vulnerable situation for minority reporters, many of whom have fled abroad, of all media outlets scrutinized. Moreover, a significant decrease in broadcasting in minority languages through the public broadcaster is identified in one of the multi-ethnic regions.

As Russia is increasingly losing its military personnel in the war with Ukraine, the Kremlin is trying to make up for these losses in every possible way. Following a period of covert partial mobilization, since 21 September 2022 Russia has launched a partial mobilization; both involved disproportionately the male population from remote underdeveloped regions with concentrated populations of national minorities, particularly from the Far East, North Caucasus, Buryatia, Khakassia etc., as well as from the occupied areas of Georgia, Ukrainian Donbas, and Crimea. Conscription is much less common in Russia’s large economically and socially developed cities, where the majority of the population is ethnic Russian. The number of representatives of the poorest national minorities from remote regions of Russia who were injured or killed during the war disproportionately exceeds the respective share of ethnic Russians who have suffered the same fate. Beyond the economic reasons for the increased participation of minorities in the war, this disproportionality raises questions as to the intentions of Putin’s regime in sending these populations - rather than the Russian majority – to the frontlines.

Minority language media (MLM) faced significant disruption resulting from the digitalisation processes which brought in increased competition and challenged traditional business models. With a new wave of technological advancements in auto-translation, however, there may be opportunities to grow audience within different speaker groups. This blogpost considers the model of Scottish Gaelic broadcaster BBC Alba, which is sustained by a two-pronged strategy of content for speakers and non-speakers, concluding that other outlets, including newspapers, could utilise auto-translation tools to grow their audience as readership habits evolve. Caution is also expressed towards the possibility of majority-language first practices creeping in out of convenience, serving as a reminder that regulation and public funding must ensure that minority language content is continuously produced, and that the current wave of digitalisation is advantageous for MLM.

In July 2022, unprecedented demonstrations took place in Uzbekistan’s Autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan. These demonstrations followed proposed constitutional amendments which would remove Karakalpakstan’s right to freely secede from the Uzbek Republic. Thousands of Karakalpaks joined together for peaceful demonstrations to protest against the changes concerning their homeland. Tashkent reacted in line with what seems to have become a Central Asian formula: military troops were sent to suppress the demonstrations, which led to multiple deaths and injuries; the Internet was shut down; curfews were introduced; and checkpoints were set up around the region. The President of Uzbekistan, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, came to Karakalpakstan to promise that its status would not change as the proposed amendments would be removed. The probability of Karakalpakstan seceding through a referendum remains low: it is the poorest region of Uzbekistan, and Karakalpaks are not even the majority of the population there. However, the status and the right to secede seem to play a significant symbolic role to the Karakalpak people, as their quick and coordinated mobilisation has shown.

In 2022, Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan Region saw several demonstrations of the non-recognised Pamiri minority. The government, unsurprisingly, reacted with force: the internet was shut down in the whole region, many local leaders were detained and persecuted. This is not the first time that confrontation between Pamiris and governmental representatives appointed by the capital Dushanbe takes place, with similar events happening in 2012, 2014, and 2021. In this blog piece ECMI Researcher Aziz Berdiqulov looks more closely at those events, puts them in a long-term perspective, and offers a possible way out of the fatal cycle of tensions.   

One of the consequences of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the imposition of western economic sanctions on the country and further autocratization of its political system. Both factors have resulted in a significant outward migration of Russian citizens, with Central Asia being one of frequent destinations due to the geographic proximity and widespread use of Russian language. At the same time, for many Russians the region remains a terra incognita, perceived primarily through the presence of the Central Asian labour migrants. In this blog piece, ECMI Researcher Aziz Berdiqulov examines this recent phenomenon by discussing specifically the cases of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as receiving countries, through the prism of different initiatives addressing the influx, social attitudes concerning the newcomers and reactions of the Russian minorities present there. Furthermore, the author tries to assess whether the new situation has the potential for changing the hitherto pattern of relations between Russians and Central Asians.