ECMI Minorities Blog. National Minorities in Serbia’s Student Protests: Unpacking Intra- and Intergroup Dynamics

*** The blog posts are prepared by the authors in their personal capacity. The views expressed in the blog posts are the sole responsibility of the authors concerned and do not necessarily reflect the view of the European Centre for Minority Issues. ***

Authors: Ljubica Djordjević, Katinka Beretka & Jelena Mihajlov I https://doi.org/10.53779/PAVA0808

* Ljubica Djordjević is a Senior Researcher and head of the Justice and Governance cluster at the European Centre for Minority Issues, Flensburg, Germany. Being a constitutional lawyer, her main research interests focus on European and national legal frameworks, implementation of minority rights, indicators and ethnic data, institutional frameworks, as well as minority language rights. djordjevic@ecmi.de

* Katinka Beretka is associate professor at the Faculty of Law and Business Studies Dr Lazar Vrkatić in Novi Sad, Serbia, and visiting professor at the Faculty of Law of the University of Szeged, Hungary. Her research focuses primarily on national minority rights, territorial and non-territorial autonomy, and human rights in constitutional court practice. beretka.katinka@gmail.com 

* Jelena Mihajlov has an interdisciplinary academic background, having graduated in History of Art and continued with MA and doctoral studies at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade. Her research focuses on national minorities, analysing identity, interculturality, and the role of cultural institutions in shaping identities in diverse and post-conflict societies. For the past two-and-a-half years, she has been engaged in the ECMI’s “Minority Protection for EU Accession” (MPA) project in Serbia. mihajlov@ecmi.de

1 November 2024 was a tragic day in Serbia: the concrete canopy of the Novi Sad railway station collapsed, ultimately resulting in the deaths of 16 people. The shock reverberated across the country, but mourning soon turned to anger, as the station had been reopened with great pomp following renovations just the year before. The initial mourning gatherings quickly turned into massive protests for systemic change, after hooligans associated with the ruling party attacked Belgrade drama school students and professors. The situation escalated, mobilizing wider public outcry throughout Serbia with citizens demanding accountability and transparency, a resolute fight against corruption, and strict adherence to the rule of law. Not only were universities blockaded, but many schools also went on strike; attorneys, some healthcare workers, and farmers joined in with temporary work stoppages or active support of the students. Large protests with thousands of participants took to the streets. Eventually, the government collapsed, but the students’ demands were not fulfilled, and Serbia remains in a significant political crisis. Considering the turbulent and unpredictable development of affairs as well as the different phases of this crisis, this blog post covers events up until the beginning of June 2025.

The protests and demands have been civic in nature as they have addressed the core principles of democratic order and the universal values of human dignity. Whether due to the universality of the demands or the depth of democratic erosion, this time a number of Serbian citizens belonging to national minorities have not remained on the sidelines but have also spoken out. Demands centred on rule of law and anti-corruption, reflecting dissatisfaction with both mainstream and minority political leaders. While previous attempts at civic mobilization failed due to widespread perceptions of political corruption, this time students – perceived as authentic and not politically greedy – have led the charge while maintaining their distance from everyday politics and the opposition. The protests were sparked by a tragic event which resonated universally, but the first demonstrations occurred in the city of Novi Sad, in Vojvodina, where the majority of national minorities in Serbia live. Later on, minorities living in other parts of the country also joined them. This is a significant step given the segregative elements of Serbian multiculturalism and the interethnic distance between various communities. Moreover, national minorities in Serbia have traditionally been reluctant to take visible stances in broader democratic movements due to their vulnerability and the risk of scapegoating.

In almost all cases of regime change, the political impact of ethnic communities (especially of vulnerable ones) inevitably remains small because of demographic reasons; choosing the (wrong) side too early could even be fatal for a community’s political survival. Although a few international studies have documented greater political engagement among those experiencing perceived discrimination and grievances (when ethnic minorities have both a significant capacity and opportunity to mobilize for collective political action to defend their place in the society), this is not the case in Serbia. Similarly to many other layers of the Serbian population, national minorities have generally been more or less aligned with the government at the formal, institutional level, especially of the evident client politics developed in the last decade. This is not surprising, as in many places national minorities, or at least their representative institutions, are rarely in strong opposition but instead persistently negotiate with the government to secure or promote their status. It is not uncommon for an ethnic party to enter into a technical or tactical coalition with the ruling majority party to extort some concessions. In some cases, this may even be desirable behaviour in terms of the ‘ethnic’ agenda. However, the demonstrations and the reactions to them showed to what extent some majority-minority coalitions also represent ideologically-based cooperation: a “love relationship”.

The situation in Serbia is also amplified by the general centralization of political power and a tendency to downplay dissenting voices. The national minority councils – institutions of minority cultural self-governance – are proverbially mainly under governmental control, and the strongest minority political parties have also been part of government coalitions at various levels. However, the political crisis and protests have revealed that national minorities, as well as their representative institutions, are not so homogenous.

There is no unified list of officially-recognized national minorities in Serbia. In fact, those ethnic communities that have elected a national self-government are considered national minorities. According to this understanding there are 24 national minorities in Serbia with established national minority councils, with different demographic strength, degree of territorial concentration, and level of political organisation, etc. Not all have been visible to the same level in broader Serbian society.  Furthermore, some do not have standardized scripts or have not established their national symbols – certain symbols may not even be known to the members of the community themselves, which further complicates their physical visibility in the protests. Also, as in the broader society, intergroup dynamics within national minorities have not been straightforward, with both pro- and anti-government perspectives also present. These dynamics have also not been straightforward for all national minorities – a few examples are illustrative.

Amidst the protests, the Serbian president, Aleksandar Vučić, visited Kovačica, a small municipality in Vojvodina traditionally inhabited by Slovaks and known as the centre of Slovak naïve art. On this occasion, the Slovak National Minority Council presented him with a painting by a famous Slovak naïve artist, demonstrating gratitude for Serbia’s support in registering Slovak naïve art as part of UNESCO’s Intangible Cultural Heritage. The gesture sparked such turmoil within the Slovak community that the Slovak National Minority Council was not only compelled to issue a public statement to justify itself, but the painting was eventually returned to the collection. Slovak protesters also launched a samizdat newspaper Slobodný hlas ľudu (Free Voice of the People) as a form of criticism against Hlas ľudu (Voice of the People), the mainstream Slovak-language weekly newspaper overseen by the Slovak National Minority Council. Moreover, the election of the head of Matica slovenská v Srbsku (a Slovak cultural organization in Serbia) caused a considerable public stir, as an independent candidate was chosen instead of the one supported by the ruling Serbian Progressive Party.

The political crisis also amplified a sharp division among key stakeholders within the Croatian national minority. The situation was intensified by the fact that the Croatian representative held a ministerial position in the government and was criticized for failing – or not reacting strongly enough – in addressing anti-Croat rhetoric in official discourse, as will be discussed below. The Croatian National Minority Council expressed a number of critical views towards the minister, while the DSHV – the Croatian-minority party to which the minister belonged – initially responded with restraint, later showing signs of internal   fragmentation. Meanwhile, the other Croatian minority party, DZH, was notably vocal in supporting the protests and criticizing the regime, promoting the message: “What is good for all citizens of the Republic of Serbia will surely always be good for Croats as well”.

Similar polarization can be seen in the Montenegrin community as well, but from the opposite perspective: the Montenegrin National Minority Council openly supports the head of the state and the Serbian government, criticizing the protests and blockades as being contrary to democratic European values, while the Montenegrin Party calls for fundraising for students, and lined up behind those calling for early elections.

Interestingly enough, the Bosniak National Minority Council welcomed students from across Serbia to the protests in Novi Pazar, a city in southwestern Serbia (Sandžak) with a predominantly Bosniak population. This was one of the rare instances of at least indirect public support by a national minority council for the protests. While the Bosniak National Minority Council maintained a politically-neutral stance, it nevertheless demonstrated hospitality and intercultural openness, which certainly can contribute to intercultural dialogue and civic solidarity.

National minorities were visible in the civic protests in various ways, such as through banners in minority languages, minority flags, and traditional attire. Banners in minority languages (Slovak, Bulgarian, Hungarian, Ruthenian, or Vlach, to name but a few) were seen not only in minority-populated areas but also in larger cities. The messages were primarily civic (Bulgarian: “People have given you everything, and this is not enough for you”), ethnic (Hungarian: “We are with you. Vojvodina Hungarians, Subotica”) or neutral (bilingual, Hungarian and Serbian: “Together”). But at times they also addressed local   contexts (Slovak: “The girl didn’t want ducats, the girl didn’t want a castle, she wanted to have a cultural house, many didn’t want to give”; Bulgarian: “Our mayor is playing the most shameful role in his life: Selling Caribrod (Dimitrovgrad) to Pirot”) or even engaged with ethnicity in playful or ironic ways (right banner, Serbian: “Not even Vlach magic will save you”). Among the variety of flags seen at the protests (such as the Serbian state flag, religious (Christian) flags, or ethnically neutral ones such as the Ferrari flag), some minority flags (e.g., Slovak, Ruthenian, and Bosniak) were also displayed to express national identity and support without causing any particular issues. In some instances, protesters wore traditional costumes – for example, during a parade of cultural associations in Subotica, in the Novi Pazar protests, or during the symbolic “disinfection” following Vučić’s visit in Kovačica.  

Moreover, in areas traditionally inhabited by national minorities, speakers also addressed the protests in minority languages – for instance, in Hungarian in Novi Sad and Subotica, or Bosnian in Novi Pazar. Minority participation and mobilization have been present also on (minority) online portals (e.g., Storyteller (Slovak); Szabad Magyar Szó (Hungarian), or FER (Bulgarian), to name a few) as well as on social media (Facebook and Instagram). The popular Facebook and Instagram pages “Vlasi na kvadrat” (“Vlachs squared”) were particularly interesting, employing irony and a hybrid blend of Vlach, Romanian, Serbian, and local slang to explore topics from Vlach culture. These pages have actively supported the movement since the beginning of the student protests by highlighting the Vlach community’s participation via recognizable protest banners, thereby creatively enhancing the visibility of minority identities within the broader sphere of civic activism. 

While the very presence of minority support can be seen as a manifestation of interethnic solidarity, there were also powerful moments of cross-group bonding. Among the most symbolic were images from Novi Pazar, where students of both Bosniak and Serbian backgrounds demonstrated acts of unity and mutual support. Particularly striking were images of young Bosniaks draped in or waving the Serbian flag. There is also particular symbolism in the presence of an individual wearing the traditional Serbian cap, the šajkača (a cultural marker closely tied to Serbian national identity and military traditions, but also to nationalism), draped in the Serbian flag yet waving the Bosniak flag. This moment was widely commented on as an unprecedented scene.

Equally moving was the preparation of an iftar in Niš, a Serbian-majority city in southeastern Serbia, organized by local student protesters for their Muslim guests fasting during Ramadan, as well as the preparation of Lenten food for Orthodox protesters fasting for Easter in Novi Pazar. Such scenes have the potential to introduce an entirely new paradigm in majority–minority relations, producing a cathartic effect on a society still bearing the legacy of interethnic conflict.

While the regime’s response to the protests was generally ethnically neutral, there were also attempts to manipulate ethnic narratives to delegitimize the movement. Early rhetoric about Vojvodina’s alleged secessionist agenda aimed to shift public and media attention away from the protests by playing on the province’s multiethnic character. The regime even informally adopted the so-called “Declaration on Vojvodina” at a  staged counter-protest, reaffirming the province’s place within Serbia and invoking the need to protect the country’s territorial integrity. However, as the move failed to sufficiently distract from the protests, it was eventually sidelined. The Serbian president only singled out the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (SVM), its loyal coalition partner for over a decade now, to be among the representatives of the national minorities with whom he wishes to discuss the document before it goes to parliamentary procedure; even though officially, this discussion did not take place. Otherwise, according to the president of the SVM, the declaration is not directed against the Hungarians or any other minority.

Far more troubling was the targeting of Croatia and Croats, whom the regime accused of “orchestrating” the uprising from abroad. High-ranking officials – including President Vučić –made public remarks referencing a Croatian “Blockade Cookbook” (Blokadna kuharica), insinuating that the ‘colour revolution’ in Serbia had been planned in Croatia. This rhetoric escalated into blatant hate speech: the mayor of Subotica referenced “Ustaša” trying to destroy the country, and graffiti reading “Croats go home” appeared in Belgrade during a visit by students from Croatia. While the protesters condemned this incident and demonstrated against the expulsion of Croatian citizens from Serbia, the Croat minority understandably felt targeted and voiced their protest, both directly as well as through kin-state and European channels.

Another example of manipulation and hate speech affecting minorities was an article published by the pro-government tabloid Informer, which claimed that, allegedly under instructions from the opposition, numerous Romanian citizens were arriving in Serbia with the intention of breaking into the homes of citizens who had posted on social media that they would be attending an opposition protest in Belgrade. In response to this article, the Embassy of Romania in Belgrade issued a public statement condemning the hate speech and its impact on public perceptions of Romanians in Serbia, while expressing gratitude to Serbian citizens for their support and solidarity.

The regime deliberately targeted vulnerable groups, most notably the Roma community, by using their precarious socioeconomic position to secure their participation and inflate attendance figures in counter-protests, which were intended to showcase political strength of the ruling party. However, these events drew criticism for being heavily orchestrated, with reports of financial incentives and clientelist pressure. As a response, the Roma Party issued a public statement alleging that representatives of the Serbian Progressive Party employed various forms of coercion, including door-to-door visits in Roma settlements, and claimed that members of the Roma National Minority Council were also actively involved in these practices.

While the visibility of Roma voices in opposition circles remains limited, it is nonetheless present, including the Roma Party’s support for the student protests, as well as certain visual strategies used during the demonstrations such as the sign “Romi nisu ćaci.” The term “ćaci” became a symbol of these student protests, originating from a piece of graffiti reading “ћаци у школу” (a misspelling of: ђаци у школу – pupils to school). Due to the spelling mistake, it went viral and turned into a meme representing ignorance and manipulation. Within the context of the protests, “ćaci” was used as a pejorative term to describe those perceived as uncritical supporters of the regime.      

At the same time, the Roma community was also targeted by the opposition when, in response to a physical altercation in Novi Sad involving students and members of the Roma community (including a Roma minor), opposition MP Marinika Tepić stated that “several individuals, along with a few Roma” had attacked the students. This instance of collective targeting the entire Roma community was publicly criticized by the Roma National Minority Council, various Roma associations and political parties (including some generally aligned with the opposition), as well as the Ministry for Human and Minority Rights and Social Dialogue. However, pro-government media and parties particularly seized on this incident. Thus, the Speaker of the National Assembly of Serbia, Ana Brnabić, publicly condemned the incident, describing it as an act of fascism and presenting it as an ethnically-motivated attack on a Roma boy, yet simultaneously placing it fully within the context of the current polarization between protesting students and government supporters.      

The civic movement that emerged in Serbia following the tragedy in Novi Sad has demonstrated notable solidarity, including across ethnic lines. Members of national minorities have gone beyond ethnicity, voicing their civic identity and a shared interest in the common good. This shift has also been embraced by many within the majority population. While acknowledging their differences, the movement has focused on universal values and human dignity.

Although the political crisis has been marked by strong polarization within Serbian society, the dividing lines have been political rather than ethnic. Attempts to manipulate ethnicity, including instances of hate speech, have been largely condemned. While nationalism remains a powerful force, the recent wave of civic mobilization offers hope for strengthening interethnic relations and fostering an overarching civic identity in Serbia. However, realizing this potential will require concrete policies that promote stronger social integration, as well as a supportive environment, built through genuine commitment from both majority and minority communities. Minorities entered their ‘civic’ role while continuing to make their ethnicity visible. Because this is not so common, it is therefore so valuable. It provides a chance for the gradual creation and nurturing of multiple identities in a society which has historically been strongly nationalist.