ECMI Minorities Blog. Choosing Nonviolence in a Violent World: The Zapatista Struggle Thirty Years On
*** The blog posts are prepared by the authors in their personal capacity. The views expressed in the blog posts are the sole responsibility of the authors concerned and do not necessarily reflect the view of the European Centre for Minority Issues. ***
Author: Barbora Valik | https://doi.org/10.53779/AWPM1472
* Barbora Valik is a PhD candidate at Central European University (Austria) and a visiting research fellow at Universidad de los Andes (Colombia). In her doctoral dissertation, she explores the mobilisation strategies of Indigenous communities in Latin America. valik_barbora@phd.ceu.edu
On 1 January 1994, the world woke up to the news of a previously unknown armed group taking over some major cities in the state of Chiapas in Mexico. The insurgents introduced themselves as the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) and became commonly known as the Zapatistas. Formed predominantly by local Indigenous people, the EZLN defined its struggle as one for “work, land, housing, food, health care, education, independence, freedom, democracy, justice, and peace.”
Although the main military confrontations only lasted twelve days, the following years were marked by further offensives and outbreaks of violence. Nevertheless, the Zapatistas were quick to adopt nonviolence as their primary method of resistance. Thirty years later, Chiapas finds itself ravaged by chaos and violence perpetrated by various criminal groups. What does this mean for the Indigenous communities involved in the Zapatista movement? And what does their story teach us about the importance of civil society and the use of nonviolence in violent contexts?
Throughout the 1990s, several factors contributed to the transformation of the Zapatista struggle. The bridges built toward the outside world were of particular importance in shaping the movement and its strategies in the past. Against the backdrop of the current security crisis, the Zapatistas have recently initiated extensive reorganisation. These developments undoubtedly signal a new era and have been even interpreted as possible withdrawal or isolation. Nevertheless, recent actions suggest that although the Zapatista communities may alter the cooperation patterns with the outside world, they are not likely to abandon their existing networks. In turn, it is now crucial that the networks sustain their support and commitment, particularly as escalating violence complicates any outreach efforts.
Civil Society’s Role in the EZLN’s Transformation
When the Zapatistas rose in arms, the attention and sympathy the movement attracted defied all odds. Although the use of violence generally tends to decreasepublic support for social movements, the Zapatistas succeeded in mobilising crowds at home and abroad. These developments were strongly facilitated by the Zapatistas’ relationship with media and civil society. From the first days of the uprising, the EZLN made good use of the vast media coverage to disseminate its message, and started to engage extensively with the NGOs and advocacy groups arriving in Chiapas. In the words of Subcomandante Marcos: “The most important thing that we realised was that… the people were in fact really interested; in this sense, we were really lucky to meet this Mexico, with its people ready to listen and to find out what was happening with the Zapatistas.”
Several factors played a crucial role in capturing the world’s attention: the sheer scale of mobilisation, its sudden appearance, bold nature, and timing, which made it impossible to ignore. Once given a platform, the Zapatistas were very efficient in spreading the word regarding their grievances, and later on also linking their struggle to anti-globalisation and social-justice movements worldwide, thus broadening their audience.
A critical factor in gaining the sympathy of spectators was also EZLN’s commitment to avoid targeting civilians. When declaring war on the Mexican government, the group called on international organisations “to watch over and regulate” the battles, so that they are “carried out while still protecting [the] civilian population.” The EZLN also acknowledged the binding nature of applicable international laws. This had an impact on EZLN’s relation with the public. In the words of Subcomandante Marcos: “In most cases, civilians were there, in the town squares where we fought… Most of the civilian population didn’t flee in the presence of our troops.”
The relationship between the EZLN, civil society, and general public has been essential to the group’s ability to advance its agenda. Throughout the 1990s, these networks were able to pressure the government into halting offensives and engaging in negotiations. The support of the civil society aided the Zapatistas in obtaining certain concessions, instigating reforms, and exercising de facto self-governance in their territories. The government representatives met with the Zapatistas first for the Dialogues in the Cathedral, and later in San Andrés Larrainzar. The San Andrés Accords promised – inter alia – constitutional recognition of Indigenous peoples and the broadening of their political representation and participation while respecting their right to self-determination and autonomy. Although the government reneged on the implementation of the accords, the process was a success in terms of bringing the Indigenous question to nation-wide attention, and eventually resulted in the adoption of the Indigenous law – although still marred with significant shortcomings – in 2001. Albeit a fruit of a separate process, this year’s constitutional reform recognising the rights of Indigenous peoples can be seen as a step towards delayed implementation of the accords.
In the 1990s, the EZLN also organised spaces called Aguascalientes, designed for encounters and exchanges with the civil society. As a result of perceived exhaustion of the governmental process, the Aguascalientes were eventually transformed into Zapatista community centres (so-called Caracoles), and the Good Government Boards (Juntas de Buen Gobierno) were created in 2003. This process formalised the Zapatista self-governing structures which remained in place until last year, with their existence informally accepted – though not officially recognised – by the Mexican authorities.
Adapting to a Violent World
Although the civil society helped pressure the government into the aforementioned concessions, paramilitary actors and drug cartels have proven to be much less responsive to such initiatives and public opinion. As a result, the security situation in Chiapas has worsened significantly in recent years. In 2021, the EZLN stated that Chiapas was at the brink of civil war. The situation has further deteriorated since then, mainly due to the actions of various “disorganised” crime groups (as the Zapatistas call them) and territorial disputes between the Cartel de Sinaloa and Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación.
Additionally, while the Zapatista communities find themselves in the midst of gunfire, they are also directly targeted for the simple act of being Zapatista support bases. In the aftermath of serious attacks in June 2023, it was reported that since President Andrés Manuel López Obrador came to power in December 2018, the Zapatista communities suffered more than 110 attacks. The incidents continue into 2024, causing considerable damage and displacement of local residents. Most recently, in October 2024, the Zapatistas and human rights organisations warned that one of the support basis has been subjected to new threats and hostile actions by a neighbouring community, and accused the local authorities of endorsing those actions.
In November 2023, the EZLN announced major changes to the governing structure of the communities, starting with the dissolution of key organisational units: the Good Government Boards and the Zapatista Rebel Autonomous Municipalities. It also confirmed the continuous closure of the Caracoles to outsiders (in place since August 2023). As a result of these changes and pervasive insecurity, rumours started to spread regarding the possible disintegration of the movement and its growing isolation.
A few weeks later, however, the EZLN announced the creation of new organisational structures designed to bring decision-making processes closer to the communities. The goal of the reorganisation is to reinforce autonomy and enable communities to tackle local problems with local solutions. This could also imply more extensive agency in how communities deal with the insecurity they experience. Overall, however, it is important to note that these changes were not a sudden response to the latest wave of violence, but had been under negotiation for years, with first mentions of possible reorganisation already appearing in 2015. The transformation, however, grew more urgent in recent years as communities became increasingly affected by the remilitarisation and megaprojects introduced in the region, such as the Maya train.
Building Bridges in Turbulent Times
Although at the time of writing, the Caracoles remain closed to the outside world, seeing the movement as isolating or withdrawing would be a hasty conclusion. In the words of Diana Itzu Luna from Red de Resistencia y Rebeldía Ajmaq (interview from April 2024): “the Caracoles are now oriented inward, listening first to the Zapatista communities, and later they will open toward the outside with proposals for the civil society.”
It is worth noting that the new organisational structures announced in late 2023 already signalled some innovative avenues for engagement with the outside world. For example, the EZLN announced the designation of parts of the recuperated territory[i] as “non-property”, and invited non-Zapatistas to come cultivate the land. Moreover, the Zapatistas have since undertaken a series of local outreach and rapprochement activities, aiming to foster amicable relations and cooperation with non-Zapatista communities.
The international networks have not been abandoned either. Despite the security challenges, in December 2023, the EZLN invited its supporters to Chiapas for the celebration of 30 years since the uprising. On 10 October 2024, a series of meetings with the signatories of the Declaration for Life – comprising various organisations, collectives, and individuals – has been announced for late 2024 and 2025. It is thus apparent that the EZLN is keen to maintain its international ties. However, the violence has become a significant impediment to this collaboration; in light of the recent hostilities, the Zapatistas announced they may consider cancelling the scheduled events due to concerns for participants’ safety.
Civil society organisations have repeatedly warned that the region was spiralling out of control, criticised the Mexican government for its lack of active engagement in conflict resolution, and condemned the legacy of governmental actions in the region, which have led various actors to perceive violence as a useful political tool. This is where the role of civil society and external support comes into play, as more pressure needs to be mounted. The lessons of the past demonstrate the importance of alliances with civil society and the outside world more broadly. Particularly in the current context of violence, it remains essential for the movement to nurture the relations that once helped pressure the government, for the same actors can now become important allies in the struggle for protection of civilian lives. The fact that the Zapatistas refuse to re-take up arms should not be to their detriment, and as they come up with new proposals towards civil society, it will be important to listen.
Over the recent years, the Zapatistas have shown remarkable resilience and adaptability to external and internal circumstances, and even in this critical moment, they stay true to the motto “aquí estamos, aquí seguimos” (here we are, here we remain). Although reinvention is clearly the opposite of disappearance, current challenges make the future uncertain and underscore a need for action that leverages the existing networks.
[i] The long process of land recuperation started in the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution (1910-17). Prior to the revolution, only 1% of the population owned 97% of the territory. In the 1930s, the government of Lázaro Cárdenas expropriated thousands of hectares of land in Chiapas and transformed them into ejidos (communal lands where peasants could farm collectively), while also encouraging peasants to reclaim lands occupied by private estates. Some landowners accommodated the demands of their labourers by selling them small plots of inferior land and by allowing them to farm on the fringes of their property in exchange for work on their ranches and plantations a few days a week. However, the pressures on land in the 1970s and 1980s led to grave conflicts among the peasant communities as well as the peasants and the landowners, giving rise to further disputes, land invasions, and occupations. While many peasant land claims were eventually recognised by the government, the bureaucratic process was lengthy, partisan, and its success far from guaranteed. The decision of the government of Carlos Salinas de Gortari to suspend the agrarian reform in 1992 – putting an end to the hope of many farmers to ever own their land – became a decisive trigger for the armed Zapatista mobilisation.